


1968/9
YEAR
STAMP
RETAIN FILES AND PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
IN THEM TO REGISTRY FOR B.U. OR P.A.
PART
B.
NE Q 3/548/1
FILE NO.



Contents checked
for transfer to
D.R.O.

(Sgd.)

Date

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

DEPT.

NEAR EASTERN

FILE No. NE Q 3/548/1 (54-111)
(Part B.)

TITLE: Anglo - Iraqi Political Relations -
British Policy.

REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
Reg.		6/2	P.H.		15/4			
P.R.M.H.	54 to 58.	8/2	Reg.		1/6.			
Reg.		7/2	P.H.		14/6			
P.H.	60.	1/2	Reg.		25/6			
Reg.		10/2			26/6			
P.H.		11/2	Reg.		1/7			
Reg.		14/2	P.H.		2/7.			
P.H.		17/2	Reg.		4/7			
Registry		21/2	Reg.		21/7			
P.H.		22	P.H.	108.	21/7			
Reg.		26/2	Reg.					
P.H.	(82)	26/2						
Reg.		27/2						
P.H.		28/2						
Reg.		3/3.						
P.H.		4/3						
Reg.								
P.H.		5/3						
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
Registry Address

Room No. 115,
F.O. Building,
Downing Street

SE
N.Z.
U

YEAR STAMP

1968/9



CONFIDENTIAL

(54)

Mr. Arthur

Private Secretary

understand that Mr. Tripp has been in touch with the Home Office; and that there really is nothing we can do, because this demonstration has been exceptionally quiet and restrained.

XOBright 54 ii

Mr. Tripp
Les. See
action on
Copy.

Demonstrations outside the Iraqi Embassy

The Iraqi Ambassador rang today to thank us for the protection which the police had provided outside the Embassy yesterday. There had been no untoward incidents at all.

2. The Ambassador added that he was very concerned to read in today's "Guardian" that the Jews intended to hold prayers outside the Embassy every evening this week. He thought this was really too much. They had demonstrated outside the Embassy three times - fair enough, but could they not leave it at that? He could not keep his staff on the alert the whole time. He had had approaches from Iraqi students who were offering to defend the Embassy. He was very worried lest a member of his staff, or some Iraqi resident in London, would lose his temper with the demonstrators if this kind of thing went on and perhaps do something which everybody would regret.


3. I told the Ambassador we had no powers to stop demonstrations of this kind. All people here had a right to demonstrate so long as they were not violent. The Ambassador said that he understood this, but he repeated that thrice was enough and that prayers every day in a week would be unnecessarily provocative. He had informed Baghdad and asked them to approach H.M. Ambassador.

/4.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

4. The Jews do seem to be overdoing things as usual. Like the Ambassador, I too am a little worried about Iraqi tempers. Is there nothing the police can do to move these people on if they continue daily?




(G. G. ARTHUR)
3 February, 1969.

P.S. pl. see Baghdad tel. no. 130
just received (copy att'd).

c.c. Mr. Hayman

Mr. Tripp

Mr. L. Mayall

Pa. 
6/c

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

CYPHER/CAT A

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 108

TO BAGHDAD
4 FEBRUARY 1969
(N.E.D.)

TOP COPY

55

NEQ 3/548/1

DEDIP
SECRET

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TEL NO 108 OF 4 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO STOCKHOLM. (50)

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 130: ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

I AGREE THAT IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO APPROACH THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT
INFORMALLY. WE THEREFORE PROPOSE TO SPEAK TO THE SWEDISH EMBASSY
HERE.

2. ANY ATTEMPT TO PERSUADE THE PRESS HERE TO MODERATE THE TONE OF ITS
COMMENT ON EVENTS IN IRAQ WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE. WE DO
NOT THEREFORE PROPOSE TO TRY. UNLESS INTEREST IN IRAQ IS REVIVED BY
NEW DEVELOPMENTS, SUCH COMMENT IS ANYWAY LIKELY TO DIE DOWN
GRADUALLY.

STEWART

FILES

HD. OF NEAR EASTERN DEPT.
HD. OF CONSULAR DEPT.
HD. OF EMERGENCY UNIT
HD. OF PERSONNEL DEPT.
HD. OF E. & O. DEPT.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.U.S.
MR. HAYMAN
MR. ARTHUR

SECRET

NNNNN

R4/MW

JK

Registry No. **NE**
DEPARTMENT

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~
~~Immediate~~ }
Priority
Routine

(Date).....

De ~~atched~~

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

En Clair.
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

SECRET

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

DEDIP

BAGHDAD



Addressed to

telegram No. 108

(date)

4/2

And to

repeated for information to STOCKHOLM

Saving to.....

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 108

(Date) 12 Feb

And to:—

Repeat to:—

STOCKHOLM

Saving to:—

Distribution:—

Copies to:—

Your telegram no. 130 [of 1 February] : Anglo-Iraqi Relations.

I agree that it would be prudent to approach the Swedish Government informally. We therefore propose to ^{Speak to the} ~~discuss the question of protection with the~~ Swedish ^{Embassy} ~~Ambassador~~ here.

2. Any attempt to persuade the press here to moderate the tone of its comment on events in Iraq would be unlikely to be effective. We do not therefore propose to try. Unless interest in Iraq is revived by new developments, such comment is anyway likely to die down gradually.


NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

31
4/2
15452
4/2/69

9.8
4.2.

Pa
PMM
6/2

SECRET



56

Mr. Arthur

As agreed, I cleared this with Consular Dept
(Emergency Planning). J.P.C.
24.2

2. Private Secretary a.a.

Anglo-Iraqi Relations

Problem

H.M. Ambassador at Baghdad has recommended that, in view of the possibility that the Iraq Government might in certain circumstances break off relations with H.M.G., we should ask the Swedes, who served as protecting power during the recent break in relations, whether they would agree to protect our interests again if needed. (Baghdad telegram No. 130) The source of Mr. Evans's worry is Iraqi resentment at the tone of British press comment on recent events in Iraq. Should we :-

- (a) Make an approach to the Swedish Government?
- (b) Use such influence as we may have to secure some moderation in the tone of comment in the British press?

Recommendation

2. I recommend that an approach be made to the Swedish Embassy in London by Mr. Arthur on the lines suggested by Mr. Evans. I further recommend that we should take no action vis-à-vis the British press. I submit a draft telegram to Baghdad. W.E. Department and News Department concur.

Argument and Background

3. Neither Mr. Evans (vide paragraph 3 of his telegram) nor I think that a breach of relations is, on present form,

/likely. ...

SECRET

B & C

likely. On the whole, as Mr. Evans has reported elsewhere (e.g. in his telegrams Nos. 115 and 136) the signs are that the Iraqis are recovering from their first spasm of irrational anger and resentment. But Mr. Evans's advice is that we should be prepared for the worst, largely in order to ensure the protection of the British community in Iraq; if a break were to come, it might come quickly.

4. This argument is persuasive and I therefore agree that it would be right to approach the Swedes. But I think it would be wrong to give them the impression that we think a break is imminent. Mr. Evans only recommends a "very tentative sounding". In these circumstances, I suggest that it would be better for Mr. Arthur to speak to the Swedish Ambassador in London than for us to instruct H.M. Embassy at Stockholm to speak to the Swedes there. To do this could result in the Swedes getting the impression that we regard the situation as more serious than we do.

5. The second issue raised by Mr. Evans's telegram No. 130 is whether we should try to use our influence with the British press to try to secure a moderation of the tone of its comment on events in Iraq (which lies at the root of the Iraqi resentment). Nothing would be achieved by any such efforts. If there are no more public executions in Iraq, comment is likely anyway to die down gradually (as is already happening). If there are new executions, no amount of F.C.O. pressure would (or indeed should) prevent the press from

/commenting ...

SECRET

commenting on them. Nor is it altogether unhelpful for the Arabs in London to become aware how damaging to their own cause extreme actions of this kind can be. I suggest, therefore, that we should do nothing about the press.

J. P. Tripp

(J. P. Tripp)
Near Eastern Dept.
4 February 1969

c.c. News Dept.

W.E. Dept.

*PM
8/2*

SECRET

TOP COPY

(57)

CONFIDENTIAL

NEQ 3/548/1

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 111

TO BAGHDAD

4 FEBRUARY 1969

(N.E.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL

MY TELEGRAMS NOS. 75, 80 AND 104: DEMONSTRATIONS AT IRAQI EMBASSY. ON 3 FEBRUARY THE IRAQI AMBASSADOR THANKED ARTHUR ON THE TELEPHONE FOR THE PROTECTION WHICH THE POLICE HAD AFFORDED ON 2 FEBRUARY. 2. THE AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO EXPRESS HIS CONCERN OVER A REPORT IN THE GUARDIAN OF 3 FEBRUARY ABOUT THE INTENTION OF GROUPS OF JEWS TO HOLD PRAYER MEETINGS OUTSIDE HIS EMBASSY EVERY EVENING THIS WEEK. ARTHUR REPEATED TO THE AMBASSADOR THAT WE HAD NO POWERS TO STOP DEMONSTRATIONS OF THIS KIND. THE AMBASSADOR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THIS, BUT HE WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE PROSPECT AND WAS ASKING THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY IN BAGHDAD TO APPROACH YOU ON THE SUBJECT. 3. A SMALL PRAYER MEETING WAS HELD BY ABOUT TWENTY PEOPLE OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY LAST NIGHT. NO INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE. THE AMBASSADOR HAS NOT COMPLAINED AGAIN: HE SEEMED QUITE CHEERFUL WHEN ARTHUR SAW HIM LAST NIGHT.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

NEAR EASTERN DEPT.
PROTOCOL & CONFERENCE DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

NNNNN

19 PMW
6/2

Registry No. **E**
DEPARTMENT **H**

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

To ~~SECRET~~
Secret
Confidential
Restricted
Unclassified

~~SECRET~~
CONFIDENTIAL
Priority
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(Date).....

Despatched.....

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~En Clair.~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]


Addressed to [BAGHDAD]

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:—

No. 111

(Date) 4/2

And to:—

Repeat to:—

when a
demonstration
of Jews protested
Saving to:
bag at the
Soviet and
Iraqi Embassies

Departmental
Distribution:—
NED,
Protocol &
Conf. Dept.

Copies to:—

My telegrams No. 75, ~~77~~ 80. and ~~100~~ 104:
Demonstrations at Iraqi Embassy.

On 3 February, the Iraqi Ambassador thanked
Arthur on the telephone for the protection which
the police had afforded ~~his Embassy~~ on 2 February.

2. The Ambassador went on, ~~however~~, to express
his concern over a report in the Guardian of
3 February about the intention of groups of Jews
to hold prayer meetings outside his Embassy every
evening this week. Arthur ^{repeated to} ~~told~~ the Ambassador
that we had no powers to stop demonstrations of
this kind. The Ambassador said he understood
this, ^{but} ~~he~~ ^{added that} he was worried about the
prospect and ^{that he had asked} ~~the Ministry of~~
Foreign Affairs in Baghdad to approach you on the
subject.

3. A small prayer meeting was held by about

/twenty...

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

17152
4/2/69

CONFIDENTIAL

people outside the Embassy last night. No incidents took place. ~~We have decided that there is no justification for us to ask the police to take action against participants e.g. by moving them on. But we shall review the position tomorrow, when we know whether or not a second meeting has taken place.~~

→ The Ambassador has not complained again : he seemed quite cheerful when Arthur ~~spoke~~ saw him last night

Departmental Distr

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIALMr. ArthurDemonstrations outside the Iraqi Embassy

A The Private Office telephoned us to ask that we should deal with the question in your minute of 3 February to the Private Secretary, about whether the police might move on the groups of Jews who, according to a report in the "Guardian", intended to hold prayer meetings outside the Iraqi Embassy every evening this week.

2. We consulted Protocol and Conference Department and asked the Home Office whether there was anything which might be done. The Home Office said that the police would be most reluctant to interfere with the prayer meetings; they would only be ready to take action if we could make out a very strong case for their taking exceptional measures. Protocol and Conference Department pointed out the risk of police action actually provoking a breach of the peace and the danger of setting a precedent which could be invoked by other Embassies.

3. The Home Office say that their information was that about twenty people held a prayer meeting outside the Embassy last night. It is therefore likely that, as forecast in the "Guardian", such peaceful meetings will be held on the remaining evenings of this week. This might provoke the Iraqi Ambassador to ordering or authorising some kind of provocative action against the demonstrators or to suggest to his Government that a counter-demonstration (no doubt of a less peaceful kind) should be organised against the British Embassy in Baghdad, but he would be unreasonable to do so.

4. For the moment, I think that these risks should be accepted in the light of Home Office advice. I suggest, however, that we should review the situation again tomorrow. If there is a further prayer meeting this evening, there may be a case for asking the police to intervene (especially if the Iraqi Ambassador should make a further complaint).

5. Meanwhile, I think that we should inform Mr. Evans of this development. I submit a draft telegram to Baghdad accordingly.

c.c. Private Secretary
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Mayall

J.P. Tripp
(J.P. Tripp)
4 February, 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ The



The Iraqi Ambassador told me last night at
the UAR Embassy that there had been no
protests outside the Embassy. He seemed quite
cheerful. I do not think we should do
anything unless he makes another fuss: I see
the Home Office's point. I have amended the
let. to Baghdad.

6
Lg
2

Th. Tappin

JR 4.2.

PM MM
6/2

TOP COPY

(59)

NEL 3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 113

TO BAGHDAD

5 FEBRUARY 1969

(N. EAST. D.)

CONFIDENTIAL

[OF 4 FEBRUARY]

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 143:/ EMERGENCY PLANNING.

THE MOST UP-TO-DATE SERVICES PLAN WE HAVE IS ONE LAST REVISED
IN 1966. THIS PLAN IS NO LONGER APPLICABLE, BUT IN CASE YOU FIND
IT OF USE A COPY WILL BE SENT BY THE NEXT BAG.

STEWART

F I L E S

N. EAST. DEPT.

P.U.S.D.

CONSULAR DEPT.

DEF. POL. DEPT.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No. **E**
DEPARTMENT N

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

Top Secret
Secret
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
Unclassified

Flash
Immediate }
Priority
Routine

(Date) 5/2/69

Despatched

2128

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~En Clair.~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

[BAGHDAD]


telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:—

Baghdad

No. 113

(Date) 5/2/69

And to:—

5/2

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Distribution:—
Departmental
N.E.D.,
Consular Dept.
Defence Policy
Dept., P.U.S.D.

Copies to:—

Your telegram No. 143 [of 4 February]:

Emergency Planning.

The most up-to-date services plan we have is
one last revised in 1966. This plan is no
longer applicable, but in case you find it of
use a copy will be sent by the next bag.

PMH
MED.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

15202
5/2/69

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
- 6 FEB 1969
NEQ 3/648/1

60

Mr. Tripp

Demonstrations outside the Iraqi

Embassy

I refer to your minute addressed to Mr. Arthur and dated 4 February and in particular to paragraph 4.

2. I have just heard from the Home Office that a demonstration very similar to one which was held on Monday night took place outside the Iraqi Embassy last night. About 12 to 20 people took part, prayers were recited and the whole proceedings was very orderly. I understand that the small group of people carried out their demonstration at a safe distance from the Embassy building. According to the Home Office similar demonstrations are expected every evening during the remainder of this week.

PRM Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
5 February, 1969.

I think we can let this one lie - unless there is anything untoward at to-night's 'vigil' or subsequent vigils.

CONFIDENTIAL

J.P. [Signature]
5.2

Mr. Arthur

Yes. 6 5/2.

pa PLMWA 7/2

Baghdad, 29 January, 1969.

61

My dear Trevor,

May I once more thank you very much for the exquisite luncheon you arranged for Be Johnson, Mrs. Johnson, myself and a number of common friends on 18 December, 1968, and for your extremely kind words upon the presentation of the gifts from the British Government and British friends in Baghdad, in appreciation of what we were able to do during the period of protection of the British interests in Iraq 1967-68.

I would like to ask you kindly to convey to Her Britannic Majesty's Government my most sincere gratitude for the beautiful silver tray with inscription, handed over to me on this occasion. I will always treasure it as a pleasant remembrance of the very stimulating direct or indirect co-operation I had with the Foreign Office in London, the British Embassies in Stockholm, Beirut and Teheran and all friends and other members of the British community in Iraq during almost a year.

Yours sincerely,


Henry

Henry Othman

H.E. Mr. Trevor A. Evans.

Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador.

Baghdad.



FOLIO (62)

TRANSFERRED
TO NEQ 18 1/2.



(63)

70 WHITEHALL SW1

XXXXXXXXXX

930-5422

Mr. Gaster

5th February

Mr. Piers

RE.	ED IN
ARGO	No. 15
NEQ 3/548/1	

Dear Miss Walker,

I enclose a copy of a telegram which Mrs. Hart has received from Rachel Adiv, who is a leading member of the Israel Labour Party.

I would be grateful if you could provide a draft reply for Mrs. Hart to send to Rachel Adiv.

Yours sincerely,

M. Sidgreaves

(Mrs. M. Sidgreaves)
Private Secretary

Miss M. W. Walker,
Private Secretary to the Secretary of State
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs,
Downing Street,
S. W. 1.

NNNN


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TELAV IVYAFO (59) 2 2000

FE 3

24 35

LHS 0002



RT HON JUDITH HART M P
HOUSE OF COMMONS LONDON

WE HALF MILLION WOMEN ORGANIZED IN GENERAL FEDERATION OF
LABOUR EXPRESS DEEP SHOCK GRIEF AND RESENTMENT OF BARBARISM
OF IRAQ RULERS FOR PUBLIC HANGING OF JEWS STOP REQUEST YOUR
ASSISTANCE PREVENT SIMILAR CRIMES STOP JOIN US IN DEMAND TO
PERMIT JEWS TO LEAVE BRUTAL IRAQ

BABA IDELSON, RACHEL ADIV

COL RT M P

To send Telegrams—CONSULT TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD

POST OFFICE
OVERSEAS TELEGRAM

CONSULT TELEPHONE
TELEX DIALING CARD

POST OFFICE
OVERSEAS TELEGRAM

To send Telegrams—CONSULT TELEPHONE
DIRECTORY OR TELEX DIALING CARD

POST
OVERSEAS

✓
Let's hope we
don't have to
produce another
silver tray in due
course.



Mr. T. J. P.

Mr. Fincham

PLW.

R.E.
6.2.
MUM 7/2 6 1/2

With the compliments of

HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S
AMBASSADOR

Reference my letter 25/2 of
18 December 1968 to Moore.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15

10 FEB 1969

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

NEQ 3/548/1

R.M. Evans, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

(64)

CONFIDENTIAL

Cypher/Cat A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

NEQ 13/1
Copy for
NEQ 3/548/1

Telno. 161

6 February, 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Addressed to FCO telegram No. 161 of 6 February. Repeated for information to Beirut.

My telegram No. 144: Alleged British Involvement in the Iraqi Spy Trials.

In an interview on Baghdad television last night, a person described as Director General of Press is reported to have alleged that the spies, apparently those recently executed, had been given their radio by the British Consulate in Basra and that a certain Naim (Consulate's translator was of this name) had acted as go between. He also spoke of events in Baghdad in 1948 which resulted in death of a number of students and implied that H.M. Ambassador had been responsible.

2. I saw Director General of Political Affairs at MFA this morning and told him that, if reports were true, the matter was serious. Allegations were not only obviously unfounded, but were, in present circumstances, inflammatory. I had not seen programme myself and therefore asked him to obtain a transcript. I assumed that if they were confirmed, statements did not reflect attitude of Iraqi Government and asked him to bring matter to attention of Minister of Foreign Affairs so that instructions could be given to those responsible to ensure that there was no repetition. I recalled that, as reported in my telegram under reference, Minister had complained that B.B.C.'s Arabic Service was paying too much attention to Iraq and suggested that statements such as those attributed to Director General of Press were bound to invite further comment.

3. Director General said he had not seen the programme, but would refer matter to his Minister.

/He was otherwise

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

He was otherwise non committal, and I suspect that he had some knowledge of the business. He told me that he would let me have an answer.

FCO pass Priority to Beirut.

Mr. Evans.

/ Repeated as requested /

FCO DISTRIBUTION

Near Eastern Dept.

XXXXXX

CONFIDENTIAL



65

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

CYPHER/CAT~A~

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 162

DATED 6 FEBRUARY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

NE

YOUR TEL NO 75.

WE HAVE HEARD A RUMOUR THAT BODY OF AN IRAQI STUDENT KILLED IN DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST IRAQI EMBASSY IN LONDON IS BEING RETURNED TO BAGHDAD BY AIR TONIGHT. MAN IS SAID TO BE AN ENGINEERING STUDENT MARRIED TO A BRITISH WOMAN.

2. GRATEFUL FOR ANY INFORMATION. I SUPPOSE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT MAN WHO WAS STABBED REFERRED TO IN YOUR TEL UNDER REFERENCE WAS AN IRAQI, BUT IF SO IRAQI AMBASSADOR WOULD PRESUMABLY HAVE PROTESTED.

3. A FULLER ACCOUNT OF THE FLAG INCIDENT WOULD BE USEFUL TO COUNTER MISAPPREHENSION HERE.

MR. EVANS

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

N. EAST. DEPT.
ARABIAN DEPT.
NEWS DEPT.
N. AFRI. DEPT.
U.N. DEPT.
P.U.S.D.

FFFFF

CONFIDENTIAL

TOP COPY

66

NEQ 3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT.A.

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO NO 130

TO BAGHDAD

7 FEB 1969. (NE)

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 162: DEMONSTRATIONS.

NO STUDENT WAS KILLED IN THE DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST THE IRAQI EMBASSY. THERE IS THEREFORE NO TRUTH IN THE RUMOUR REPORTED IN PARA 1 OF YOUR TELEGRAM.

2. YOUR PARAGRAPH 3. AT THE HEIGHT OF THE DEMONSTRATION (DESCRIBED IN MY TELEGRAM NO. 75) A LARGE ISRAELI FLAG APPEARED ON A HOUSE NEXT TO THE IRAQI EMBASSY. HALF-AN-HOUR LATER TWO ISRAELI FLAGS WERE HUNG FROM THE ROOFS OF THE EMBASSY BUILDINGS ITSELF (NOS. 21 AND 22 QUEENS GATE). VERY SOON AFTER FOUR BANGS SOUNDING LIKE GUN SHOTS WERE HEARD. IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS THE FLAGS DISAPPEARED.

3. FIVE MINUTES LATER A MAN, LATER IDENTIFIED AS A JEW, WAS FOUND LYING INJURED, APPARENTLY STABBED BY ONE OF THEM. THIS HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE MAN CONCERNED (WHO WAS NOT SERIOUSLY INJURED).

4. THIS INCIDENT WAS FOLLOWED BY AN ATTEMPT BY THE CROWD TO RUSH THE BUILDINGS AND IN THE COURSE OF THE ENSUING FRACAS A WINDOW WAS BROKEN. THE CROWD, AFTER THE ARRIVAL OF POLICE REINFORCEMENT, DISPERSED TWO HOURS AFTER THE STABBING INCIDENT.

STEWART

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION:

N.EASTERN D.
NEWS D.
U.N.D.
P.U.S.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.
DEPARTMENT **NE**

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should reach addressee(s).....

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~TOP SECRET~~
~~SECRET~~
Confidential
~~Restricted~~
Unclassified

~~FILE~~
Investigation }
Priority
~~Return~~

(Date).....

Despatched.....

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

~~No Confidentiality~~

~~Ex Clr.~~
~~Gordex~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to **BAGHDAD**

telegram No..... (date).....

And to.....

repeated for information to.....

Saving to.....

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
10 FEB 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. **130**

(Date) **7/2**

And to:—

Repeat to:—

Saving to:—

Your telegram No. 162 [of 6 February]:

Demonstrations.

No student was killed in the demonstrations against the Iraqi Embassy. There is therefore no truth in the rumour reported in paragraph 1 of your telegram.

2. Your paragraph 3. At the height of the demonstration (described in my telegram No. 75) a large Israeli flag appeared on a house next to the Iraqi Embassy. Half-an-hour later two Israeli flags were hung from the roofs of the Embassy buildings itself (Nos. 21 and 22 Queens Gate). Very soon after four bangs sounding like gun shots were heard. Immediately afterwards the flags disappeared.

3. Five minutes later a man, later identified as a Jew, was found lying injured, apparently

/stabbed....

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PUSD

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17252
7/19/69

stabbed by one of them. This has been confirmed by the man concerned (who was not seriously injured).

4. This incident was followed by an attempt by the crowd to rush the building and in the course of the ensuing fracas a window was broken. The crowd, after the arrival of police reinforcement, dispersed two hours after the stabbing incident.

72

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Folio (67)

SEE Folio

(38)



Mr. Godden ✓


Handwritten signature 5/2

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 2 13 1969 NEG 3/548/1

--- I attach a draft letter which Lord Shepherd may wish to use as a reply to Mr. Wolrige-Gordon M.P.

Handwritten signature: P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Department
4 February, 1969.



Mr. Godden

I suggest that the second paragraph should now read :

"The latest information that we have about Dr. Bazzaz is that he is under arrest and is likely to face formal charges of conspiracy and espionage in the near future."

(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Dept.
7 February 1969

EQ 3/548/1



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

10 February, 1969.

From The Minister of State

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has asked me to reply to your letter of 28 January about Dr. Bazzaz.

The latest information that we have about Dr. Bazzaz is that he is under arrest and is likely to face formal charges of conspiracy and espionage in the near future.

You may have heard Mr. Stewart's reply to a question from Mr. Shinwell in the House of Commons on the 30 January in which he stated that urgent consideration was being given as to what action we could take on humanitarian grounds to help those still awaiting trial in Baghdad. As you know informal representations made to the Iraqi Government at the time of the trials in early January were not effective.

Anti-British feelings continue to run high in Iraq because of the understandably highly critical attitude of the British press and because the Iraqis apparently feel that our statement made on the 28 January and referred to by the Secretary of State when replying to Mr. Shinwell in the House, was an unwarranted interference in their affairs. Thus there is a very real danger that any new approach made by HMG on behalf of Dr. Bazzaz or indeed on behalf of any other Iraqi in a similar position, would be regarded by the Iraqi Government as further interference in its internal affairs and could lead to a hardening of its attitude towards those remaining in custody.

P. WOLRIGE-GORDON, ESQ., MP.



I share your concern about recent developments in Iraq and I will continue to watch the situation very closely. Meanwhile no opportunity will be neglected of doing anything which stands a real chance of helping Dr. Bazzaz and those others still awaiting trial, taking into consideration the limitations imposed by the circumstances described in the preceding paragraph.

(SHEPHERD)

DRAFT LETTER

To: P. Wolrige ^{ES}
Gordon M.P.,
House of Commons,
S.W.1.

From: Lord Shepherd

The Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary
has asked me to
Dr. Bazzaz

(36) I am replying to your letter of
28 January which ^{about Dr. Bazzaz} you had addressed to the
~~Secretary of State.~~

If I am sorry that
~~We have no very recent information on~~
Dr. Bazzaz. He was arrested in December
apparently in connexion with the recent
spy trials. It is thought that he may still
be in prison or under house arrest but this
has not been confirmed. Despite press
reports there is no definite evidence that
any charges have been preferred against
him as yet.

You may have heard ^{Mr. Shinwell} ~~the Secretary of~~
~~State's~~ reply to a question from Mr.
Shinwell in the House of Commons on the
30th of January in which he stated that
urgent consideration was being given as to
what action we could take on humanitarian
grounds to help those still awaiting trial
in Baghdad. As you know informal
representations made to the Iraqi Government
at the time of the trials in early January
were not effective.

Anti-British feelings continue to run
high in Iraq because of the understandably
highly critical attitude of the British
press and because the Iraqis apparently
feel that our statement made on the 28th of
January and referred to by the Secretary of
State when replying to Mr. Shinwell in the

/House.....

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

House, was an unwarranted interference in their affairs. Thus there is a very real danger that any new approach made by H.M.G. on behalf of Dr. Bazzaz ~~should it be confirmed that he is in fact under arrest~~ or indeed on behalf of any other Iraqi in a similar position, would be regarded by the Iraqi Government as further interference in its internal affairs and could lead to a hardening of its attitude towards those remaining in custody.

I share your concern about recent developments in Iraq and I will continue to watch the situation very closely.

~~In the~~ Meanwhile no opportunity will be neglected of doing anything ~~which in my judgment~~ stands a real chance of helping Dr. Bazzaz and those others still awaiting trial, taking into consideration the limitations imposed by the circumstances described in ^{the preceding} ~~my fourth paragraph of this~~ letter.

5/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

71



RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
12 FEB 1969
NEQ 3/548/1

Mr. Miers

I attach a draft letter which the Minister of State may wish to recommend to Mrs. Judith Hart as being a suitable reply for despatch to Rachel Adiv.

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
Near Eastern Department
10 February, 1969.

11 February, 1969.

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

63
I am replying to your letter
of 5 February to Mary Walker in which
you asked for a draft reply which
Mrs. Hart could send in reply to
a telegram she had received from
Rachel Adiv.

--- I enclose a draft herewith.

(H.D.A.C. Miers)
Private Secretary to Minister
of State, Mr. Roberts

Mrs. M. Sidgreaves,
Private Secretary to
the Paymaster General,
70 Whitehall,
S.W.1.

Reg - ra
the form

PNMM

11/2.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

DRAFT LETTER TO:

Rachel Adiv.

FROM:

Mrs. Judith Hart

Thank you for your telegram concerning the recent executions in Iraq.

As you will no doubt have heard by now, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has expressed his horror at the executions and has regretted that an informal approach made to the Iraqi Government on humanitarian grounds at the time of the trials was not successful. He has also made it clear in the House of Commons that, as none of those involved in the trials, whether Christians, Jews, or Moslems, were

/British

British subjects, the Government had no locus standi in the matter, and was therefore unable to make a formal intervention.

I would like to assure you that the Government will continue to pursue any action which would have a real chance of helping those still under arrest in Iraq, and in a wider context strive to improve the lot of religious minorities in those countries in the Middle East where they face intolerance and persecution.

DRAFT LETTER

To: Rachel Adiv

From: Mrs. Judith Hart

Thank you for your telegram concerning the recent executions in Iraq.

As you will no doubt have heard by now, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary has ^{EXPRESSED} ~~showed~~ his horror at the executions and has regretted that an informal approach made to the Iraqi Government on humanitarian grounds at the time of the trials was not successful. He has also made it clear in the House of Commons that ^{and therefore} ~~the Government was~~ unable to make a formal intervention, as none of those involved in the trials, ^{whether} Christians, Jews, or Moslems, were British subjects, ~~therefore~~ the Government had no locus standi in the matter,

I would like to assure you that the Government will continue to pursue any action which could have a real chance ^{of} ~~to~~ helping those still under arrest in Iraq, and in a wider context strive to improve the lot of religious minorities in those countries in the Middle East where they face intolerance and persecution.

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr T with 512.2
Mr Acland 11/2

then enter
PMMH 11/2.

in Blallock (to see)
Com in Dept
Dear Donald,

Send you
8/14
8/11



BRITISH EMBASSY,
BAGHDAD.

5 February 1969

Demonstrations outside the
British Embassy, Baghdad

You may like to have the enclosed
account by Donald Hawley of the events
of 29 January.

Yours ever,
P. McKearney

(P. McKearney)

D. J. Makinson, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

The Demonstration Against the Embassy
on 29 January 1969

Demonstrators numbering several thousand demonstrated outside the Embassy on the morning of 29 January from approximately 9.00 a.m. until 1.00 p.m. By 12.30 the crowds had begun to thin out, but it was not until 2.00 p.m. that the local commander of the forces responsible for our protection said that it was all clear for staff to leave after he had obtained the authority of the Ministry of Defence. Clarification took a further time and in the event staff, other than local staff who left by launch at 1.00 p.m., left by car at about 100 yard intervals between 2.30 and 2.45 p.m. There were no incidents at this stage and traffic was running normally on the Embassy side of the river.

2. Crowds began to form immediately after the arrival of the U.K. based staff at about 9.00 a.m. By this time it was too late to send any of the staff away. The crowd built up fairly quickly and consisted at first mainly of students. Organised workers, brought in lorries then joined them. The slogans shouted were "We do not want your Embassy", "The British are not friends of the Arabs" and "Shut the Embassy". They also, I think, shouted familiar slogans about imperialism. The crowd were able to make a very loud noise but they seemed to be well under control for the most part.

3. At one stage we were concerned that some members of the crowd might effect an entrance through the Consulate door and one or two stray demonstrators did get in. One attempted to set Mr. Hamilton's car on fire.

4. At about 10.30 we were informed that a delegation wished to present a petition. Instructions were then given that they should be admitted and they were permitted to enter the compound by the security forces without consultation with us. About seven of them came and were received outside the Chancery by D.A., Mr. Saunders and myself. I offered to shake hands with the leader. After a moment's hesitation he refused. He then made a short speech complaining that Britain had protested about the hangings in Baghdad but were silent about the infinitely greater crimes of the Zionists. They then handed me a petition, ^(Baghdad telno 104) ~~copy attached~~. The delegation were comparatively responsible looking people, perhaps teachers, who were in their late twenties or early thirties. As they were going away they mentioned to one of the local staff that the flag was a provocation. A C.I.D. man also told the same story ~~(above)~~ to a local member of the staff who passed it on. We attempted to make contact with the Commander of the Security Force about this but were unable to do so; the Chief of Protocol /whom

whom I rang likewise had no advice. After consulting D.A., Messrs. Saunders and McNaught and then H.E. who telephoned from outside at this time I decided that, as there was lull in the chanting and it did not appear that we were acting under duress the flag should be lowered. We particularly had in mind the events at the Iraqi Embassy in London on the previous day and considered that the safety of the Staff including all the home-based and locally engaged girls was a paramount consideration.

5. The Embassy was protected by a considerable force of Police, Traffic Emergency police and Military Police. There were two Saracens at the gates. Good liaison was established with the Commanders of the protection forces, but they advised members of the staff to keep away from the main gate. The Security forces comprised about 100 Army and 100 Police at their maximum.

6. At one stage of the morning, two Iraqi flags were placed by demonstrators on the gate posts and a slogan reading "Iraq rejects British interference in internal affairs" was stuck on the wall by the gate. A considerable amount of stone throwing took place over the side wall, but did not last for long and no harm was done. One stone was thrown at the D.A. and Mr. Saunders, when they were near the front gate.

7. Local staff behaved very calmly for the most part. Mr. Albert Ghassaly was notably helpful and several others, including Ali Namal, did very well in dealing with infiltrators.

D. F. Hawley

(D. F. Hawley)
4 February 1969

EN CLAIR

TOP COPY


~~74~~ 74

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 176

12 FEBRUARY, 1969

UNCLASSIFIED



copy

ADDSD TO FCO TELNO 176 OF 12 FEB
RPTD FOR INFO TO BEIRUT.

YOUR TELNO 117 - No Ref.

RESIDENCE. YOU WILL BE GLAD TO KNOW THAT WE MOVED IN ON 2 FEBRUARY.
OWING TO DELAY IN ENGROSSMENT AND TO THE ABSENCE OF THE COMPANYS
CHIEF LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE, THE LEASE WAS SIGNED ONLY ON 10 FEBRUARY

2. MFA NOTE NOW RECEIVED, COPY FOLLOWS BY BAG

MR. EVANS

FILES

ACCOMMODATION DEPT.

per PPM 17/2

75

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

ROUTINE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 151

TO BAGHDAD
14 FEBRUARY 1969 (NE)

TOP COPY

NEQ 3/548/1

SECRET.

55

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELNO 151 OF 14 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR
INFORMATION TO STOCKHOLM.

MY TEL. 138: ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

SWEDISH EMBASSY HAVE NOW CONFIRMED WILLINGNESS TO LOOK AFTER OUR
INTERESTS IN THE EVENT OF A BREAK ALTHOUGH THEY ARE SHORT OF STAFF.

2. THEY MENTIONED HOWEVER IN VIEW OF THE OUTSPOKEN ATTITUDE
OF THE SWEDISH GOVERNMENT ON THE EXECUTIONS THAT THEY MIGHT NOT
PROVE ACCEPTABLE TO THE IRAQIS. NO DOUBT THEY ALSO HAVE IN MIND
THE RECENT TREATMENT BY THE IRAQIS OF THE DANISH CHARGE.

STEWART.

F I L E S:

N.EASTERN D%
HD.N.EASTERN D.
HD.W.EUR.D.
HD. CONSULAR D.
HD. EMERGENCY UNIT
HD. PERSONNEL D.
PRIVATE SECRETARY
P.U.S.
MR. HAYMAN
MR. ARTHUR
HD. E.& O.D.

SECRET

Registry No.
DEPARTMENT

N E

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

(N.E.D.)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

~~Flash~~
~~Immediate~~
~~Priority~~
~~Routine~~

(Date)

Dispatched

15/1
0123
CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

~~By Glair.~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Security classification
—if any]

SECRET

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to

BAGHDAD

telegram No.

(date)

14 February

And to

repeated for information to

STOCKHOLM

Saving to

Your tel 130 of 1 February and My tel. 108

of 4 February: Anglo-Iraqi relations.

Swedish Embassy have now confirmed ~~agreed~~ willingness to look
Swedes have agreed to act for us in event of
after our interests in the event of a
break, although they are short of staff.

2. They mentioned ^{however} in view of their outspoken

^{of the Swedish Government} attitude on the executions that they might not be ^{prove}
acceptable to the Iraqis. ~~I imagine that they had~~ ^{No doubt they have also have}
in mind the recent treatment by the Iraqis of the
Danish Chargé d'Affaires.

Distribution: FILES

Head of N.E.D.
Head of W.E.D.
Head of Consular Dept.
Head of Emergency
Unit
Head of Personnel Dept.
~~Private Secretary~~
P.U.S.
Mr. Hayman
Mr. Arthur
Head E.L.O. Dept.

14
2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Draft Telegram to:

BAGHDAD

No.

151

(Date)

14/2

And to:

Repeat to:

Stockholm

Saving to:

12302
14/2/69

British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15

20 FEB 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

11 February, 1969.

Dear Hinchcliffe,

Iraqi Student (Deceased)

Thank you for your telegram No. 130 of 7 February about the demonstrations in London and in particular about the student.

2. You will wish to know that there was in fact a student whose body was returned to Baghdad by air from London on 6 February. According to the press, he was Shamil Shakir al-Abdi, the son of a railway worker. He was studying engineering and was described in his obituary as being the President of the Iraqi Students Union in Exeter, where he was expected to complete his studies within the next three months.

4. The rumour that he was killed in the demonstration is not spelt out in the press report though the implication is there if the reader wishes to interpret it that way. The literal translation of what was published is that Shamil's life came to an end after he played an eternal part in the resistance to the Zionist demonstrations against the Iraqi Embassy in London.

5. I have not heard any more of the story since he was buried the day after his body was taken to the house of his father in Baghdad. We thought that the funeral might give rise to further demonstrations against the Embassy, but in the event the coffin was taken a very short distance to the Baghdad railway station and sent either to Najif (if he was Sunni) or Kerbala (if he was Shia). In fact I think he was a Sunni. For the moment the story is cold, but it could no doubt be resuscitated by those who do not wish us well when the next opportunity offers itself.

Yours etc.

Dorrie Saunders.

(A. E. Saunders)

P. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

Welcome to the
Iraqi desk -
and Good Luck.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No. 15 20 FEB 1966 NEQ 3/548/1
--

Minutes

(77)

Mr Adlard

IRAQI STUDENT (DECEASED)

I have had several thoughts since
reading Mr Saunders' letter.

2. Another rumour was circulating in
Baghdad and as it broke out
in the Iraqi newspapers with the
information that Shamil Shakin
was killed in a demonstration outside
the Iraqi Embassy here there may
be a case for informing the
Iraqi Ambassador and asking him
to tell his masters at home that
no such ~~incidental~~ fatality occurred during
the demonstration.
This might avert our future attempts
to use this cowardly timed death
against us in the future.

3. There is also a case for allowing
sleeping dogs to lie. I defer to
Your judgement on this one.

PMH:HH:llb
14/2

I think that if the Iraqis had
been going to use this, they would
have done so by now. They must
know that we have evidence which
would disprove their allegations
— and to make a great fuss
several days or weeks after the
event would look almost
ridiculous.

If one saw the Iraqi Ambassador
frequently on other matters, I
would

would see no objection to
 slipping this point into a
 general conversation. But
 I think it would be wrong
 (also some time after the
 event) to make a separate
 issue.

So all in all, "let
 sleeping dogs...."

~~AM~~ $\frac{15}{2}$

in Hinchcliffe. ~~19/2~~

Regis. Ent & r.a.

PMH

19/2

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

78

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CYPHER/CAT A
PRIORITY BAGHDAD

Copy to NEQ 10/25/1
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH
OFFICE

19 FEBRUARY 1969

RECEIVED ARCHIVES No. 15 21 NEQ 3/548/1
--

TELEGRAM NUMBER 206

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NUMBER 206
OF 19 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN
JEDDA AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI ALGIERS TUNIS KHARTOUM BEIRUT RABAT
KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

NEQ 10/25/1

MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 191 AND 193: ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

SINCE RESUMPTION OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN MAY 1968, THE IRAQIS
HAVE GIVEN US BEFEBIT OF THE DOUBT: OLD SUSPICIONS WERE ALLAYED
BY OUR EFFORTS TO BE IMPARTIAL ON PALESTINE ISSUE, AND NEUTRALITY
WAS FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW A CONSIDERABLE IMPORVEMENT ON WHAT
THEY REGARDED AS OUR PRO-ISRAEL STANCE IN MAY AND JUNE 1967. NOW,
REPORTS OF ARMS SALES TO ISRAEL HAVE REKINDLED THEIR SUSPICIONS
OF DOUBLE DEALING, AND OUR WORDS AND ACTIONS WILL BE CAREFULLY
WATCHED.

2. IRAQI FEELING ON THIS ISSUE IS ALREADY STRONG AND MAY WELL
INTENSIFY. SINCE JUNE WAR PALESTINE HAS BECOME MAIN FOCUS OF
ATTENTION OF SUCCESSIVE IRAQI GOVERNMENTS, WHICH HAVE ADOPTED
EXTREME POSITIONS BY REJECTING SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION AND
IDEA OF A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT AND BY SUPPORTING FEDAYEEN. ALTHOUGH
THIS POLICY RESULTS FROM GENUINE FEELINGS OF OUTRAGE AND INJUSTICE
DONE TO PALESTINIANS, IT ALSO MEETS NEED TO HAVE A PROMINENT ISSUE
BEFORE PUBLIC ON WHICH ALL CAN AGREE AND WHICH STRENGTHENS
GOVERNMENT'S OWN POSITION INTERNALLY. PRESENT GOVERNMENT HAVE
REPEATEDLY SAID THAT IRAQ'S RELATIONS WITH OTHER STATES WILL DEPEND
ON ATTITUDE ADOPTED BY THEM TO PALESTINE QUESTION, AND THEY HAVE
IN RECENT MONTHS PUT THIS INTO PRACTISE BY DIVERTING TRADE AWAY
FROM THOSE COUNTRIES WHOSE SYMPATHIES FOR ISRAEL WERE OBJECTIONABLE
TO THE ARABS.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. SITUATION

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. SITUATION AS IRAQIS NOW SEE IT IS THAT BRITAIN HAS ACTUALLY SUPPLIED AND IS AT LEAST CONTEMPLATING FURTHER SUPPLYING TO ISRAEL LARGE QUANTITIES OF A HIGHLY EFFECTIVE WEAPON WHICH CAN EQUALLY BE USED FOR ATTACK AS FOR DEFENCE. THIS IS GOING ON AT A TIME WHEN ISRAEL IS OCCUPYING ARAB TERRITORY WHICH SHE TOOK BY FORCE AND WHEN WE HAVE CLAIMED TO BE BRINGING PRESSURE TO BEAR TO BRING ABOUT A SETTLEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH 1967 RESOLUTION. IRAQIS THEREFORE REGARD OUR ACTIONS AS CLEAR EVIDENCE OF SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL AND HOSTILITY TO ARABS ON A PAR WITH AMERICANS. OUR POLICY IS CONTRASTED WITH THAT OF FRANCE.

4. CONSEQUENCES ARE LIKELY TO BE FELT THROUGHOUT WHOLE FIELD OF OUR RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. ALTHOUGH CERTAIN MINISTRIES AND TRADING ORGANISATIONS APPEAR TO BE CONTINUING TO DEAL AS BEFORE WITH US AND WITH BRITISH FIRMS, IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT THEY WILL BEFORE LONG FOLLOW LINE ALREADY TAKEN BY MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY, WHICH HAS PUT INTO COLD STORAGE A NUMBER OF PROMISING CONTACTS WITH BRITISH FIRMS ON MINISTER'S INSTRUCTIONS BECAUSE OF QUOTE BRITAIN'S UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE ARABS UNQUOTE. STRIDENT PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST US WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR COMMERCIAL DECISIONS TO BE TAKEN ON PURELY COMMERCIAL GROUNDS IF THIS MEANS THAT BRITISH FIRMS WILL BENEFIT. UNLESS SOMETHING IS DONE TO ARREST DETERIORATING SITUATION, THERE COULD WELL BE A COMPLETE BOYCOTT OF BRITISH GOODS.

5. THESE DEVELOPEMENTS WILL INEVITABLY MAKE PROSPECT OF A SETTLEMENT OF I P C'S DISPUTE WITH IRAQ MORE REMOTE, AND THIS WILL HAVE RESULT OF MAKING COMPANY'S FUTURE LESS SECURE. IT IS VERY DOUBTFUL WHETHER GOVERNMENT COULD EVEN ENTER INTO SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS IN PRESENT ATMOSPHERE.

6. ALTHOUGH UNDER SECRETARY AT M.F.A. SPOKE MODERATELY, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT HIS WARNING OF CONSIDERABLE DAMAGE WHICH AN ARMS DEAL WOULD CAUSE TO OUR RELATIONS WAS MEANT TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. IRAQIS / ARE EMOTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO.206 TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

- 3 -

ARE EMOTIONAL AND VOLATILE AND REACT QUICKLY. IT WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH TO PUSH THEM OVER BRINK, TO BRING ANTI BRITISH DEMONSTRATORS OUT ON STREETS AGAIN AND TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY BROKE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH US ONCE MORE (THEIR RELATIONS WITH U.S. AND WEST GERMANY ARE STILL BROKEN).

7. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT I HAVE OVER-DRAWN DANGERS OF PRESENT SITUATION, WHICH IS PROBABLY WORSE THAN THAT FORESEEN IN MY TELEGRAMS NUMBERS 202 AND 446 OF 21 AUGUST AND 10 NOVEMBER 1968. IN SHORT, OUR INTERESTS IN IRAQ ARE IN JEOPARDY.

NER 10/5.

F.C.O. PASS TEL AVIV CAIRO AMMAN JEDDA AND SAVING TO TRIPOLI ALGIERS TUNIS KHARTOUM BEIRUT RABAT KUWAIT BAHRAIN RESIDENCY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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re [signature]
2/2

EN CLAIR

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 201.A. 20 FEBRUARY, 1969

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Spec NER 10/25/1

Copy for
NEQ 3/548/1

ADDSD TO F C O TEL NO 210 OF 20 FEB R F I SAVING TO CAIRO,
AMMAN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT,
RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON,
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

MY TEL NO 191. — NER 10/25/1

ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

ACCORDING TO THE IRAQI NEWS AGENCY BULLETIN OF 19 FEB AN
OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COMMENTING
ON THE REPORTED BRITISH ARMS DEAL WITH ISRAEL, STATED THAT
MR NIMA AL NIMA, THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE, HAD SUMMONED
ME ON 17 FEB AND "MADE IT CLEAR THAT BRITAIN'S POLICY REGARDING
MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ISRAEL WAS A MATTER OF EXTREME GRAVITY AND
WOULD HAVE ITS EFFECT ON IRAQI, BRITISH RELATIONS".

2... AL NUR ALSO PUBLISHED A UNITED PRESS REPORT THAT THE IRAQI
STATEMENT IS THE FIRST OFFICIAL HINT AT THE PROBABILITY OF
THE SEVERENCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAQ AND BRITIAN

3... F C O PSE PASS SAVING TO CAIRO, AMMAN, JEDDA, TRIPOLI,
ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY,
TEL AVIV, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK .

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM SECTION
Room 124 K.C.S.
Communications Department

YTC/1

Please send copies of the following telegram

201 A

20 February 1969

BAGHDAD TO AMEMB. TO F.C.D.

TO:

AMEMB

Mr D. B. Bellack

Emergency Planning Unit

CONSULAR DEPT

Room CL 614.

Sent.
24/2/69.

(Signed) *P. M. H. H. H.*

(Department) N.E.P.

(Date) 21/2/69.

Action taken in Communications Department :

(Initials) (Date)

AFTER ACTION THIS FORM SHOULD BE SENT TO
THE APPROPRIATE ARCHIVES DIVISION FOR RETENTION

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Telegram Section

1974

EN CLAIR

BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TEL NO.211

20 FEBRUARY 1969

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Spec NER 10/25/1
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NEQ 3/548/1
(80)

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 211 OF 20 FEB.

PT FOR INFO SAVING TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TRIPOLI,
ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN,
WASHINGTON , UKMIS NEW YORK.

IRAQI PRESS 20 FEB.

THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER EDITORIAL COMMENTS AGAIN ON THE REPORTED
BRITISH ARMS DEAL WITH ISRAEL .

IT SAYS THAT IN CARRYING OUT THIS ACTION BRITAIN IS DUTIFULLY
CARRYING OUT THE ASSIGNMENT ENTRUSTED TO HER BY WORLD IMPERIALISM
TO SHORE UP ISRAEL AND MAKE HER AN AGGRESSIVE IMPERIALIST BASE
THREATENING PEACE NOT ONLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST BUT ELSEWHERE IN
THE WORLD .

IT CONCLUDES THAT BRITAIN'S ACTION IS SELF INCRIMINATING AND
THAT THE BRITISH RESOLUTION WAS A FILTHY PLOY BY WHICH THE SUPERANNUATED

EMPIRE HOPED TO BRING BLOOD RUNNING ONCE AGAIN THROUGH
ITS VEINS . BUT IT IS A FORLORN HOPE AND BY OFFERING ARMS TO
ISRAEL BRITAIN IS DIGGING THE GRAVE OF HER OWN INTERESTS IN THE
MIDDLE EAST.

2.. AL NUR WRITES THAT ZIONISM AND IMPERIALIST IS EXPLOITING THE
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CERTAIN LIBERATED ARAB COUNTRIES. BRITAIN
AMERICA AND WEST GERMANY HAVE LED THE HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS
THE ARABS AND OPENLY CONSPIRED AGAINST THEM BY SUPPLYING ISRAEL
WITH DESTRUCTIVE WEAPONS - PHANTOMS FROM AMERICA , CENTURIONS FROM
BRITAIN AND ROCKETS FROM WEST GERMANY .

THE EDITORIAL EXHORTS LIBERATED ARAB GOVTS TO PUT ASIDE THEIR
DIFFERENCES AND AGREE ON A UNIFIED PLAN TO CONFRONT ISRAEL AND
IMPERIALISM .

/ 3. AL THAWRA

3... AL THAWRA HAS REPEATED WELL WORN PHRASES ABOUT OUR PAST ACTIVITY , SPELLING OUT THAT WHEREAS FORMERLY BRITAIN CARRIED OUT HER HOSTILE ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE ARABS IN SECRET , SHE IS NOW DOING SO OPENLY .

THE PAPER POSES THE QUESTION QUOTE WHY DO WE NOT ONCE MORE DEFINE OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS BRITAIN IN THE LIGHT OF THE PALESTINE ISSUE UNQUOTE .

4... AL NUR PUBLISHES A JORDANIAN REPORT THAT BRITISH ARMS WERE IN FACT UNLOADED AT HAIFA EIGHT WEEKS AGO .

F C O PASS SAVING TO TEL AVIV, AMMAN, CAIRO, JEDDA, TRIPOLI, ALGIERS, TUNIS, KHARTOUM, BEIRUT, RABAT, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN RESIDENCY, , WASHINGTON , UKMIS NEW YORK.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED].

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&&&&&&

EN CLAIR
BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELNO 220 21 FEBRUARY 1969
UNCLASSIFIED

81
Copy for
NEQ 3/548/1

ADDSD TO FCO TEL NO 220 OF 21 FEB RPTD SAYING TO ALGIERS

AMMAN BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BEIRUT CAIRO JEDDA KHARTOUM

KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS UKMIS NEW YORK AND

WASHINGTON.

IRAQI PRESS 21 FEB.

REPORTING MR HEALEYS PRESS CONFERENCE ON 20 FEB THE BAGHDAD
OBSERVER UNDER THE FRONT PAGE HEADLINE BRITAIN UNDECIDED
YET ON ARMS SUPPLIES TO THE MIDDLE EAST BUT HEALEY INDICATES
CARRYING OUT ARMS CONTRACTS WITH ISRAEL QUOTES EXTENSIVELY
FROM MR HEALEYS REPLY BUT OMITTS REFERENCE TO BRITISH
PROPOSAL MADE AT BEGINNING OF JUNE WAR FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
ARMS EMBARGO.

2. AL HURRIYA PUBLISHES A SHORTER AND LESS ACCURATE VERSION
OF THE ABOVE UNDER THE HEADING BRITAIN INSISTS ON SUPPLYING

ARMS TO THE ENEMY.

3. THE RESOLUTION BY THE UAR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY CONDEMNING
BRITISH MILITARY AID TO ISRAEL IS GIVEN PROMINENCE.

A FRONT PAGE BOX IN AL JUMHURIYA QUOTING THE CAIRO AL AHRAH

SAYS BRITAIN HAS ACTUALLY SUPPLIED CENTURIONS OTHER MILITARY
EQUIPMENT AND OFFENSIVE ARMS TO ISRAEL.

/4. THE

4 THE THEME OF AL THAWRS (BA'ATH PARTY)

COMMENT IS BRITAINS HYPOCRACY IN PROFESSING TO BE SEEKING

A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM WHILE

CURRENTLY SUPPLYING THE ENEMY OF THE ARABS WITH ARMS,

HAVING CONCEIVED ZIONISM AND ENTRUSTED IT TO THE UNITED

STATES FOR ITS UPBRINGING BRITAIN HAS NOT NEGLECTED HER

OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS THE ZIONIST ENTITY

FCO PASS SAVING TO ALGIERS AMMAN BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BEIRUT

CAIRO JEDDAHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV RTIPOLI TUNIS

UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

MR. EVANS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION
NEAR EASTERN DEPT.

NNNNN

Mr A. Saunders 25 1/2
R.I.P.

then v.g. P.M.H.

(82)

British Embassy,

BAGHDAD.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1/1)



14 February, 1969.

Dear Hinchcliffe,

Iraqi Student (deceased)

With reference to my letter No. 1/1 of 11 February, it would seem from the attached translation of an item in Al-Thawra (Ba'th Party official newspaper) that the Ba'th are content to say that Shamil died as a result of a diseased heart - which is an improvement on the original rumour that it was from a knife wound.

Yours etc.,

Bertie Saunders

(A. E. Saunders)

P. Hinchcliffe, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

re. P.M.H. 25/2

Translation from Al Thawra of 12 February, 1969.

Shamil Shakir al Ubaidi died as a martyr, far away from his home and relatives, far away from the playgrounds of his youth, far away from the land which he loved much and gave it all that he possessed generously.

Shamil died after entering the struggles of his people by his membership in the Socialist Arab Ba'th Party. He acquired the honour of becoming a member of the Party in 1959, and due to this membership and the spirit of struggle possessed by him he was imprisoned and lost his seat at school more than once.

Shamil died at London as a result of the strain caused him by his activities to repel the Imperialist-Zionist attacks against Iraq. He delivered speeches at Hyde Park in which he refuted the poisonous allegations, and led demonstrations and participated in resisting the Iranian attack against our Embassy at London, especially as he was suffering from a heart disease and did not listen to the advice of his doctors but to the voice of his nation to which he responded.....

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BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

15 February, 1969.

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No.15
27 FEB 1969
NEQ 3/548/1.

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313.

Mr. [unclear]

Pl [unclear] [unclear]
regime. [unclear]
[unclear] 9.85.21.2

My dear Peter,

During the past week I have talked to several top Iraqis and have been able to take the temperature after the recent coup de fièvre. You will be glad to know that the patient is making satisfactory progress; indeed, as reported in my telegram No. CREDA 27 of today's date, the situation has more or less returned to normal.

2. My first encounter was with Ammash at the Police College Passing Out Ceremony. I had not seen him for some time, although I had written to him several personal letters about various matters and had invariably found him helpful. On this occasion, he went out of his way to be friendly in public and it was his manner rather than what he said that I found encouraging. We did have a brief word about oil and he agreed that it would be a good idea if he saw Chris Dalley, who is now here. Incidentally, my new Japanese colleague has just paid his formal call on Ammash and was very impressed by him. He found him strongly anti-Communist and generally anxious to improve the lot of the rural population. His conclusion is that Ammash is a moderate and that he, Takriti and the President have their work cut out resisting pressure from younger and more extremist elements. (He is probably right.)

3. A few days later I met Takriti twice, on the first occasion at a party given by my Iranian colleague for the visit of the Iranian Chief of Staff, and the following day at Takriti's own party for the Iranian general. I had not seen Takriti either for some time so was very glad of the opportunity of a word with him. He too was very friendly but said right away that I (by me he presumably means H.M.G.) had done nothing to help him, with the extremists, of course, he meant. He readily agreed to see Dalley. He was as good as his word and gave him an hour and a quarter of his time on the following day. He reminded me that he had told me in the past that he hoped to be able to visit the United Kingdom fairly soon, but that he did not wish to go there with his pocket empty or to return empty handed. Actually, my Defence Attaché has been informed that the General would like, work permitting, to attend the RAF Staff College Reunion Dinner at Andover on 30 May (Takriti is, of course, a graduate of the College). Incidentally, he surprised me a lot by saying that the Iranians did not want Iraq to come to an agreement with us, presumably IPC. Obviously, increased production in Iraq, which could well follow such an agreement, would inhibit further increases in Iranian production, but I had not expected the Iranians to

/show

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

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show the Iraqis that this worried them. I was also able to introduce to Takriti Sir Charles Duke of the Middle East Association, who has been here for a few days, and I cannot do better than reproduce Sir Charles' record of their brief conversation (please also see my telegram No. CREDA 26 of 12 February).

4. Neither Ammash nor Takriti made any mention of the recent attacks on the Iraqi Government in the British press, etc. following the hangings. The same could not, unfortunately, be said of the various Ministers I have seen during the last few days. The Minister of Agriculture, whom I met at the Police College, was almost apologetic about the postponement of the COMET Mission, but was clearly upset by the bitterness of the attacks - he and his colleagues had expected criticism for a few days, but had not imagined that it would go on for so long. The Minister of Planning, on whom I called with Donald Hawley on 11 February, was also very critical of the attacks in the British press, radio and television and also, and particularly so, of Mr. Stewart's statement in the House. He professed to believe that H.M.G. could, if they wished, control the information media and was unwilling to believe that what the Secretary of State had said was the minimum possible in the circumstances. Speaking of the trials, Dr. Hashim said that he had regularly read the daily minutes which had been made available to members of the Government. Only a fraction of the information contained in these documents had been released. The reason for this was that several countries, including one Arab country (prominent individuals, not the Government, he added hastily) were involved and the Iraqi Government were anxious that their relations with these countries should not be adversely affected.

5. He said that he had been on the point of submitting to the Council of Ministers his report of his recent visit to the U.K. It included some very favourable comment, all of which had been endorsed by those who had been with him. It made nonsense after all that had happened and he had had to withdraw it.

6. The visit of the COMET Mission had had to be postponed (but fortunately not cancelled).

7. On the subject of the IPC, he repeated the advice he had given Mr. Dalley in London, namely that he should see Generals Ammash and Takriti and also the President. He would be seeing Mr. Dalley himself on the following day.

/8.

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8. Dr. Hashim spoke in sorrow rather than anger but, not surprisingly, he spoke with some bitterness - the more well-disposed towards us, the more he feels that he has been let down. He was certainly not as relaxed or as communicative as usual.
9. Two days later I accompanied Sir Charles Duke on his visit to the Minister of Planning. Dr. Hashim was more relaxed and communicative than when I saw him on 11 February. Nevertheless, he spoke with considerable bitterness of the attacks on Iraq in the press, etc. in the U.K. Sir Charles Duke and I tried hard to persuade him that the information media in the U.K. were not and could not be controlled by H.M.G.
10. Dr. Hashim said that he had advocated cooperation with the U.K., not because of his associations with the U.K. (graduate of the London School of Economics, etc.) but because he believed that such cooperation was to our mutual advantage. For example, British education was, he believed, the most suitable for the Iraqis.
11. The present Ba'ath Government was not making the mistakes of the Ba'ath Government of 1963 when key posts had been entrusted to non-Ba'athists. Nevertheless, as was inevitable, the régime included various trends. Some, for instance, were in favour of the nationalisation of the oil industry, but he had pointed out that marketing was an insuperable difficulty. All members of the Government were, however, pragmatists and not doctrinaires, as was clear from the encouragement now being given to the private sector and also from the recent decision of the Revolutionary Council to pay compensation to individuals whose properties had been nationalised in the past. (The bonds would bear interest and could be used to pay debts to the Government). I suggested that the IPC would be interested in this pragmatic approach and also in the compensation arrangements referred to. Dr. Hashim hastily made the point that the amounts "due" under the heading royalty expensing and also North Rumaila could not come into this category. As regards the former, the IPC should pay a sum on account, say ID. 40m. He was sure a satisfactory solution would follow. (In spite of this rejoinder, I think the IPC might be able to make some play with the Groups with this compensation decision and I have told Dalley.)
12. As regards the COMET Mission, he said that it could come "in a few weeks".
13. Although he was more relaxed and more ready to talk than he had been on 11 February, he was not quite his old self. Sir Charles Duke thought that the bitterness which he felt about the attacks on Iraq in the British press had not evaporated.
14. Donald Hawley has had much the same reaction from senior officials on whom he has been calling with Sir Charles Duke. They included the Director General at the Ministry of Economy,

/the

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the Director of Foreign Trade and the Presidents of the State Organisations for Trade and Industry. They also saw the Director General of the Baghdad Chamber of Commerce. The atmosphere at all these meetings was extremely cordial and all the persons visited made it quite plain that they wished to trade with the United Kingdom on an increasing scale. Donald Hawley was in fact surprised to find everyone as friendly and relaxed as they were before the recent upheaval and events at the Iraqi Embassy in London and here were not brought up at all.

15. Both the Director General and the Director of Foreign Trade at the Ministry of Economy made it absolutely plain that there are no obstacles to trade with the United Kingdom at the moment. In fact it was clear that they were actively in favour of increasing it. The Director of Foreign Trade pointed out that the Iraqi Government had had to place restrictions on trade with some other countries because of the trade imbalance but this did not apply to the United Kingdom whose considerable imports of Iraqi oil were, although excluded from Iraq's trade figures, thrown into the balance. The Director General of the Ministry was very forthcoming with figures for allocations under the various heads of the Import Policy for 1969 and both these officials specifically said that they would welcome a COMET Mission in a relatively short time.

16. The Presidents of the State Organisations for Industry and Trade also spoke in favour of increased Anglo/Iraqi trade. Sayid Tahsin Bakr, President of the State Organisation for Industry, however, claimed that British firms were not nearly as active and quick off the mark as he would like them to be. In particular, he - and the Minister of Industry - were sorry that Carreras had not responded more positively to the enquiries made by the Minister of Industry concerning setting up a cigarette factory in Iraq. Sayid Hisham Windawi, President of the State Organisation for Trade, gave about an hour and a half of his time indicating that there were considerable opportunities for British firms in dealing with his organisation and its subsidiary companies. He wanted to deal with such firms but found that the representatives of the Communist countries were much more active in dealing with his organisation and usually sent representatives with wide discretion to conclude in any negotiation. What he would like to see was more British firms coming out to do real business, rather than talking round the subject with his organisation.

17. I apologise for the length of this epistle, which will, however, (I hope) help you and also Dick Ellingworth, to whom

/I am

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I am sending a copy, to gauge the temperature here. On the whole the outlook is encouraging and, though the information media have turned against us and are unlikely quickly to give up their attacks, the situation is, as I wrote above, more or less returning to normal.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]
(T.E. Evans)

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Record of a Conversation

As soon as I mentioned that I was concerned with trade on this visit to Baghdad, the General asked me if I dealt in armaments. I said that my Association did not, as that we considered to be a matter between governments in which we could not be concerned. But that we were interested in a number of types of British aircraft and would like to see the Iraqi Government taking more of the civilian aircraft. The General implied that he would like to buy much more from Great Britain but "they did not like him and they did not understand that things have changed in the Middle East" and he complained that his requests were met with dilatory or evasive replies. He said that he had spoken about this to the Ambassador. He added that "the others" by contrast were only too ready to supply anything that he asked for very promptly and at very cheap prices "they almost give it to me" he said.

2. I referred to the enquiry which I thought had perhaps originated from him for earth moving and other equipment for airfield construction. The General was immediately aware of the matter to which I was referring and said that he would indeed be glad to get this equipment from Great Britain but he wanted it urgently and was still waiting for a reply.

3. The General spoke in perfectly friendly but very emphatic terms. He mentioned that he was still in command of the Air Force as well as holding his other offices and repeated that he hoped there would be more response from British sources.

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Reference.....

Mr. Acland

Mr. Tripp

af to same

84

RECEIVED IN ARCHIVES No.15 27 FEB 1969 26-2 NEQ 3/548/1

Anglo/Iraqi relations

Mr. Evans' letter of 15 February attached, describes the approaching return to normality of Anglo/Iraqi relations.

2. The situation has been changed since then by the outcry in the Arab world, perhaps more strident and aggressive in Baghdad than anywhere else, over the supply of arms for Israel.

3. The Ministry of Industry has frozen negotiations, some promising, with British firms and it seems probable that this attitude could also spread to the private commercial sector where relations with British businessmen generally remain good irrespective of the vicissitudes of official government policy. The Iraqi press is very hostile and is apparently deliberately distorting and misinterpreting our statements on the arms supply issue.

4. Commodities and Oil have a copy of the letter and I do not think that a further distribution of the whole letter is necessary; but O.D.M. would be interested in certain paragraphs and should perhaps be given an extract. However the record of Sir Charles Duke's conversation with Harden Takriti would be of interest to M.O.D. and to the Ministry of Technology.

5. I attach a draft reply.

P. R. M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
24 February, 1969.

I have expanded the draft somewhat.

CONFIDENTIAL

AAA Acland
26
2

(83)

26 February, 1969.

NEQ 3/548/1

RESTRICTED

Thank you for your very interesting letter of 15 February reporting contacts with Iraqi Ministers and members of their departments.

2. Unfortunately, since you were able to say in that letter that the situation had more or less returned to normal, we have had the outburst in the Arab world over the rumours that H.M.G. are supplying arms to Israel. From your recent telegrams (notably No.206 of 19 February) it seems that our relations with the Iraqis have deteriorated, because of the arms for Israel issue, to the lowest point since you reopened the Embassy last May. As we all know, however, the Iraqis are very volatile and I hope that this storm too will eventually blow over. What the Defence Secretary said at his press conference (FCO telegram No.69 to Tel Aviv) together with the Secretary of State's assurances to the four Arab Ambassadors on 21 February (FCO telegram No.130 to Cairo) may have helped to take some of the heat out of the situation. (Michael Adams, who called to give me his impressions of his recent visit, confirmed that things were indeed better now.) I know only too well, however, the sort of suspicions with which you are having to deal and your difficulties in allaying them.

3. On the trade side, I was interested to read of Charles Duke's visit. If, as you implied in your telegram No.206, the Iraqi regime's official attitude to trade with us may spread into the private commercial sector, then trade prospects would indeed be bleak. I know from your telegrams that you and your staff are particularly on the look out for any opportunities for trade.

4. You mentioned Iraqi criticism of the British press and the BBC. Now that the furor over the earlier hangings has died down Iraq has been given little coverage in the press here. The more recent hangings produced no significant reaction and were barely mentioned in the newspapers. On the other hand, as you have

/described....

His Excellency
Mr. T.E. Evans, C.M.G., C.B.E.,
Baghdad.

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

- 2 -

described, the Iraqi newspapers continue to be very hostile and it is apparent that they are determined to distort and misrepresent our position both on the arms issue and on Middle Eastern affairs in general to an unreasonable extent. I doubt if there is much that you or we can do about this at the moment but I assume that if there are any really outrageous accusations in the Iraqi press you would continue to point out to your contacts, that these can only have a damaging effect on Anglo/Iraqi relations which we wish to improve.

5. We know we must expect ups and downs in our relations with Iraq more than with most countries, and these ups and downs will often depend on circumstances which have no connexion with Anglo/Iraqi relations as such.

6. One of the difficulties for you, as for us, must be that the Iraqis tend to put out different and sometimes contradictory signals on a particular issue. This was clear from your telegram No.193 on commercial affairs and possible arms deals. On commercial sales we will do anything we can to help, although it is more for the Board of Trade, ECOD, the Ministry of Technology and of course the firms themselves.

7. The whole question of arms is a thorny one, as you can well imagine. It is easier for us to initiate action if there is a specific Iraqi request at Governmental level either to you or to the firms concerned. We did not know quite what to make, for example, of the approach to you from Takriti's cousin. In these sort of matters we will rely heavily on you for guidance and for sorting what you think are firm approaches from self-interested kite-flying. We may not always be able to give you the answer which you would like but we will certainly ensure that full consideration is given to any specific requests which may be made.

Pa PNM/1

28/2

(J.P. Tripp)

RESTRICTED

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Registry
No.

DRAFT

Letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

PRIVACY MARKING

In Confidence

To:—

Y. E. Evans, Esq.,
Baghdad.

From

Mr. Tripp

Telephone No. & Ext.

Department

Thank you for your ~~full~~ ^{very} and interesting letter of 15 February reporting on contacts ~~which you have had~~ with Iraqi Ministers and members of their departments.

2. Unfortunately, since you ~~reported~~ ^{were able to say} in that letter that the situation had more or less returned to normal we have had the outburst in the Arab world over the rumours that HMG are supplying arms to Israel. From your recent telegrams (notably No. 206 of 19 February) it seems that our relations with the Iraqis have ~~deteriorated~~ ^{deteriorated}, because of the arms for Israel issue, to the lowest point since you reopened the Embassy last May. As we all know, however, the Iraqis are very volatile and I hope that this storm too will eventually blow over. What the Defence Secretary said at his press conference (FCO telegram No. 69 to Tel Aviv) ^{together with} and the Secretary of State's assurances to the four Arab Ambassadors on 21 February (FCO telegram No. 130 to Cairo) may have helped to take some of the heat out of the situation. I know only too well the sort of suspicions with which you are having to deal and ~~the~~ ^{your} difficulties in allaying them.

(Michael Adams, who called to give me his impression of his recent visit, confirmed that things were better here). Indeed


/3.

3. On the trade side, I was interested to read of Charles Duke's visit. If, as you implied in your telegram No. 206, the Iraqi regime's official attitude to trade with us may spread into the private commercial sector then ~~the~~ trade prospects ^{would} ~~be~~ indeed be bleak. ~~But here we and trade representatives can only be on the alert for firm openings~~ and I know from your telegrams that you and your staff are particularly on the look out for ~~such possibilities.~~ *any opportunities for trade.*

4. You mentioned Iraqi criticism of the British press and the BBC. Now that the ~~press~~ ^{furor} over the earlier hangings has died down Iraq has been given little coverage in the press here. The ~~second batch of~~ ^{more recent hangings} ~~executions~~ produced no significant reaction and was barely mentioned in the newspapers. On the other hand, as you have described, the Iraqi newspapers continue to be very hostile and it is apparent that they are determined to distort and misrepresent our position both on the arms issue and on Middle Eastern affairs in general to an unreasonable extent. I doubt if there is much that you or we can do about this at the moment but I ~~hope~~ ^{am sure} that if there are any really outrageous accusations in the Iraqi press you ~~will~~ ^{would continue to} point out to your contacts, ~~as you think appropriate,~~ that these can only have a damaging effect on Anglo/Iraqi relations which we ~~would~~ wish to improve.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

5. ~~As has been said in other corres-~~
~~pondence, we~~ ^{know we} must expect ups and downs
in our relations with Iraq more than with
most countries, and these ups and downs will
often depend on circumstances which have
no connection with Anglo/Iraqi relations
as such. ~~The future both of the Iraq~~
~~Government itself and of our relations with~~
~~it can only be described as unpredictable.~~



/ 6.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

FLAG I

6. One of the difficulties for you, as for us, must be that the Iraqis tend to put out different and some times contradictory signals on ^a~~an~~ particular issue. This was clear from your telegram No. 193 on commercial affairs and possible arms deals. On commercial sales we will do anything we can to help, although it is more for the Board of Trade, ECGD, the Ministry of Technology and of course the firms themselves.

7. The whole question of arms is a thorny one, as you can well imagine. It is easier for us to initiate action if there is a specific Iraqi request at Governmental level either to you ~~in the Embassy~~ or to the firms concerned. We did not know quite what to make, for example, ~~of~~ the approach to you from Takriti's cousin. In these sort of matters we will rely heavily on you for guidance and for sorting what you think are firm approaches from self-interested kite-flying. We may not always be able to give you the answer which you would like but we will certainly ensure that full consideration is given to any specific requests which may be made.

J.B.
26.2.

SECRET

86
Copy to NEQ 3/545/T
Top Copy NEQ 10/2.

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BRITISH DEFENCE ATTACHE BAGHDAD TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

EDQ 271535Z FEB

SECRET

U.K.EYES ONLY

ADDRESSED TO M.O.D. (SALES) TELEGRAM NO. EDQ 271535Z FEB
AND TO MINTECH
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO.

FOR GENERAL HALL FROM DEFATT.

YOUR EDQ 251650Z REFERS.

ARMS FOR IRAQ

REQUEST FOR DEMONSTRATION OF AIR DEFENCE SYSTEM SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED IN THE CONTEXT OF ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS,
PARTICULARLY FOLLOWING THE REPORTS OF BRITISH SUPPLIES
OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO ISRAEL.

2. SITUATION ON ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT IS AS FOLLOWS:

A. AA GUNS. IRAQIS WERE TOLD THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
UNLIKELY THAT ANY WERE AVAILABLE AND CERTAINLY NO 40 MM
BOFORS. THOUGH DISAPPOINTED AT THE LATTER, I FEEL
THAT ENQUIRY FOR OTHER TYPES WAS CASUAL.

B. RAPIER. THEY WERE WARNED THAT FOR SECURITY
AND PRODUCTION REASONS THERE COULD BE NO QUESTION OF
DELIVERY FOR A MATTER OF YEARS. THEY STILL EXPRESSED
GREAT INTEREST.

C. THUNDERBIRD. THEY REGARDED THIS AS A POSSIBLE INTERIM
WEAPON PENDING RAPIER AND WOULD PROBABLY BE INTERESTED
IN A LARGE ORDER IF DELIVERY DATES WERE REASONABLE.

SECRET

/D.

D. TIGERCAT. I HAVE SEEN A SUB-COMMITTEE WORKING ON SHORTS BROCHURES AND INTEREST IS VERY STRONG. THEY ARE AWARE OF A DEAL WITH JORDAN. IT SEEMS MOST UNLIKELY THAT SECURITY OF THE SYSTEM CAN BE PRESERVED WITH SO MANY IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN.

E. LIGHTNING. WHILST AIRCRAFT WERE OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF DMO'S ENQUIRIES, FAVOURABLE COMMENT WAS PASSED ON THE AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE SYSTEM. MINTECH ARE AWARE OF THE POSITION.

F. ELECTRONICS. CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAD BEEN MADE IN THIS FIELD AND BRITISH EARLY WARNING AND COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT ENJOYS A HIGH REPUTATION. MINTECH CAN SUPPLY DETAILS OF PRESENT POSITION.

3. WHILST I APPRECIATE THE DANGERS OF A MISSION RETURNING HOME EMPTY-HANDED, IT STILL APPEARS TO ME THAT THERE IS SCOPE FOR A USEFUL VISIT. ON THE OTHER HAND, I CONSIDER THAT AN ADMISSION OF OUR INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO MEET THEIR REQUESTS WOULD EFFECTIVELY END ALL PROSPECTS OF MILITARY SALES HERE. THIS IN TURN WOULD CAUSE SIDE REPERCUSSIONS IN THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FIELDS.

4. I THEREFORE EARNESTLY REQUEST THAT AN INVITATION TO ATTEND A DEMONSTRATION DURING MARCH BE ISSUED IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE. IN THE MEANTIME WE WILL WORK ON THE EXPENSE ASPECT OF THE VISIT THROUGH F C O CHANNELS.

5. H.M. AMBASSADOR AGREES.
FCO PASS TO MOD (SALES) AND MINTECH.

MR. EVANS

[SENT TO D.C.C. AND MINTECH]

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
CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 254

28 FEBRUARY, 1969

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ADDSO TO FCO TEL NO 254 OF 28 FEB REPTD FOR INFMN TO CAIRO
AND SVG TO ALGIERS BAHRAIN RESIDENCY BEIRUT AMMAN JEDDA
KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS W.K. MIS NEW YORK
AND WASHINGTON.

MY TELEGRAMS NOS 249 AND 250: ARMS FOR ISRAEL.

IN THESE TELEGRAMS I SUGGESTED THAT THE DAMAGE DONE HERE
IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST US OVER THE ISRAELI 'ARMS DEAL'
MIGHT BE MITIGATED BY OUR READINESS TO SELL ARMS TO IRAQ. IN
FACT THIS IS PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY AT PRESENT OF IMPROVING
THE SITUATION.

2. GENERAL HALL'S REFERENCES IN HIS TELEGRAM NO EDQ 251650Z
FEB TO POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES ARE OF COURSE UNDERSTOOD, AT
LEAST TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PRESENT SITUATION CALLS FOR THE
GREATEST CAUTION. THERE ARE HOWEVER A NUMBER OF POLITICAL
POINTS WHICH SHOULD, I CONSIDER, BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT,
APART FROM THE OVER-RIDING ONE OF THE OBVIOUS DANGER TO OUR
INTERESTS HERE AND IN OTHER PARTS OF THE ARAB WORLD. THESE
POINTS ARE:

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/(A) RECENT

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-2-

(A) RECENT STATEMENTS HAVE STRESSED THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN OUR ARMS SUPPLY POLICY NOR IN OUR POLICY OF WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB/ISRAEL DISPUTE (EG YOUR TELEGRAM NUMBER 120 TO CAIRO). IF WE FULFIL EXISTING COMMITMENTS TO THE ISRAELIS WHILE REJECTING IRAQI REQUESTS EVEN FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE IRAQIS OF OUR IMPARTIALITY IN WORKING FOR A SETTLEMENT:

(B) SALE OF SOME OF THE ITEMS MENTIONED IN TELEGRAM NO EDQ 251650Z FEB. HAVE, I AM INFORMED, ALREADY BEEN MADE TO OTHER ARAB STATES AND THE IRAQIS WOULD FEEL DOUBLY AGGRIEVED IF WE FAILED TO SUPPLY THEM:

(C) WHATEVER THE IMAGE OF IRAQ IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, (AND I REALIZE THAT IT IS AT PRESENT FAR FROM BEING A GOOD ONE) THERE ARE IMPORTANT ELEMENTS IN THE REGIME WHO STILL WISH TO DO BUSINESS WITH US FOR POLITICAL AS WELL AS TECHNICAL REASONS. THEY HOPE BY INCREASING COMMERCIAL DEALINGS WITH US TO WEAKEN THE INFLUENCE OF THE U S S R AND THE BLOC:

(D) A KEY TO SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN OUR COMMERCIAL POSITION - ALWAYS ASSUMING THAT IT IS NOT PREJUDICED BY THE ISRAELI 'ARMS DEAL' IS TO DO SUBSTANTIAL ARMS BUSINESS WITH THE IRAQIS AT LEAST FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT. IF WE CONCLUDED THIS SUCCESSFULLY, IT WOULD STRENGTHEN THE HAND OF THOSE WHO ARE FAVOURABLY DISPOSED TOWARDS US AND OPEN THE DOOR FOR INCREASED BUSINESS IN THE CIVILIAN SPHERE. THE ARMS DEALS IN THEMSELVES COULD BE WORTH MANY MILLIONS OF POUNDS AND IN ADDITION COULD CREATE A FAVOURABLE CLIMATE FOR IMPORTANT TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ELECTRONIC DEALS WITH FIRMS SUCH AS MARCONI AND STC:

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/(E)

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BAGHDAD TELNO 254 TO FCO

-3-

(E) IF WE TURN DOWN THE PRESENT IRAQI APPROACH TO US FOR DEFENSIVE EQUIPMENT, THEY WILL UNDOUBTEDLY TURN ELSEWHERE AND THE ATMOSPHERE FOR FUTURE ARMS DEALS AS WELL AS LARGE SCALE COMMERCIAL BUSINESS WILL BE SOURED.

3. I HAVE ACCORDINGLY HAD NO HESITATION IN ENDORSING MY DA'S RECOMMENDATION THAT AN INVITATION SHOULD BE EXTENDED WITHOUT DELAY TO THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES TO SEND THEIR EXPERTS TO ATTEND THE PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT - PLEASE SEE MY TEL EDQ 271535Z

FCO PASS ROUTINE CAIRO AND SVG TO ALGIERS BAHRAIN RES BEIRUT
AMMAN JEDDA KHARTOUM KUWAIT RABAT TEL AVIV TRIPOLI TUNIS
UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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Editorial Offices

March 4, 1969

~~Minister of State has/has not~~
seen. N. Easkin. Dept.
~~for advice and draft reply~~
~~from~~

The Rt. Hon. Goronwy Roberts, M.P.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London, S.W. 1,
England

RECEIVED IN
ARCHIVES No. 15
11 MAR 1969
NEQ 3/548/1

7/3.

7

Dear Mr. Roberts:

Thank you for your letter of January 14, which has arrived today. I am much obliged to you for letting me know the views of the Iraqi Minister for Industry.

I should be very pleased to talk to you about the Encyclopaedia Britannica and I shall give you a ring to arrange a meeting when I am in London in May.

With kind regards.

Yours sincerely,

William Haley

pu PNMH

11/3

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action
on oil
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CYPHER CAT.A.

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELEGRAM NO 509

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

30 MAY 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Per P/M/M 2/6

MEP 2/359/1

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 509 OF 29 MAY R F I
CAIRO KUWAIT JEDDA TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND

SAVING TO IN REGISTER -2 JUN 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
--

YOUR TELNO. 432 : ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

copy to NEQ 10/2

1. ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS, LIKE ANGLO/ARAB RELATIONS, DEPEND PRIMARILY ON OUR ATTITUDE TO THE PALESTINE QUESTION. IN THE CASE OF ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS THERE IS, HOWEVER, THE ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENT THAT PROGRESS SHOULD BE MADE WITH THE I P C DISPUTE.
2. MR HAHN HAS AGAIN RETURNED TO LONDON AFTER A SHORT VISIT TO BASRAH, IN ORDER TO FINALISE THE REVISION OF THE CARGO DUES AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THE COMPANY HOPE THAT THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THESE LIMITED NEGOTIATIONS WILL LEAD TO TALKS ON WIDER ISSUES.
3. AS REGARDS INVOLVEMENT OR INTERVENTION BY H M G, I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE ARE RIGHT NOT TO EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CLEARLY SHOULD NOT TRY AND BRING PRESSURE ON THE COMPANY IN PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. WHAT I THINK IS CALLED FOR IS ADVICE AND ENCOURAGEMENT. THE LOCAL MANAGEMENT HERE AND HEAD OFFICE IN LONDON, AT LEAST AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL, AND EVEN SOME REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GROUPS, WOULD, I BELIEVE, WELCOME IT.

/4.

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4. FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME THE MORE FAR-SIGHTED IN THE COMPANY HAVE REALISED THAT A FURTHER ATTEMPT SHOULD BE MADE TO REACH AGREEMENT, BUT HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TRANSLATE THIS INTO ACTION. TIME MAY NOW BE GETTING SHORT. IF NO SETTLEMENT IS REACHED, THERE IS THE GROWING RISK OF THE GROUP LOSING THEIR VERY CONSIDERABLE INVESTMENT THROUGH SOME RASH ACTION ON THE PART OF THE IRAQIS. THE REPERCUSSIONS OF THIS IN NEIGHBOURING OIL PRODUCING COUNTRIES MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERABLE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AGREEMENT, AND THE RESULTANT IMPROVEMENT IN GENERAL ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS, COULD SAFEGUARD THE INVESTMENT FOR A GOOD NUMBER OF YEARS AND WOULD NOT, I SUSPECT, NECESSARILY AT THIS STAGE IN THE GAME HAVE THE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES ON THEIR CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS IN OTHER COUNTRIES WHICH SOME ELEMENTS IN THE COMPANY FEAR.

5. THE SITUATION HAS BEEN MADE MORE DELICATE AND URGENT BY THE LATEST AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT AND THE NATIONAL IRANIAN OIL COMPANY. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ALLUDED TO THIS IN CONVERSATION WITH MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR AND ME ON 27 MAY.

6. THE CRUX OF THE MATTER IS, OF COURSE, THE VIABILITY OF THE PRESENT IRAQI REGIME. IF IT IS DOOMED TO GO THE WAY OF ALL IRAQI GOVERNMENTS SINCE 1958, THE I P C ARE RIGHT TO ACCEPT THE RISKS OF SOLDIERING ON. I FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT IF THEY DO THIS, THEY AND WE MAY BE DISILLUSIONED. THE BA'ATHIST REGIME IN SYRIA HAS LASTED, ADMITTEDLY WITH UPS AND DOWNS, SINCE 1963. THE REGIME IN IRAQ IS PROBABLY BETTER PLACED AND ITS CHANCES OF SURVIVAL IN SOME FORM MAY BE GREATER. CLEARLY,

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BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 509 TO FCO

-3-

IT HAS ITS SHORT-COMINGS AND WEAKNESSES, BUT FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW AT LEAST, INCLUDES SOME FRIENDLY ELEMENTS, I E TAKRITI AND HIS FRIENDS.

7. I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE SHOULD TAKE TAKRITI'S FRIENDLY ADVANCES SERIOUSLY. ORDERS FOR HARDWARE OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE LINKED TO THE SETTLEMENT OF THE I P C, BUT IF THERE IS AN AGREEMENT AND, AS A RESULT, TAKRITI CAN DRAW ON ADDITIONAL FINANCIAL RESOURCES, THERE IS A GOOD PROSPECT OF MORE SUBSTANTIAL ARMS AND OTHER PURCHASES FROM THE U K AND ALSO OF PREVENTING IRAQ, AND POSSIBLY EVEN THE GULF, FROM FALLING INTO THE LAP OF THE RUSSIANS.

8. THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF EVIDENCE DURING THE PAST WEEKS OF THE RUSSIAN AND THEIR ALLIES GAINING GROUND. IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, THE POLES HAVE SECURED CONTRACTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF IRAQ'S SULPHUR DEPOSITS, AND THE RUSSIANS THEMSELVES ARE INCREASINGLY ACTIVE. THE IRAQ/.U S S R FISHERIES AGREEMENT HAS BEEN RATIFIED AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION COULD HAVE FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCE IN THE GULF. IN THE POLITICAL FIELD, THERE IS THE IRAQI RECOGNITION OF THE G D R. INTERNALLY, THE POSSIBILITY OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE REGIME IS NOT TO BE EXCLUDED-PLEASE SEE MY TELNO. 487.

9. IT IS TO THE CREDIT OF THE REGIME THAT THEY ARE NOT ONLY INTERESTED IN ARMAMENTS, BUT ALSO IN THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR COUNTRY. LIKE THE SHAH, THEY BASE THEIR NEED

/FOR INCREASED

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-4-

FOR INCREASED OIL REVENUES ON THE FACT THAT THEY ARE A DEVELOPING COUNTRY. FORTUNATELY, THE I P C TOP MANAGEMENT, IF NOT ALL IN THE CONSTITUENT GROUPS, ARE CONSCIOUS OF THIS - PLEASE SEE THE RECORD OF MY CONVERSATION WITH DALLEY TRANSMITTED WITH MY LETTER OF 15 FEBRUARY TO ELLINGWORTH.

10. I HOPE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY AFFORDED BY THE CONTINUING CONTACTS BETWEEN YOUR DEPARTMENT AND THE I P C AND THE GROUPS WILL BE TAKEN TO IMPRESS ON THOSE CONCERNED THE NEED FOR SOME FURTHER EFFORT, WHICH WOULD AT LEAST SHOW THE IRAQI AUTHORITIES THAT THE COMPANY ARE NOT STALLING.

F C O PASS SAVING TO CAIRO KUWAIT JEDDA TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW AND PARIS.

MR. EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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British Embassy,
BAGHDAD.

29 May, 1969.

(3/4)

Dear P. M.

Meeting with Mutasarrif of Basra

Baghdad
telegram no. 510 to FCO

In view of the helpful part played by the Mutasarrif of Basra in the negotiations with I.P.C. over cargo dues you may be interested in the following account on my meeting with him on 3 May. I had not earlier thought it sufficiently important to pass on.

2. When I called on the Mutasarrif of Basra on 3 May he sent his greetings to the Ambassador and said that he had enjoyed his long talk with him a few weeks ago, even though it was "hard" at times. His principal preoccupation was with the floods, which he said were causing a great administrative problem. They were expected to grow worse, as there was more water coming down from the Euphrates.

3. He mentioned the Iraq/Iranian dispute over the Shatt-al-Arab, but what he said confirmed the general impression one got in Basra that there was no sabre rattling on the Iraqi side. (There were no very obvious military preparations.) He confirmed that the Iraqis wanted to play it in minor key. He scotched any Iranian stories that the Iraqis were adopting a threatening posture by telling the story, subsequently published in the Iraqi press, of a group of Iraqi policemen going to the help of a contingent of Iranian soldiers, who were marooned by the rising floods on the Shatt.

4. He said that he realised that the image of the Ba'ath party outside the country was very bad, but he wondered why it was that Britain seemed unwilling to cooperate with the Socialist regime in Iraq. What did they want? Of course, the Iraqi Government was against imperialism, but they wanted to expand trade contacts, they wanted technical assistance and experts, they wanted to send young people to the United Kingdom for further education and welcomed exchanges; and they wanted tourists.

5. However Iraq's general attitude towards the U.K. would be governed by two main considerations:

- (a) her policy over the Arab/Israel dispute;
- (b) whether a fair settlement with I.P.C. could be achieved.

Yours Ever
D. F. Hawley
(D. F. Hawley)

J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.

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91

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 534

9 JUNE 1969



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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 534 OF 9 JUNE RFI SAVING TO
TEHRAN CAIRO BAHRAIN AMMAN BEIRUT ANKARA KUWAIT UKMIS
NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

NE 3/359/1
MY I.P.T. ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

MISUNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION OVER ARAB/ISRAEL
DISPUTE IS UNFORTUNATELY NOT THE ONLY THING WHICH HAS
INHIBITED ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS IN THE LAST MONTHS.
THERE WAS RUMPUS OVER HANGINGS IN JANUARY, FOLLOWED
BY CONSTERNATION AROUSED HERE AS IN OTHER ARAB CAPITALS [? GP OMITTED]
REPORTS OF ARMS DEAL WITH ISRAEL. LATTERLY CENTO
MEETING IN TEHRAN HAS BEEN MISCONSTRUED NOT ONLY IN PRESS
BUT IN OFFICIAL CIRCLES. YOUR OWN PRESENCE, SIR,
IN TEHRAN AND YOUR PRIVATE TALKS WITH THE SHAH ARE TAKEN
AS EVIDENCE OF PARTISANSHIP IN DISPUTE OVER SHATT AL ARAB
AND IRAQ/IRAN RIVALRY OVER GULF. SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN
CREEPING IN THAT IMPARTIAL ATTITUDE WE AT FIRST DEMONSTRATED
OVER SHATT AL ARAB DISPUTE GRADUALLY HAS CHANGED IN FAVOUR
OF IRANIAN.

2. PERHAPS A DEEPER ROOTED DIFFICULTY IN ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS
IS THEIR FEELING THAT WE HAVE BEEN COLD SHOULDERING
THEM (MY TELNO 474). THEY SEE LITTLE WILLINGNESS ON
OUR PART TO MAKE ANY SORT OF POLITICAL GESTURE OF EVEN MILD

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/FRIENDSHIP

FRIENDSHIP TOWARDS PRESENT REGIME AND SEVERAL IRAQIS, AND OTHER OBSERVERS, HAVE EVEN SUGGESTED THAT LACK OF RESPONSIVENESS ON PART OF WEST, PARTICULARLY OURSELVES, COMBINED WITH PRO ISRAELI ATTITUDES, HAS BEEN CAUSE OF IRAQIS AGAIN TURNING TOWARDS USSR AND RECOGNISING GDR.

3. IT HAS UNFORTUNATELY NOT SO FAR BEEN POSSIBLE FOR MR. ROBERTS TO TAKE UP INVITATION OF IRAQI MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO VISIT BAGHDAD. THERE IS GROWING EVIDENCE THAT THIS HAS BEEN TAKEN HARDLY HERE AND THAT SHEIKHLY, POSSIBLY FOR REASONS OF PERSONAL PRIDE, HAS PUT A SORT OF BAN ON OTHER MINISTERIAL CONTACTS E.G. IRAQI MINISTER OF INDUSTRY'S VISIT TO UK IN APRIL. OUR COOLNESS IS CONTRASTED WITH THE ALACRITY WITH WHICH RUSSIANS LAID DOWN RED CARPET FOR HARDAN TAKRITI EVEN ON EVE OF WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE.

4. RECENT ROUND OF ARRESTS IN IRAQ HAS PROBABLY FURTHER LOWERED REGIME'S REPUTATION ABROAD. BUT, UNLESS WE CALCULATE - WHICH I DO NOT SINCE ALL OBVIOUS OPPOSITION HAS BEEN REDUCED - THAT REGIME IS LIKELY TO BE BROUGHT DOWN, IT IS NOT IN OUR INTERESTS TO ALLOW SOUR CLIMATE TO CONTINUE. ALREADY THERE HAS BEEN A HINT IN PRESS OF POSSIBLE FUTURE SUBVERSION IN GULF TO OVERTHROW QUOTE OPPRESSIVE REGIMES UNQUOTE THERE (MY TELNO 19 SAVING OF 3 JUNE). IF WE HAVE NO SATISFACTORY DIALOGUE WITH IRAQIS, THERE IS A RISK THAT THEIR POLICIES WILL TURN STILL MORE EXTREME. IF THIS HAPPENED, IT COULD BE VERY DETRIMENTAL TO OUR INTERESTS NOT ONLY HERE BUT ALSO IN GULF AND AREA AS A WHOLE.

5. MOREOVER, DESPITE GENERALLY UNSAVOURY REPUTATION OF REGIME, THERE ARE MODERATE ELEMENTS WHO ARE FRIENDLY TOWARDS US AND THEY STILL ACT AS A FOCUS FOR CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF GOODWILL TOWARDS US REMAINING IN THIS COUNTRY. IF WE CONCLUDE THAT THERE IS NO BETTER ALTERNATIVE GOVERNMENT ON HORIZON, IT MUST SURELY BE IN OUR INTEREST TO PAY SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO MORE MODERATE IN THEIR MIDST.

6. I WONDER THEREFORE WHETHER CONSIDERATION SHOULD NOT NOW BE GIVEN TO MR ROBERTS TAKING UP SHEIKHLY'S INVITATION. IF IDEA IS ACCEPTABLE IN PRINCIPLE, WE COULD TAKE VERY INFORMAL SOUNDINGS TO SEE WHETHER ACCEPTANCE OF INVITATION WOULD MEET A FAVOURABLE RESPONSE. THERE ARE SOME FAVOURABLE OMENS; PARTICULARLY RECENTLY INITIALLED AGREEMENT BETWEEN IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND IPC.

7. ADVANTAGES OF SUCH A VISIT WOULD BE THAT MR ROBERTS WOULD BE ABLE TO

(A) EXPLAIN OUR POLICY BOTH OVER ARAB/ISRAEL AND SHATT AL ARAB DISPUTES AND THUS HELP TO REMOVE MISUNDERSTANDINGS - HE MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO INDUCE IRAQIS TO MODIFY THEIR HARDLINE OVER PALESTINE ISSUE - AT LEAST TO A LIMITED EXTENT -

(B) REMOVE GRIEVANCES UNDER WHICH IRAQIS - INCLUDING MANY WHO ARE NOT PARTICULARLY ENAMoured OF PRESENT REGIME - ARE FEELING THAT HMG HAVE PAID CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION IN LAST MONTHS TO UAR AND OTHER ARAB COUNTRIES BUT HAVE VIRTUALLY IGNORED IRAQ.

8. VALUE OF VISIT WOULD BE GREATLY ENHANCED IF MR ROBERTS COULD SHOW A READINESS TO MEET IRAQI REQUIREMENTS ON AT LEAST SOME OF FOLLOWING:

- (A) DELIVERY OF ARMS REQUIRED BY IRAQI ARMED FORCES
- (B) WILLINGNESS BY HMG TO HELP TO ACHIEVE AN IPC SETTLEMENT
- (C) TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR FLOOD RELIEF (YOUR TELNO 462 OF 4 JUNE).

FCO PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN CAIRO BAHRAIN AMMAN BEIRUT ANKARA KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR. EVANS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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16

This too will have to
be taken into account
in our analysis of British interests
in Iraq, & Anglo/Iraqi relations
generally.
Mr. Brant

Mr. Brant

Pa on

Anglo/Iraqi
relations file

with copy

in Amman

170 Iraq

WMA

11/6

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REGISTRY NO. 10

11 JUN 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Iraqi Oil

When I lunched with Mr. Dalley of the IPC last week, I found him in a rather gloomy mood. Although he had just learned of the successful conclusion of the negotiations in the South over port dues, he seemed to have little hope that there was much chance of a more general settlement. He was also depressed by renewed pressure from the Iraq Government to "recruit" skilled IPC Iraqi staff for service with INOC and feared that, if this trend continued, he might be forced to increase the number of expatriates working for IPC in Iraq. It was very hard to find suitable people when conditions there were so difficult.

2. Mr. Dalley said that he personally believed it would not be possible to continue to run IPC on the basis of preserving the status quo more than another six months or so. He did not question that the policy adopted up to now had been right from the point of view of the groups in view of the companies' wider interests, in spite of all the difficulties involved for him and other IPC staff: but he thought there would soon have to be a forward move of some kind on the part of the companies if they wished IPC to continue operating in Iraq. Now that the port dues question had been settled, he would be pressing for another mission to go to Baghdad for discussion of the overall problems. He expected that the groups would agree to this.

3. It was difficult at this stage, however, to say whether any negotiating would have anything worthwhile to offer the Iraqis. Certainly, they would not concede all that the latter were demanding in terms of advance payments. I asked whether, as had been mooted in the past, there might be a partial offer, e.g. over the introduction of expensing from 1 January 1969, leaving the backlog for use in seeking an Iraqi quid pro quo. Mr. Dalley said this was certainly a possibility. He would favour it, but the American members were strongly opposed.

4. Mr. Dalley said he thought things might come to a head over North Rumaila before long. The latest rumour to reach him was that the Iraqis might be contemplating an arrangement with the Czechs. He did not appear to have any firm details, but suggested the Czechs might be paid in oil for any work they did for the Iraqis and that this oil might be used to supply Soviet customers East of Suez, the Russians for their part re-imbursing the Czechs with oil from the Soviet Union supplied through the Friendship Pipeline.

/5. Mr. Dalley

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
5. Mr. Dalley said he had established a cordial relationship with the Mitsubishi representatives in London. As there had been talk from time to time of Japanese meddling in Iraq, he had taken such opportunities as had offered to impress on Mitsubishi the importance of upholding the sanctity of contracts in the oil-producing countries. The Japanese companies themselves, in view of their growing stake, had an interest in this too. He hoped that the point had sunk in and that M.I.T.I. would have become aware of his contacts. I said I thought the word would have got back.

6. I asked Mr. Dalley about the implications for IPC of the Tapline incident. He said that the value of IPC's Mediterranean terminal crude would be enhanced, but there was no question of them stepping up supplies. The IPC pipeline was already working to capacity. Mr. Dalley mentioned in this connection that, although there had been no recent serious attacks by the Kurds, the existing damage was not likely to be wholly made good for some time. They were only just managing to keep up the flow from Kirkuk, with a good deal of improvisation.

7. In response to my question, Mr. Dalley said that the visit of Lt. Jiburi had probably been worthwhile as a goodwill gesture, but he doubted whether there would be much improvement in practice in the security measures taken to protect oil installations.

8. Mr. Dalley expressed appreciation for the summaries of the Baghdad press we were making available on the basis of material supplied by the Embassy. He was also grateful for the note on the political situation in the Lebanon and said he would always be grateful for such information about that country. Also about Syria.

9. Mr. Dalley asked for the earliest possible notification of any firm indication that Takriti intended to visit the U.K. He agreed that Takriti was well-disposed, but hesitated to over-emphasise his power within Iraq.



(R.H. Ellingworth)
Oil Department
9 June, 1969

c.c. Mr. Gallagher
Mr. Arthur
N.E.D.
Mr. Gregory, Min. of Power
Mr. Derrick, Treasury
Mr. Hawley, Baghdad
Mr. Willmot, Washington
Mr. Galsworthy, Paris

Mr. Olver, The Hague
Mr. Cortazzi, Tokyo
Mr. Rich, Prague.

BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

RECEIVED 18 June 1969

RESTRICTED REGISTRY No. 10

12 JUN 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Mr. Burnham

NEQ 10/250

Copied to
NEQ 1/1
for para 6,
12.6.

Please refer to my letter (3/4) of 3 May reporting a brief conversation I had had with General Takriti.

2. At a party last night I met Taha Muheiddin Malouf, the Minister of State and Acting Minister of Works and Housing. Rather to my surprise, he said - in fact he said it twice - that Takriti would shortly be going to London. He himself would be leaving for London in two days time. He would be going for a medical check-up - he had had an operation for flebitis in 1958 - but he hoped to see some friends. I said that perhaps he should try to see the Minister of State. His reaction to this confirmed the impression that I had formed during a recent talk I had with the Minister of Foreign Affairs that some sort of ban had been put on Iraqi Ministers visiting London calling on Mr. Roberts, because Mr. Roberts had still not come to Baghdad in response to Sheikhly's invitation of last January. You will remember that the Minister of Industry cut short his recent visit to London and cancelled arrangements we had made for him to call at the Office. Please see my telegram No. 417 of 1 May.

3. Malouf said that he would be seeing Takriti today. I took the opportunity of asking him to tell Takriti that I too would like to call on him, and he promised to do so. (Appointments are not always easy to arrange through the Protocol Department these days.)

4. It is interesting, I think, that Malouf should have told me all this about Takriti. It suggests that he is a Takriti man and that possibly, when in London, he will make some provisional arrangements for Takriti's visit.

5. In the course of a general tour d'horizon, I asked Malouf what was happening to Bazaz, adding that he had many friends in London and that the continuing uncertainty about his position did not help Anglo/Iraqi relations. Perhaps he will pass this on to Takriti.

6. Malouf said that the proposal that the Minister of State, Mr. Roberts, should visit Baghdad had had the approval of all members of the Council of Ministers. The Government were anxious to improve relations and I had no doubt noted that, in the course of the recent spy trials, no attempt had been made to implicate the United Kingdom. Some people were now beginning to ask why.

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London, S.W.1.

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7. I also asked about developments in the North - there has been some speculation, following the creation of the new Liwa in the Kurdish area, that further attempts were being made to reach a peaceful solution. I had the impression that Malouf thought that there was no chance of Barazani and Talabani patching things up.

8. I will, of course, telegraph as soon as we have anything firm on Takriti's plans.

[Handwritten signature]
[Handwritten signature]
(T. E. Evans)

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[Handwritten initials]

14/6

(94)

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CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TELNO. 553

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
16 JUNE 1969

REGISTERED
18 JUN 1969
NEQ 3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 553 OF 16 JUNE RFI SAVING TO
CAIRO TEHRAN WASHINGTON MOSCOW KUWAIT AND JEDDA.

^{NEQ 10/2}
YOUR TELNO 432: ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

GENERAL TAKRITI, ON WHOM I CALLED ON JULY 14, SAID THAT HE WAS AS ANXIOUS AS EVER TO GO TO THE U.K. HE REMINDED ME THAT MANY MONTHS AGO HE HAD TOLD ME THAT HE NEEDED OUR HELP TO KEEP IRAQ FROM GOING COMMUNIST. HE HOPED HE WOULD NOT HAVE TO TELL ME QUOTE I TOLD YOU SO UNQUOTE. HE SAID THAT HE NEEDED BRITISH PLANES - 30 LIGHTNINGS, 30 JAGUARS AND 30 BAC 167S - AND ALSO RADAR AND MANY OTHER THINGS. THE RUSSIANS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPLY, NOT EVERYTHING THE IRAQIS ASKED FOR, IT WAS TRUE, BUT THEIR PRICES WERE LOWER THAN OURS AND THEIR CREDIT TERMS MORE ADVANTAGEOUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, BRITISH PLANES WERE ADMITTEDLY BETTER. HE COULD NOT, HOWEVER, GO TO LONDON WITHOUT SOMETHING IN HIS POCKET, I.E. THE ASSURANCE OF AN AGREEMENT WITH THE IPC. WERE THE COMPANY PREPARED TO PAY WHAT THEY OWED UNDER ROYALTY EXPENSING? IF NOT, THERE WAS NO POINT IN HIS GOING TO LONDON.

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This is covered
by a
release
19/6

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

2 I TOLD HIM THAT THE COMPANY CONSIDERED THAT THEY OWED NOTHING. WHAT HAD BEEN PAID TO NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES UNDER ROYALTY EXPENSING HAD BEEN THE RESULT OF NEGOTIATION, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THERE HAD BEEN GIVE AND TAKE. THE COMPANY WERE SIMILARLY PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AND WERE CONFIDENT THAT AGREEMENT TO THE GREAT ADVANTAGE OF IRAQ AND THE COMPANY WOULD RESULT. I ADDED THAT NEGOTIATIONS OVER CARGO DUES, ON WHICH AGREEMENT SEEMED IMMINENT WAS PROOF OF THIS AND THAT ITS SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION WOULD BE THE GREEN LIGHT FOR TALKS ON WIDER ISSUES BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE COMPANY AND THE RESPONSIBLE IRAQIS. GENERAL TAKRITI SAID THAT HE HIMSELF WAS READY FOR THIS. I ADVISED HIM TO SEND FOR THE COMPANY'S CHIEF REPRESENTATIVE WITHOUT DELAY (GP UNDEC HAD ASKED ME TO PREPARE THE WAY FOR A MEETING). TAKRITI SAID HE WOULD DO SO AND REPEATED THAT HE WANTED TO GO TO LONDON, BUT ADDED THAT IF HE DID NOT GO BEFORE THE END OF THE MONTH IT MIGHT BE TOO LATE.

3 INCIDENTALLY, HE SAID THAT THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL SHENSHALL, HAD BEEN VERY PLEASED WITH HIS RECENT VISIT TO THE U.K. AND WAS URGING HIM TO GO HIMSELF. HE IMPLIED THAT HE WOULD NO DOUBT BE ABLE TO SEE THINGS THAT GENERAL SHENSHALL HAD NOT FOR SECURITY REASONS BEEN PERMITTED TO SEE

4 TAKRITI WAS EXTREMEY FRIENDLY AND REACTED POSITIVELY TO VARIOUS REPRESENTATIONS I MADE ON MATTERS OF LOCAL INTEREST AFFECTING BRITISH SUBJECTS. IT IS, I THINK, SIGNIFICANT THAT HE SHOULD STILL PROFESS INTEREST IN BRITISH HARDWARE, EVEN AFTER HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW.

FCO PASS AS PREAMBLE.

MR EVANS.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DEF. POL. DEPT.
D.T.S.D.
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M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

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18 JUN 1969	
NEQ 3/548/1	

CYPHER/CAT A

PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 556 16 JUNE 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO F C O TELNO. 556 OF 16 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO SAHNG TEHRAN, CAIRO BAHRAIN AMMAN BEIRUT ANKARA KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON

534? 91 94
MY TELEGRAMS NOS. 554 AND 553: ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

GENERAL TAKRITI AND ALSO GENERAL AMMASH AS WELL AS MR. SHEIKHLY ATTENDED MY QUEEN'S BIRTHDAY PARTY. THE PRESIDENT SENT A MESSAGE OF GOOD WISHES AND HIS TELEGRAM TO THE QUEEN WAS PROMINENTLY PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS.

2. THE UNUSUALLY HIGH LEVEL TURN-OUT, THE TWO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WAS CLEARLY INTENDED AS A MEANINGFUL GESTURE. IN FACT, SHEIKHLY SAID AS MUCH TO MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR, ADDING EXPLICITLY THAT IT WAS IRAQI GOVERNMENT POLICY TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE U.K.

3. SHEIKHLY ALSO TOLD ME THAT HE HOPED TO BE ABLE TO SPEND A FEW DAYS IN LONDON ON HIS WAY TO THE U.N. IN SEPTEMBER.

4. THIS CAN BE REGARDED AS THEIR SECOND ATTEMPT TO START A DIALOGUE - THE FIRST WAS THEIR INVITATION IN JANUARY OF THIS YEAR TO THE MINISTER OF STATE TO VISIT BAGHDAD. ON THIS OCCASION MODERATE ELEMENTS IN THE REGIME HAVE NO DOUBT BEEN ENCOURAGED TO TRY AGAIN BY THE PROSPECT OF AN AGREEMENT WITH IPC OVER CARGO DUES AND THE POSSIBILITY OF SETTLING WIDER ISSUES WITH THE COMPANY.

Now see Submission

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19/6 15. THE

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- 2 -

5. THE MOMENT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM TO BE OPPORTUNE FOR CONSIDERING, AS SUGGESTED IN THE FIRST OF MY TELEGRAMS, UNDER REFERENCE, WHETHER MR. ROBERTS SHOULD TAKE UP SHEIKHLY'S INVITATION, EVEN IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PROPOSE A DATE AT THIS STAGE, IT WOULD, I THINK, DO GOOD TO BE ABLE TO TELL THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAT MR. ROBERTS HAD HIS INVITATION IN MIND AND HOPED TO COME TO BAGHDAD SOON.

6. I SHALL BE SEEING THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS WITHIN THE NEXT DAY OR TWO. IS THERE ANYTHING I CAN TELL HIM?

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO TEHRAN CAIRO BAHRAIN AMMAN
BEIRUT ANKARA KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

MR EVANS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DP
Near Eastern Department,

(96)

NEQ 3/542/1
D

18 June, 1969.

(91)

Anglo-Iraqi Relations

(93)

I wanted to get a short letter in the next bag to tell you that we had been considering very carefully your recent reports about the state of Anglo/Iraqi relations and possibilities for the future. I have in mind particularly your letter 3/4 of 5 June and your telegram No. 534 of 9 June.

2. In our telegram No. 432^{near 10/2} of 21 May we were able to give some guidance of our present policy on arms sales and their link with the IPC dispute. Since then you will have seen from our telegram No. 398 to Tehran that we are considering the possible sale to the Iraqis (unless there are serious objections from Tehran) of a fair amount in the way of arms and ammunition.

3. We will, I hope before too long, be able to let you have further views on the whole spectrum of relations with Iraq.

4. As far as a visit to Iraq by Mr. Roberts is concerned, this in part depends on decisions which may be taken shortly on the general policy of visits by Ministers to Middle East countries. It would not therefore be practical to consider as a separate issue the question of a Ministerial visit to Iraq but I will let you have further comment on this point also as soon as I can.

(J.P. Tripp)

H.E. Mr. Trevor Evans, C.M.G., O.B.E.,
British Embassy,
Baghdad.

Pa 11/11/69

19/6

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry No.	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>CONFIDENTIAL</u></p> <p>DRAFT letter</p>	Type 1 +
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION	To:—	From
Top Secret. Secret. Confidential. Restricted. Unclassified.	H.E. Mr. Trefor Evans, C.M.G. O.B.E.	Mr. Tripp Telephone No. & Ext. Department
PRIVACY MARKING	British Embassy,	
.....In Confidence	Baghdad.	
<div style="display: flex; flex-direction: column; align-items: center; justify-content: space-around; padding-top: 100px;"> <div>Flag A</div> <div>Flag B</div> <div>Flag C</div> <div>Flag D</div> </div>	<p style="text-align: center;"><u>Anglo/Iraqi Relations</u></p> <p>I wanted to get a short letter in the next bag to tell you that we had been considering very carefully your recent reports about the state of Anglo/Iraqi relations and possibilities for the future. I have in mind particularly your letter 3/4 of 5 June and your telegram No.534 of 9 June.</p> <p>2. In our telegram No.432 of 21 May we were able to give some guidance of our present policy on arms sales and their link with the IPC dispute. Since then you will have seen from our telegram No.398 to Tehran ^{one considering the possible sale to} that we hope to be able to sell the Iraqis (unless there are serious objections from Tehran) ^{be able to} a fair amount in the way of arms and ammunition.</p> <p>3. We will, I hope before too long, let you have further views on the whole spectrum of relations with Iraq.</p> <p>4. As far as a visit to Iraq by Mr. Roberts is concerned, this in part depends on decisions which may be taken shortly on the general policy of visits by Ministers to Middle East countries. It would not therefore be practical to consider as a separate issue the question of a Ministerial visit to Iraq but I will let you have further comment on this point also as soon as I can.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">JR 176</p>	

Mr. AclandAnglo/Iraqi Relations

--- I attach a draft letter which you may wish to recommend that Mr. Tripp sends as an interim reply to H.M. Ambassador Baghdad's telegram No.534 of 9 June (Folio 91) and to his letter to Mr. Tripp of 5 June (Folio 93).

2. We are now preparing an analysis of Anglo/Iraqi relations (and our interests in Iraq) which could be used, when completed, as the basis of a more substantive reply.

3. Our present attitude to arms sales for Iraq and their link with the IPC dispute was set out in F.C.O. telegram No.432 of 21 May. As this telegram is referred to in the draft letter, I am attaching a copy for reference purposes.



P.R.M. Hinchcliffe

(P. R. M. Hinchcliffe)
16 June, 1969.

I agreed with Mr Hinchcliffe that it would be worth sending an interim reply to Mr Evans.

A.A. Acland 17/6

Mr Tripp 17.6


Mr. ArthurMr. MiersProposed Visit to Iraq by Mr. RobertsProblemFlag A

Her Majesty's Ambassador in Baghdad has asked us to consider whether Mr. Roberts might now take up the invitation from the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs to visit Iraq. H.M. Ambassador will be seeing the Minister shortly and has asked for instructions. He recommends that at least he should be able to tell the Minister that Mr. Roberts had the invitation in mind and hoped to come to Baghdad soon. What instructions should we send?

Recommendation

2. I recommend that H.M. Ambassador be instructed to tell the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs that owing to other commitments Mr. Roberts regrets that he cannot visit Iraq this year but that he will keep this invitation in mind when arranging his engagements for 1970. A draft telegram to Baghdad is attached.

Argument

3. Anglo/Iraqi relations have been indifferent for the past five months. Apart from the British oil companies' stake in the Iraq Petroleum Company, we have no major interests in Iraq and indeed there is very little we can do in any effective way to influence the policies and attitudes of the Iraq Government. Nevertheless it is in our interest to encourage those elements within the Iraqi regime who would

/welcome

welcome closer ties with this country and a visit by Mr. Roberts to Iraq could be an important step in improving our relations. Indeed there are signs from the Iraqi side that they consider the ball to be in our court, and require a Ministerial visit before they make any further overtures themselves.

4. In view of possible visits to the Middle East later this year by both the Secretary of State and by Mr. Roberts, which are still under discussion, it would not be practical for Mr. Roberts to plan to go to Iraq before the end of this year. A visit to Iraq immediately following one to Israel (or indeed within a short period of time after such a visit) would not be acceptable to the Iraqis who are extreme in their intransigence over the Arab/Israel dispute. It is also worth bearing in mind that Iraqi reaction to a major arms deal with Israel would almost certainly rule out a Ministerial visit for some time to come. Mr. Roberts might therefore consider giving priority to a visit to Iraq some time early next year and possibly in conjunction with a visit to other Arab countries, always assuming that the circumstances then prevailing would make this a worthwhile and practical proposition.

5. Her Majesty's Ambassador has mentioned that the Iraqi Foreign Minister may be passing through London in September this year; by that time we may be in a position to recommend to Mr. Roberts that a definite date for a visit to Iraq could be mentioned to Mr. Sheikhy.

Background

6. In January this year the Iraqi Ambassador called on

/Mr. Roberts

-3-

Mr. Roberts and said that he had received instructions from his Government to invite Mr. Roberts to visit Baghdad during his forthcoming tour of Arab countries. Mr. Roberts replied that he warmly appreciated this kind invitation but feared that it was impossible in view of previous commitments for him to extend his tour any further. He went on to say that he looked forward to the possibility of visiting Iraq at some future date.

Flag B

A.A. Acland

(A.A. Acland)

20 June, 1969

I think this is right: quite apart from other considerations, I think that if you went to Iraq soon, or later this year (and gave a date now), you would be subjected to an embarrassing severity of pressure over the I.P.C. On the other hand, if the Iraqi Minister of F.A. does pass through London in September, we should do him proud.

J.R. Curran 20/6

Minister of State (Mr. Roberts)

I am sure this is right.

in Hinchcliffe 20/6

2 p.a.

23/6

Reg. 6/4.
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PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 502

TO BAGHDAD

23 JUNE 1969

(NEQ 3/548/1)

95

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 502 OF 23 JUNE REPEATED FOR INFORMATION SAVING TO TEHRAN CAIRO BAHRAIN AMMAN BEIRUT ANKARA KUWAIT UKMIS NEW YORK WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 556: ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS: POSSIBLE VISIT BY MINISTER OF STATE.

WHOLE QUESTION OF VISITS BY MINISTERS TO THE MIDDLE EAST THIS YEAR IS STILL UNDER DISCUSSION (SEE ALSO TRIPP'S LETTER NEQ 3/548/1-96 OF 18 JUNE) AND IT WOULD NOT BE PRACTICAL BECAUSE OF THIS AND OTHER COMMITMENTS FOR MR ROBERTS TO VISIT IRAQ BEFORE THE END OF THIS YEAR. WE AGREE THAT SUCH A VISIT COULD BE BENEFICIAL BUT WE CANNOT COMMIT OURSELVES TO A FIRM DATE AT THIS STAGE. THE POSITION MAY, HOWEVER, BE CLEARER BY THE TIME SHEIKHLY PASSES THROUGH THE UNITED KINGDOM IN SEPTMEBER, AND WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO SAY SOMETHING MORE TO HIM THEN.

2. WE WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO YOU SPEAKING TO THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE FOLLOWING LINES:

MR ROBERTS HAS VERY MUCH IN MIND THE KIND INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT IRAQ, WHICH HE LOOKS FORWARD TO DOING. UNFORTUNATLEY, BECAUSE OF OTHER COMMITMENTS HE CANNOT TAKE UP THIS INVITATION THIS YEAR. HOWEVER, HE WILL CERTAINLY TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT WHEN HE IS ARRANGING NEXT YEAR'S PROGRAMME.

STEWART.

FILES

N.E.D.

ARAB. D.

N.A.D.

OIL. D.

D.T.S.D.

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DEPARTMENT

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Q 3/548/1

NE Dept.

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

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(Date)

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PRIVACY MARKING

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En Clair.
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[Codeword—if any]

Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

RECEIVED IN

REGISTRY No. 10

24 JUN 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

Draft Telegram to:—

BAGHDAD

No. 502

(Date) 23/6.

And to:—

Saving to TEHRAN, CAIRO, BAHRAIN, AMMAN, BEIRUT,
ANKARA, KUWAIT, UKMIS NEW YORK, WASHINGTON.

Repeat to:—

Your telegram No. 556 [of 16 June]: Anglo/
Iraqi Relations; Possible Visit by Minister of
State.

Whole question of visits by Ministers to the
Middle East this year is still under discussion (see
also Tripp's letter NEQ 3/548/1 of 18 June) and it
would not be practical because of this and other
commitments for Mr. Roberts to visit Iraq before
the end of this year. We agree that such a visit
could be beneficial but we cannot commit ourselves
to a firm date at this stage. The position may,
however, be clearer by the time Sheikhly passes
through the United Kingdom in September, and we
might be able to say something more to him then.

2. We would have no objection to you speaking
to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the following

/lines:

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NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Saving to

TEHRAN, CAIRO,
BAHRAIN, AMMAN,
BEIRUT, ANKARA,
KUWAIT, UKMIS
NEW YORK,
WASHINGTON.

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African, Oil,
D.T.S.D.

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SIGNATURE

20/13

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lines. "Mr. Roberts has very much in mind the kind invitation to him to visit Iraq, which he looks forward to doing. Unfortunately, because of other commitments he cannot take up this invitation this year. However, he will certainly take it into account when he is arranging next year's programme".

VG 23/6

Mr Roberts
has seen and
approved the draft.

VG

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference.....

4/97

~~Mr. Duffield~~

Mr. Tripp

I am most grateful for this
review.

2. We discussed possible uses. I
think Mr. A. M. H. should see in detail
of submissions to him.

J. P. [Signature]
196.

Anglo/Iraqi Relations

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10

- 3 JUL 1969

NEQ 3/548/1

In view of the recent telegrams from Baghdad on Anglo/Iraqi relations, I thought that it might be worthwhile, as a mind clearing exercise, to set down briefly what British interests are in Iraq, and whether we can do very much to influence events, even if we wish to.

2. The attached paper is the result. Mr. Hinchcliffe has looked at this and added some useful points.

3. The conclusions (comfortingly perhaps) come fairly close to those contained in the despatch of 12 November 1968 to Mr. Evans which set out British policy towards Iraq.

4. I do not think that the note on British interests merits wider circulation but if you agree with it, it might be worth typing as a departmental note and it can be attached to submissions which deal with aspects of Anglo/Iraqi relations as a recent departmental assessment of the matter.

Flag A

A. A. Acland

(A. A. Acland)
19 June, 1969.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
26 JUN 1969

NEQ 3/545/1

21 June 1969

40/27

You may like to know that several of the managers of local British concerns in Baghdad have recently complained to us about a new system for issue by the Iraqi authorities of exit and re-entry visas. A week or two ago the Iraqi Residence Department started refusing to grant re-entry visas to British subjects without reference to the Security Authorities. Such reference was liable to take up to three or four weeks and consequently British businessmen who have interests in neighbouring countries were inconvenienced. The new procedure apparently only applied to the holders of U.S., West German and British passports.

2. You will be glad to hear that this matter appears to have been solved. The Ambassador raised the subject in general terms with General Takriti on 14 June but he took it up more specifically with the Minister of Foreign Affairs on 19 June and also with General Amash. Consequently British subjects who had applications in the pipeline, notably Cocky Hahn of IPC and David Eddleston of Frankipile, obtained their re-entry visas immediately. We are now informed that the authorities in the Residence Department have now been instructed to revert to the former procedure which is to grant re-entry visas to British subjects immediately without reference to the Security Authorities, unless the files of the Residence Department contain something necessitating reference. This seems perfectly reasonable.

3. It is not clear why the new procedures were introduced. They appear to have been discriminatory, but it is encouraging that the Iraqis seem in this instance to have lived up to the intention expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Queen's Birthday Party to improve relations with the U.K.

(D. P. Hawley)

**T. E. Sinclair, Esq.,
C.R. & E. Department,
Board of Trade,
London, S.W.1.**

c.c. J. P. Tripp, Esq.,
Near Eastern Department,
F.C.O.,
London, S.W.1.

Mr. Ackland First
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Migration & VISA
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
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26/5
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Mr. Gurneys

H.E.
H of C
1st Sec.
D.A.



Reg
Pa.

copy to

M. Hallin on 20/6

re (e)

& for Miss Colman's

news paper

re (a)

PUMH

27/6

Mr

I had a long conversation with Sayid Abdul Karim al Sheikhly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Queen's Birthday Party. The following points were discussed:-

(a) Anglo/Iraqi Relations

Sheikhly explicitly said that it was the Iraqi Government's policy to improve relations with the U.K. and that was the reason for the high level turn out at the Party (Mardan Takriti and Annash, in addition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs.) However, the key was in our hands. I suggested that both sides held keys and efforts were required on the Iraqi side as well as ours. He then complained about the tone of the U.K. press, though he admitted that there was nothing very specific to which he objected, and asked why the British press could not be persuaded to be more friendly disposed. For instance on the Shatt-al-Arab dispute they could have assisted Iraq considerably, even if they had only given some publicity to HMG's policy as explained by the Ambassador. He took the wind out of my sails by saying that he knew I would object to what he said since the British press was free - "just like ours" he added. I argued with him a little on this point - amicably - and pointed out that it was also important for the general tone of the Baghdad press to moderate if any improvement in the London press was to be expected.

(b) I.P.C.

Sheikhly again stressed the importance of an IPC settlement. He welcomed the cargo dues agreement but was disappointed that the Company had not produced a formula for charging back payment of cargo dues to previous years (see my telegram no. 555 of 16 June) on the day after Mr. Hahn and Mr. Goff had seen him last week. He had received them formally in the HFA where things were done formally, and had expected an answer. I said that I understood that the Company were working actively on this and that Mr. Goff had himself gone to London with proposals. Sheikhly then said that he got on extremely well with Mr. Hahn and had had a very useful

/meeting

meeting with him and Mr. Goff last week. He would tell me a secret. He had actively encouraged the Company to produce a formula to save the faces of officials in the Ministry of Oil, but he would not like this to get round since it looked like "collusion with the Imperialist Company". It was important however that IPC should produce an answer whilst he was still acting Minister of Oil before Rifai came back.

Sheikhly regarded the cargo dues agreement as only a beginning. What was really wanted was agreement on the substantive issues. I said that the cargo dues agreement was extremely important to the companies and if this were successfully concluded without further ado they would be considerably heartened. It was, therefore, important that the Iraqi side should go snap on whatever the Company were able to come up with now.

(c) C.O.M.E.T. Mission

After some hesitation and some vague references to the difficulties of the political situation, he agreed that the COMET Mission could come out in October at the time of the Baghdad Fair. He wondered if they had anything specific to offer and I told him that it would probably be a Mission consisting of the same people, including Lord Limerick, who had been designated to come out in June. He then said that certain political issues needed to be cleared out of the way and made some reference to spies which I did not quite follow. He also said that there were many trade delegations coming and going and the British Mission should come at a favourable time. He volunteered that it was he who had cancelled the COMET Mission in January on account of the Secretary of State's "interference in Iraqi affairs".

THWMM

(d) Shatt-al-Arab Dispute

Sheikhly said that there were no new developments over the Shatt-al-Arab dispute. The Iraqis were perfectly willing to negotiate and even willing to agree to amendments to the 1937 Treaty. However, it would weaken their position too much to agree to negotiations while the Iranians still publicly maintained that the 1937 Treaty had been abrogated.

(D. P. Hawley)
16 June 1968

C.C.
J.P. Tripp, E
Near Eastern
Department,
F.C.O.
R.H. Kilingworth
Commodities

EXPORTS BY THE MAIN MANUFACTURING COUNTRIES (NON-COMMUNIST) TO IRAQ

Compiled from information available 31.3.69

£'000 and percentage change compared with a year earlier

	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968
	£'000 % change	£'000 % change	£'000 % change	£'000 % change	£'000 % change
<u>Exports from:-</u>					
United Kingdom	20,208 + 14.3	21,555 + 6.7	25,867 + 20.0	16,688 - 35.5	15,615 - 6.4
U.S.A.	20,131 + 71.9	17,571 - 12.7	16,500 - 6.1	10,558 - 36.6	6,250 - 48.8
Germany Fed. R.	10,804 + 9.8	14,716 - 31.2	20,868 + 47.2	14,076 - 33.7	8,416 - 47.8
Japan	6,163 +132.6	8,679 + 40.8	10,062 + 15.9	7,122 - 30.4	17,217 +110.6
Belgium/ Luxembourg	4,922 + 25.9	5,392 + 9.5	5,519 + 2.4	3,280 - 41.6	5,186 + 38.0
Netherlands	2,918 + 12.4	2,486 - 14.8	3,241 + 30.4	3,181 - 2.3	2,017 - 45.4
Italy	4,469 + 50.6	4,447 - 0.5	8,543 + 92.1	7,820 - 9.8	9,256 + 3.0
Sweden	2,989 + 16.5	3,098 + 3.6	3,797 + 22.6	3,344 - 12.9	4,986 + 29.2
Switzerland	1,796 + 17.2	2,124 + 18.3	3,017 + 42.0	3,009 - 2.8	3,724 + 8.9
France	1,784 +101.4	2,432 + 36.3	4,668 + 91.9	4,480 - 5.9	8,524 + 66.2
Canada	318 - 71.5	244 - 13.3	293 + 20.1	208 - 29.5	339 + 41.1
TOTAL	76,502 + 33.1	82,744 + 8.2	102,375 + 23.7	73,766 - 27.9	81,530 N/A

N/A = Not available

CYPHER/CAT'A'

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TOP COPY (101)

PRIORITY BAGHDAD

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 602
CONFIDENTIAL

DATED 1 JULY 1969

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 10
1 JUL 1969
NEQ 3/548/1

MY TELNO 553: ANGLO/IRAQI RELATIONS.

THE MINISTER OF MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS, GHAYEB MAWLOU MUKHLIS, ON WHOM MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR AND I CALLED THIS MORNING, SAID THAT GENERAL TAKRITI HOPED TO GET AWAY SHORTLY AFTER THE 17 JULY CELEBRATIONS AND BE IN LONDON FOR A STAY OF A WEEK OR TEN DAYS FROM ABOUT 22 JULY. TAKRITI'S VISIT WOULD THUS PARTIALLY COINCIDE WITH HIS OWN - MY TELNO 600 REFERS. THE ONLY OUTSTANDING POINT WAS WHETHER THE VISIT WOULD BE PRIVATE OR OFFICIAL. MUKHLIS THOUGHT IT SHOULD BE OFFICIAL.

2. MUKHLIS, WHO IS I THINK RELATED TO TAKRITI, SAID HE HAD DISCUSSED THESE TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS WITH HIM AND I HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE FOREGOING CAN BE TAKEN FIRM, INCLUDING THE REFERENCE TO THE VISIT BEING OFFICIAL. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK IT WOULD BE WISE TO FOLLOW THIS UP WITH A TALK TO TAKRITI HIMSELF.

3. WOULD IT BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND TO HIM AN INVITATION TO STAY AS A GUEST OF HMG? IF THIS IS IN PRINCIPLE POSSIBLE, I COULD MAKE THE OFFER AND THEN HE COULD DECIDE FOR HIMSELF. I COULD, OF COURSE, ALSO DISCUSS HIS PROGRAMME WITH HIM.

4. GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD REPLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

MR. EVANS

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*Submission to GCA
m 2/7/69*

PMH 2/7 Pa.



Mr. Arthur

Mr. Miers

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 11 JUL 1969 NEQ 3/548/1
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Visit by Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister

Problem

FLAG A

In his telegram No. 624, H.M. Ambassador Baghdad

FLAG B

has considered the difficulties which were set out in FCO telegram No. 531 and would like to sound General Takriti out and be authorised to convey an official invitation if it were to become apparent that this would be welcome.

Recommendation

...

2. I recommend that, inspite of Mr. Evans' views that the difficulties in the face of such a visit could be overcome, it would be inappropriate to issue an official invitation in the present circumstances and that Mr. Evans be instructed on the lines of the attached draft telegram. If General Takriti comes privately, we should do everything possible to make the visit a success and to arrange special engagements if this would be welcome. Oil Department and News Department agree.

Argument

FLAG C

3. The full implications of the recent Soviet-Iraqi agreement are not yet clear, but the extract from the joint communiqué quoted in Baghdad telegram No. 625 indicate that the Soviet side will "develop production in the national oil industry, especially in the Rumaila oil fields in the southern part of Iraq". It looks therefore as if the Rumaila oil field may now finally be lost to IPC without compensation.

/This



O This is a serious development which may involve official protests at some stage by HMG on IPC's behalf. General Takriti may well not approve of the Soviet-Iraqi agreement, but nonetheless he is Deputy Prime Minister in the Government and it would look odd to extend an official invitation to him immediately after action had been taken to damage the major British interest in Iraq. Mr. Dalley (IPC) has been informally consulted and is somewhat in two minds. On the one hand, General Takriti is important and IPC need the help of people like him. Mr. Dalley would therefore welcome anything which gave him encouragement. At the same time, he sees the possible embarrassments in an official invitation and he would probably accept that the alternative of a private visit with special attentions might be as good - if not better.

4. News Department have also been consulted and consider that there would be a strong adverse reaction in the British press to an official visit by a senior Iraqi Minister in present circumstances. This must be taken into account since an official visit with hostile publicity to Iraq could well do more harm than good.

5. Taking the above factors into account together with those set out in my earlier submission of 2 July and Mr. Arthur's minute (there is today a further report from Beirut that Dr. Al-Bazzaz may shortly be put on trial), and since time is now very short, I conclude that the risks are such that an official visit should be avoided.

FLAG DZ

J.P. Tripp
(J.P. Tripp)
8 July, 1969.



I am reluctant to come to this answer, but I think it is the right one.

J. L. Amis

8/7

Minister of State (Mr. Roberts)

I am sure this is right. The available details of the deal with Russia point to a major difficulty over T.P.C. And the prosecution of Al-Bazzaz is another big difficulty.

Re
... 8/7

I discussed this with Mr. Dalley at the lunch to Sheikh Khalifah of Qatar today. Mr. Dalley appeared to understand Iraq's position. He will "lay it on" for Takriti, & I said that I would accept an invitation to a reception & then up early.


Re 9/7

Reg. please see that U Takriti is coming

PHM

1411

8/7


Mr. Arthur~~M. M. S.~~Visit by Iraqi Deputy Prime MinisterProblemFlag A

In his telegram No. 602, H.M. Ambassador Baghdad has reported that General Takriti hopes to be in London for a week or ten days from about 22 July. He asks if it would be possible to invite General Takriti to be an official guest of H.M.G.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we should agree in principle to the issue of such an invitation, provided that H.M. Ambassador considers it worth going ahead despite certain limitations which would have to be put on the visit. A draft telegram to Baghdad and a draft letter to the Secretary of the Government Hospitality Fund are attached. Mr. Paterson (G.H.F.) has, with the agreement of the Private Office, been consulted by the Department and he would have no objection to the instructions to Baghdad issuing immediately provided the usual letter containing the approval of Foreign Office Ministers to the visit is sent seeking his Minister's agreement.

Argument

3. In our view, it is doubtful whether General Takriti would accept an official invitation. Hitherto, he has seemed to put unacceptable conditions (agreement to a major arms deal and settlement with the Iraq Petroleum Company) on a visit to London (Baghdad telegrams Nos. 456 and 553). Furthermore,

Flags B
and C

-2-

he has the reputation of being pro-Western and with the present aggravation of rivalries within the Iraqi regime, he might well think it undesirable to be seen to be accepting an official invitation from H.M.G.

4. There are also difficulties about the arrangements for the visit itself. These are explained in the draft telegram to Baghdad. The Iraqis have shown themselves extremely sensitive about the scale of attentions paid to them, and before deciding to go ahead, H.M. Ambassador must be asked to consider very carefully the limitations which would have to be imposed.

5. On the other hand, H.M. Ambassador considers that there has been a definite sounding on the part of General Takriti to see whether an official invitation would be forthcoming. We have recognised that General Takriti, as Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence is an important figure and he would justify official attentions (F.C.O. telegram No. 432 to Baghdad). If General Takriti is prepared to accept the invitation on the terms offered we must do all we can to make the visit a success. If he prefers to come privately, no harm will have been done.

6. H.M. Ambassador Baghdad has also raised the question of an official invitation to the Iraqi Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs, who conveyed the message about General Takriti and who is coming on a purchasing mission. This is primarily a matter for the Board of Trade who have been consulted and is being dealt with separately.

Flag D


(J.P. Tripp)

CONFIDENTIAL

2 July, 1969

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May E

Since Mr. Tripp's submission was drafted there have been continuing reports of the possibility of an Iraqi/Soviet deal on oil matters which might prove very damaging to I.P.C.'s interests. There has also been the leader in the Times of 3 July which raises the possibility of a television trial of Dr. Bazzaz. The Times takes a consistently hostile attitude towards Iraq and the fact that this leader has been published now does not necessarily mean that such a trial is going to happen. Nevertheless it remains a possibility, particularly since there have recently been trials of this kind involving prominent Iraqis. Either of these two events would put serious strains on Anglo-Iraqi relations and a visit in such circumstances could be very embarrassing, and might therefore have to be cancelled.

2. I have had the draft telegram amended to take account of these possibilities. While I strongly support in principle the idea of an official invitation to General Takriti and consider that this could be helpful to Anglo-Iraqi relations, I think that before taking a final decision we should ask Mr. Evans to consider the various drawbacks and to let us have his further advice.

G. G. Arthur

(G. G. ARTHUR)
4 July, 1969.

Pa PHM

14/7

Minister of State (Mr. Roberts)

Certainly, in principle. The visit might do a lot of good. But an invitation should not be extended if there is any likelihood of embarrassing incidents supervening, and the limitations will have to be spelled out to the Iraqis here and in Baghdad. I agree

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr 4/7

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
TELEGRAM NUMBER 531

TO BAGHDAD

4 JULY 1969. (NE Q)

3/548/1

CONFIDENTIAL.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 622: TAKRITI'S VISIT. ^{N629} 10/2

94

IN VIEW OF THE CONDITIONS WHICH TAKRITI HAS HITHERTO PUT ON A VISIT TO LONDON (YOUR TELEGRAMS NOS. 456 AND 553), IT SEEMS SUPRISING TO US THAT HE SHOULD CONSIDER ACCEPTING AN OFFICIAL INVITATION. WE ALSO WONDER WHETHER, WITH THE PRESENT STRAINS WITHIN THE IRAQI REGIME, HE WOULD WISH TO BE SEEN TO DO SO.

2. THERE ARE ALSO INHIBITIONS ON OUR SIDE. IT WOULD LOOK VERY ODD INDEED TO HAVE THE IRAQI DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ON AN OFFICIAL VISIT IF BETWEEN NOW AND THE END OF JULY THE IRAQIS CONCLUDED A DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS WHICH WAS SERIOUSLY DAMAGING TO IPC'S INTERESTS, OR IF THERE WERE A SERIES OF TELEVISION TRIALS INCLUDING BAZZAZ. THIS WOULD CAUSE A GREAT OUTCRY HERE (SEE FOR EXAMPLE THE TIMES LEADER OF 3 JULY) AND IF AN INVITATION HAD BEEN ISSUED WE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE TO WITHDRAW IT.

3. THERE ARE ALSO CONSIDERABLE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN ARRANGING A VISIT AT COMPARATIVELY SHORT NOTICE. THERE IS THE FINNISH STATE VISIT IN MID-JULY, FOLLOWED BY AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY THE RULER OF DUBAI UNTIL 24 JULY. THE LAST TEN DAYS OF JULY WILL BE A BUSY PERIOD FOR MINISTERS IN PARLIAMENT AND THE BEGINNING OF THE HOLIDAY SEASON FOR BUSINESSMEN. WITH THE BEST WILL IN THE WORLD, THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO ARRANGE THE SORT OF HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS WHICH TAKRITI MIGHT WISH AND THE IRAQIS MIGHT EXPECT. GUEST LISTS MIGHT LOOK SOMEWHAT THIN AND OUR EXPERIENCE HERE HAS BEEN THAT THE IRAQIS ARE CONSTANTLY ON THE LOOKOUT FOR DISCRIMINATION AND SLIGHTS. TO ARRANGE AN OFFICIAL VISIT THEREFORE WHICH, HOWEVER HARD WE TRIED, DID NOT MATCH UP TO THEIR EXPECTATIONS MIGHT DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD.

/4. IN ADDITION

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-2-

4. IN ADDITION, IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EXTEND AN OFFICIAL INVITATION FOR THE ENTIRE PERIOD. THREE TO FOUR DAYS IS NORMALLY THE MAXIMUM AND FOR THE REST OF THE PERIOD THE VISITOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS OWN EXPENSES. TAKRITI'S ENTOURAGE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE STRICTLY LIMITED. AN OFFICIAL INVITATION COULD BE EXTENDED TO HIS WIFE IF SHE IS STILL HERE AND TO AN AIDE OR PRIVATE SECRETARY.

5. THE SORT OF PROGRAMME WHICH WE HAVE IN MIND WOULD BE THREE TO FOUR DAYS WITH HOTEL ACCOMMODATION PAID AND AN OFFICIAL CAR PROVIDED: TALKS WITH THE MINISTER OF STATE (MR. ROBERTS): CALLS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND MINISTRY OF TECHNOLOGY: AND AN OFFICIAL ENTERTAINMENT BY H.M.G. WITH A MINISTER AS HOST. I.P.C. WOULD CERTAINLY DO THEIR BIT. COMET AND OTHER COMMERCIAL FIRMS MIGHT BE PREPARED TO HELP FILL OUT THE PROGRAMME. AS REGARDS DATES, THE WEEK BEGINNING 23 JULY WOULD BE BEST AND PERHAPS TAKRITI COULD START ON A PRIVATE BASIS AND THEN BECOME THE OFFICIAL GUEST OF H.M.G. FOR THE LAST THREE DAYS (23-30 JULY INCLUSIVE).

6. WE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD CONSIDER THE ABOVE POINTS MOST CAREFULLY AND BEFORE TAKING ANY ACTION LET US HAVE YOUR FURTHER ADVICE ON WHETHER YOU WOULD STILL RECOMMEND THAT AN OFFICIAL INVITATION BE EXTENDED IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE THINK THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO TELL TAKRITI FRANKLY THAT IF EVENTS TOOK PLACE IN THE COMING WEEKS TO PUT STRAINS ON ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE VISIT TO GO FORWARD.

7. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE THAT THE BOARD OF TRADE ARE HOPING TO BE ABLE TO EXTEND AN OFFICIAL INVITATION TO MUKHLIS. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THE SAME DIFFICULTIES APPLY HERE SINCE A VISIT BY THE IRAQI MINISTER OF MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS WOULD NOT ATTRACT MUCH NOTICE.

STEWART.

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N E. 17

* Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should
reach addressee(s)

103.

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

PRIORITY MARKINGS

~~Top Secret~~
~~Secret~~
~~Confidential~~
~~Restricted~~
~~Unclassified~~

~~Star~~
~~Immediate~~
~~Priority~~
~~Routine~~

(Date)

Despatched

CYPHER

PRIVACY MARKING

~~In Confidence~~

[Security classification
—if any]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~In Clair~~
~~Code~~
Cypher

[Privacy marking
—if any]

[Codeword—if any]


Addressed to BAGHDAD

telegram No. (date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to



Draft Telegram to:—
BAGHDAD

No. 331

(Date) 4/7

And to:—

Repeat to:—

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Your telegram No. 602: Takriti's Visit.

In view of the conditions which Takriti has hitherto put on a visit to London (your telegram Nos. 456 and 553), it seems surprising to us that he should consider accepting an official invitation. We also wonder whether, with the present strains within the Iraqi régime, he would wish to be seen to do so.

2. There are also inhibitions on our side. It would look very odd indeed to have the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister on an official visit if between now and the end of July the Iraqis concluded a deal with the Russians which was seriously damaging to IPC's interests, or if there were a series of television trials including Bazzaz. This would cause a great outcry here (see for example the Times leader of 3 July) and if an invitation

EXAMINED AT 12002
SIGNATURE W. 4/7

tion had been issued we would almost certainly have to withdraw it.

3. There are also considerable practical difficulties in arranging a visit at comparatively short notice. There is the Finnish State Visit in mid-July, followed by an official visit by the Ruler of Dubai until 24 July. The last ten days of July will be a busy period for Ministers in Parliament and the beginning of the holiday season for businessmen. With the best will in the world, therefore, it would be extremely difficult to arrange the sort of high level meetings which Takriti might wish and the Iraqis might expect. Guest lists might look somewhat thin and our experience here has been that the Iraqis are constantly on the lookout for discrimination and slights. To arrange an official visit therefore which, however hard we tried, did not match up to their expectations might do more harm than good.

4. In addition, it would not be possible to extend an official invitation for the entire period. Three to four days is normally the maximum and for the rest of the period the visitor is responsible for his own expenses. Takriti's entourage would also have to be strictly limited. An official invitation could be extended to his wife if she is still here and to an aide or private secretary.

5. The sort of programme which we have in mind would be three to four days with hotel accommodation paid and an official car provided; talks with the Minister of State (Mr. Roberts); calls in the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Technology; and an official entertainment by H.M.G. with a Minister as host.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

I.P.C. would certainly do their bit.

COMET and other commercial firms might be prepared to help fill out the programme. As regards dates, the week beginning 28 July would be best and perhaps Takriti could start on a private basis and then become the official guest of H.M.G. for the last three days (28-30 July inclusive).

6. We would be grateful if you would consider the above points most carefully and before taking any action let us have your further advice on whether you would still recommend that an official invitation be extended in these circumstances. We think that you would have to tell Takriti frankly that if events took place in the coming weeks to put strains on Anglo-Iraqi relations it would be difficult for the visit to go forward.

7. You will have seen from separate correspondence that the Board of Trade are hoping to be able to extend an official invitation to Mukhlis. We do not think that the same difficulties apply here since a visit by the Iraqi Minister of Municipal and Rural Affairs would not attract much notice.

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104

CYPHER/CAT A
IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD
TELEGRAM NUMBER 624

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE
7 JULY 1969

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103
YOUR TELNO. 531: TAKRITI'S VISIT.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 - 7 JUL 1969 NEQ 3/548/1

I AM GRATEFUL THAT DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES YOU ARE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE AN OFFICIAL VISIT.

2. I WAS MYSELF RATHER SURPRISED THAT TAKRITI HAD DECIDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO PAY AN OFFICIAL VISIT. HOWEVER, MUKHLIS' QUOTE TIP-OFF UNQUOTE WAS QUITE CLEAR. WE MUST THEREFORE ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT TAKRITI CONSIDERS HIS POSITION STRONG ENOUGH TO ACCEPT AN OFFICIAL INVITATION.

3. AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY TAKRITI ON THE HEELS OF ANY DEAL WITH THE RUSSIANS WHICH SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED IPC'S INTERESTS, WOULD CERTAINLY LOOK ODD. HOWEVER, IF THE IRAQI-RUSSIAN OIL AGREEMENT DOES NOT UNDULY PREJUDICE IPC'S POSITION (THE AGREEMENT AS REPORTED IN MOSCOW TELNO. 678 AND ANNOUNCED IN THE PRESS HERE MAKES NO MENTION OF MARKETING), A VISIT BY TAKRITI AT THIS TIME COULD BE BOTH SIGNIFICANT AND HELPFUL. AS REGARDS BAZZAZ, ACCOUNT MUST OBVIOUSLY BE TAKEN OF PUBLIC OPINION AND I AGREE THAT IF BAZZAZ APPEARED ON TELEVISION IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH SHOCKED WESTERN CONSCIENCES, IT COULD PRECLUDE THE VISIT. IT NEVERTHELESS SEEMS TO ME REGRETTABLE THAT BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION SHOULD BE CONDITIONED BY SUCH ONE SIDED ARTICLES AS HAVE RECENTLY APPEARED IN THE TIMES. - AND AS A RESULT OUR POLICY AND EXPORT DRIVE PREJUDICED.

4. A VISIT WHICH DID NOT MATCH UP TO TAKRITI'S EXPECTATIONS COULD DO MORE HARM THAN GOOD. HOWEVER, HE IS APPARENTLY INTENDING TO

/VISIT

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PO PNH

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- 2 -

VISIT THE U.K. IN ANY CASE AND, IF AN INVITATION IS EXTENDED, I THINK I COULD PUT OVER THE DIFFICULTIES OF FITTING IT INTO AN ALREADY TIGHT OFFICIAL PROGRAMME. I DO NOT THINK HE WOULD EXPECT AN INVITATION FOR LONGER THAN THE NORMAL 3 OR 4 DAYS OR THAT HE WOULD MAKE ANY DIFFICULTY ABOUT THE OFFICIAL PART OF HIS VISIT FOLLOWING RATHER THAN PRECEDING THE PRIVATE PART. THERE SHOULD ALSO BE NO DIFFICULTY ABOUT RESTRICTING HIS ENTOURAGE TO HIS WIFE AND AIDE.

5. WHEN I SEE TAKRITI, I WOULD LIKE THEREFORE TO SOUND HIM OUT. IT WOULD SOON BECOME APPARENT WHETHER THE IMPRESSION THAT MY COMMERCIAL COUNSELLOR AND I GAINED FROM MUKHLIS THAT AN OFFICIAL INVITATION WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE WAS CORRECT. I SHOULD LIKE, HOWEVER, TO BE AUTHORISED TO CONVEY AN OFFICIAL INVITATION, IF IT BECAME APPARENT THAT THIS WOULD BE WELCOME. BY THE TIME THAT I SEE HIM, WE SHALL KNOW MORE ABOUT AMMASH'S TRIP TO THE U.S.S.R. AND WE MAY HAVE MORE INFORMATION ABOUT BAZZAZ. I WOULD IN ANY CASE RAISE THESE TWO POINTS WITH TAKRITI BEFORE EXTENDING THE OFFICIAL INVITATION AND ONLY OFFER IT IF TAKRITI'S REPLIES APPEAR TO BE SATISFACTORY.

MR. EVANS

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105

Baathists' warning to the west

FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT—Baghdad, July 6

The Baathist regime in Iraq, which has, in the space of a few months, thrust itself into the forefront of the Arab movement with the bold recognition of east Germany and a sharp move towards the communist block generally has served notice that its future relations with the west will be determined by individual attitudes towards the Arab-Israel conflict.

"We are a Government and a state which adopts every problem concerning the Arab people", Mr. Abdullah Salloum Sammerai, the Minister of Information and a key figure in the Baath leadership told me. "We are against every country that does not understand our problem with Israel, and we are with all countries that do understand our problem."

A portent of the effect of such a policy on British and American interests in the Arab world if the present peace efforts fail is that three other Arab Governments, Sudan, with her new leftist regime, Syria, and South Yemen followed Iraq's lead on east Germany.

Whereas the west has made very little headway in Iraq since the Baathists came to power, the economic facts—not to mention more intangible political considerations—speak for themselves as far as the eastern block is concerned: the past few months have seen the potentially rich Mashraq sulphur field go to Poland; the Soviet Union enter the Iraq oil industry in a £35m. agreement; and east Germany consolidate her position with a £40m. loan scheme to finance 13 large industrial projects in the country.

Of added significance in the newly disclosed east German deal is that it will be at only 2½ per cent over 12 years and that repayment will be on a barter basis including 70 per cent of the estimated production of the Iraq National Oil Company.

Much is made of the "traditional goodwill" which Britain enjoys in Iraq—and which is in fact very real—but when it comes down to political and economic realities this could be said to be of little other than sentimental value.

"Our relationship has a long history and has been filled with many problems", Mr. Samerrai told me, taking the more extreme view. "They date from 1917. The last of them was the agreement of Britain to sell tanks to Israel. We are in a state of war with Israel and any help to Israel from Britain is against us."

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IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 545

TO BAGHDAD

8 JULY 1969

(NE)

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104

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 624: TAKRITI'S VISIT.

ALTHOUGH THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE IRAQI-SOVIET AGREEMENT ARE NOT YET CLEAR (WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR OWN ASSESSMENT IN DUE COURSE) IT LOOKS AS IF THE NORTH RUMAILA FIELD MAY NOW FINALLY BE LOST TO IPC, PROBABLY WITHOUT HOPE OF COMPENSATION. THIS IS A SERIOUS DEVELOPMENT WHICH MAY REQUIRE REPRESENTATIONS ON OUR PART TO THE IRAQI GOVT.

2. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT AN OFFICIAL VISIT BY A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT AT THE PRESENT TIME WOULD GENERATE CONSIDERABLE ADVERSE COMMENT IN THE BRITISH PRESS IN VIEW OF CURRENT INTEREST IN THE FATE OF THOSE DETAINED IN IRAQ AND FOLLOWING SO SOON ON THE IRAQI/SOVIET DEAL. THERE IS NOT MUCH WHICH WE COULD DO TO AVOID THIS AND ANTI-IRAQI CRITICISM IN BRITISH PAPERS WOULD BE ANOTHER FACTOR WHICH COULD RESULT IN THE VISIT DOING MORE HARM THAN GOOD TO ANGLO-IRAQI RELATIONS.

3. IN ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND SINCE TIME IS NOW SO VERY SHORT, WE HAVE RELUCTANTLY CONCLUDED THAT AN OFFICIAL INVITATION SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MADE.

/4. WHEN

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- 2 -

4. WHEN YOU SEE TAKRITI HOWEVER, PLEASE MAKE VERY CLEAR TO HIM OUR INTEREST IN HIS VISIT. WE LEAVE IT TO YOU TO DECIDE HOW BEST TO EXPLAIN TO HIM, IF YOU CONSIDER THIS NECESSARY, WHY, BOTH IN HIS AND OUR INTERESTS, WE THINK IT BEST NOT TO INVITE HIM AS AN OFFICIAL GUEST AT THIS TIME (YOU MAY THINK IT BEST TO CONCENTRATE ON THE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES - WRONG SEASON, SHORT NOTICE, ETC.). THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT HE WILL NOT RECEIVE A WARM WELCOME. WE WILL BE GLAD TO ARRANGE INTERVIEWS OR VISITS FOR HIM IF HE CAN TELL YOU WHAT HE WOULD LIKE TO DO. WE KNOW TOO THAT THE ORGANISATIONS AND FIRMS OPERATING IN IRAQ WOULD WISH TO EXTEND HOSPITALITY. WOULD HE THEREFORE GIVE YOU AN INDICATION OF HIS WISHES AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH HE WOULD LIKE A PROGRAMME ARRANGED. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE WILL UNDERSTAND IF HE PREFERS TO TREAT HIS VISIT AS A HOLIDAY AND A REST WITHOUT MANY ENGAGEMENTS.

STEWART

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Addressed to

BAGHDAD

telegram No.

(date)

And to

repeated for information to

Saving to

Your telegram No. 624: Takriti's Visit.

Although the implications of the Iraqi-Soviet agreement are not yet clear, ~~and~~ (we would welcome your own assessment in due course) it looks as if the north Rumaila field may now finally be lost to IPC, ~~and~~ probably without hope of compensation.

This is a serious development which may require representations on our part to the Iraqi Government.

2. It is also likely that an official visit by a senior member of the Iraqi Government at the

present time would generate considerable adverse ~~in view of current interest in the case of those detained in Iraq and following so soon on the Iraqi/Soviet deal.~~ comment in the British press. There is not much

which we could do to avoid this, and anti-Iraqi

criticism in British papers would be another factor

which could result in the visit doing more harm than good to Anglo-Iraqi relations.

3. In all the circumstances, and since time is now so very short, we have reluctantly concluded that

/an

Draft Telegram to:—
BAGHDAD

No.

545

(Date)

8/7

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an official invitation should not repeat not be made.

4. When you see Takriti however, please make very clear to him our interest in his visit. We leave it to you to decide how best to explain to him, if you consider this necessary, why, both in his and our interests, we think it best not to invite him as an official guest at this time.↑ This does not

imply that he will not receive a warm welcome. We will be glad to arrange interviews or visits for him if he can tell you what he would like to do. We know too that the organisations and firms operating in Iraq would wish to extend hospitality. Would he therefore give you an indication of his wishes and the extent to which he would like a programme arranged. On the other hand, we will understand if he prefers to treat his visit as a holiday and a rest without many engagements.

(You may think it best to concentrate on the practical difficulties -- wrong season, short notice, etc.)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr Roberts
Agrees the draft
telegram

W.F. 87

Mr A. ~~Adams~~ 18/7

Mr T. ~~Adams~~ (107)

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15.2.



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BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

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16 JUL 1969	
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26/11/69
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25/10
Translation.

No. 807/439/200.



27

Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Protocol Department,

Baghdad, 28 June, 1969.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and has the honour to ~~be~~ convey to the Embassy the approval of the Iraqi authorities to the nomination of Mr. H.G. Balfour as the new Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq in succession to Mr. Trevor Ellis Evans, the former Ambassador.

The Ministry avails itself of this opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy,
Baghdad.

1. Copy to Protocol Dept
F.O.

2. Hrg. Sec

U. J. 4/7

pa [signature]
16/7

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PRIORITY BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 675

19 JULY 1969

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--

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 545: TAKRITI'S VISIT.

THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN THE EVENT UNABLE TO SEE TAKRITI HIMSELF BEFORE HE LEFT AND THERE IS SOME OBSCURITY ABOUT THE PROPOSED VISIT. ON THE ONE HAND BAKR PROFESSED NO KNOWLEDGE OF IT AND TAKRITI'S P.S.O. TO WHOM THE AMBASSADOR SPOKE LIKEWISE KNEW NOTHING OF IT.

2. ON THE OTHER HAND, TAKRITI, WHOM I MET AT BAKR'S RECEPTION ON 17 JULY, HAS SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD ME THAT HE STILL HOPES TO GO TO LONDON AND THAT HE WILL LET US KNOW IF AND WHEN HE CAN GET AWAY. I NATURALLY SAID NOTHING TO HIM ABOUT AN INVITATION FROM HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT.

MR. HAWLEY

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Baghdad Despatch of 15 July 1969

Mr. Evans' Valedictory Despatch

NEQ 3/548/1

SUMMARY

1. Our failure to do business with the "progressive" régimes in the Arab world is in marked contrast with our continuing success with traditional régimes. This is surprising, as at least the Ba'ath Arab Socialist régime established in Iraq in July 1968 contains elements who are well-disposed to the United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 1 - 5)
2. Why have the Russians and the East Europeans been more successful? They have not allowed the régime's drastic treatment of the opposition and even of the Communists, to deter them and they have moved in quickly on all fronts. (Paragraphs 6 - 9)
3. Could we have done better? Probably, yes. In Egypt in 1955 and in Syria in 1967 our rigidity and lack of imagination had unfortunate results. In Algeria in 1963/64, we were more far-sighted and some of the advantages gained have survived the Middle East War of 1967. Moscow had no inhibitions. (Paragraphs 10 - 11)
4. No such tolerance has been in evidence in Whitehall, where the tendency has been to assume that with the exception of Nasser's Egypt progressive régimes would be short-lived. In Westminster, too, the Labour Party has shown little interest in Arab progressive movements - in marked contrast to the fraternal relations that have developed between the British Labour Party and the labour movement in Israel. (Paragraph 12)
5. Satisfaction of Her Majesty's Ambassador at his being called to re-open Her Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad. It has been restored to its rightful place, thanks to the loyal cooperation of the staff. This is encouraging at a time when the Service has failed so many of its most experienced members. (Paragraph 13)

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BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD

15 July 1969

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Sir,

I shall shortly be leaving Baghdad on the termination of my Mission. I shall at the same time be resigning from Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service after 32 years to take up my appointment to the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University of Wales.

2. The entire period of 32 years has been spent in the Arab world or in dealing with Arab affairs, the last fifteen in the so-called "progressive" countries, Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq. It might therefore be useful if I do not confine my valedictory observations to Anglo-Iraqi relations, but extend them to the wider field of Anglo-Arab relations, and in particular of relations with the "progressive" countries.

3. One thing stands out. It is that our efforts to do business with the new régimes have only been very partially successful. This is in marked contrast with what has happened in countries where traditional régimes have persisted. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf States, Libya and Jordan, British influence has been maintained and British interests safeguarded in a highly satisfactory manner.

4. Eleven years have passed since in this country the Revolution of 1958 swept away the King, Nuri Pasha and all they stood for. It is not surprising that we found it difficult to come to terms with the régicide Qassem, whose reforming zeal

/quickly

The Right Honourable
Michael Stewart, M.P.,
etc., etc., etc.,

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quickly gave way to eccentricity and violence, often turned against the very elements he sought to protect. The nine months period of the Ba'athist/Military rule in 1963 was hardly long enough to allow a meaningful relationship to be established. Under the two Arefs the régime was marked by undisguised military dictatorship, unalleviated by any pretence at ideology or even a serious attempt at honest or efficient government. The exception, the Bazzaz administration, was short-lived. Though there was some half-baked progressive legislation, land reform under Qassem and the establishment of a Public Sector under the first Aref, it is doubtful whether any of the Governments of this period, certainly not those of the Arefs, really qualify for the label "progressive" even of the Middle East variety. The resurgence of the Ba'ath after the coup d'état of July 1968 seemed to herald at least an approximation of progressive government and there were at the time signs that at least some lessons had been learned from the excesses of the 1963 experiment. It was clear that the régime could not have come to power and that it could not maintain itself, without the support of the military wing of the Party and its control of the Armed Forces. Nevertheless, observers were hopeful that some progress towards good government would be made, although the fundamental ruthlessness of the régime soon came to the surface. It was also known that there were among the leaders of the movement some that were well-disposed towards the United Kingdom, particularly

/General

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General Hardan Takriti, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Within a very short time of their coming to power, these elements made it clear to us that they were anxious to establish friendly relations with the United Kingdom in the economic, cultural and political fields. In particular, they indicated that they very much wanted to come to some agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, whose dispute with the Government had persisted since the nationalisation without compensation in 1961 of over 99% of the Company's concessionary territory. Nearly a year has passed and little progress has been made. It is pertinent to ask why, particularly as the Russians and the East Europeans have made marked headway in developing their relations with Iraq.

5. We should perhaps first consider whether those Ba'athis who profess to seek friendly relations with the United Kingdom are genuine and mean what they say. We should also consider what influence they have in the Councils of the Party and whether they are weaker or stronger than those who would prefer to develop cooperation with the U.S.S.R. and her allies. Fortunately, the record of 1963 is clear. General Takriti, who was then the Commander of the Iraqi Air Force, succeeded in partially re-equipping the Iraqi Air Force with British Hunter fighters and other British equipment, and there is no reason to doubt his word when he says that he would "like to do better" this time, when he is Minister of Defence and also Deputy Prime Minister. Unfortunately, although he is beyond question a powerful figure (possibly, as enjoying the loyalty of the Air Force, the key figure in any power struggle), he
/is certainly

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is certainly not all powerful and his influence among the civilians in the Party is limited as compared with that of General Ammash, Minister of the Interior, and of a number of other figures. But other influential persons, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and possibly President Bakr himself, appear to support General Takriti in his moderate courses. In general, even protagonists of a pro-Soviet policy, are probably not unconscious of the need to balance Russian influence. Few, Communists apart, want Iraq to become a Russian satellite.

6. Why then are the Russians succeeding and we have so far failed to do so? There has been no lack of trying on our part. General Takriti was invited to be the guest of Her Majesty's Government at the Farnborough Air Show last Autumn. There is no doubt that he would have liked nothing better than to have accepted, but it is equally clear that he did not feel strong enough at the time to do so. Hence, in part, his insistent desire to play a role in the settlement of the dispute between the I.P.C. and the Government, which would not only enable him to buy military equipment, particularly aircraft, in the United Kingdom, but would strengthen his position in the Party and in the Government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs responded early in the year with an invitation to the Minister of State, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, to visit Baghdad. Unfortunately, although he accepted the invitation, Mr. Roberts was unable, owing to other commitments, to fix a date for the visit.

17. As

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7. As regards the I.P.C., cautious probings were undertaken over the months but it was only in these last days that even modest progress was made. The recently concluded Cargo Dues Agreement the first for sixteen years, although covering only a limited field, at least proved that agreement between the Company and the Government was possible and opened the way to the consideration of more far-reaching problems.

8. Unfortunately, extraneous factors contributed to the difficulties of the situation. The régime's preoccupation with the activities of the opposition and with foreign espionage, which culminated in the public hangings last Spring and in the detention of well-known political figures, particularly the former Prime Minister, Bazzaz, who was well-known and much respected in the United Kingdom, brought down on the heads of the partly unsuspecting Iraqi leaders much merited and some unmerited criticism. In informing public opinion in the United Kingdom, liberals joined forces with both Arabophiles of the traditional variety, to whom Kings and Sheikhs represent Arabism and the so-called progressives are anathema, and with the pro-Israelis, who were delighted with the opportunity to denigrate Iraq. Iraq's image suffered not only with the general public but also in commercial, financial and industrial circles. The Iraqi leaders reacted with charges of interference in the internal affairs of Iraq and withdrew an invitation to a British

/Trade Mission

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Trade Mission to visit Baghdad. British commercial interest and participation in various development projects in Iraq quickly evaporated and Iraqi interest in alternative sources of technical and other assistance intensified. Very soon, mutual confidence was at a low ebb.

9. Not surprisingly, while this sad story was unfolding, the Russians and the East Europeans, who by virtue of economic and arms supply agreements dating back to the time of Qassem were well placed to move forward, lost no time in taking advantage of the situation. In quick succession, the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior visited Moscow and various lesser Ministers visited the lesser capitals in the Communist camp. Numerous Communist delegations visited Iraq and it was clear that the Russians and their allies were making every effort in the economic, political, military and cultural fields. All this culminated in the recognition of the G.D.R., in an agreement with Poland for Polish participation in the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits and in agreements with the U.S.S.R. for the development of fisheries, the construction of dams on the Euphrates and, more important, for cooperation in the direct exploitation of the country's petroleum resources, including those in North Rumaila. This should not surprise us. Many elements in the Party, particularly its younger members, are naturally receptive to the blandishments of the Left. Unlike their elders, even of the same class (school teachers, minor officials, etc.) they have had little contact with the British
/and the

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and the West and the diet of propaganda and lies on which they have been brought up hardly predisposes them to a favourable view of Western policy. They were thus not protected even by the principle, well respected in the Arab world, of "The Devil you know is better than the Devil you don't know" and were thus ready to fall into the embrace of the Russian bear. The Czech lesson had no meaning for them. Even the more experienced leaders, for example, General Ammash, who is anti-Communist and, in spite of his rivalry with General Takriti, not anti-British, has to take them into account, particularly as his influence in the Armed Forces is not so great as that of General Takriti. General Ammash probably does not like it and it may be that pressure from below is to some extent serving to bring the two rival Generals together. Finally, and perhaps the most telling argument of all, shortage of cash. Anyone who is prepared to offer credit on favourable terms, and the Russians and the East Germans are, is well placed to do business with the Iraqis.

19. In these circumstances, was there anything we could have done that would have avoided these, from our point of view, unsatisfactory results. My feeling is that there was, and this is reinforced by my experience in other progressive Arab countries. Most of the advantages of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian settlement were, in my opinion, largely lost by our over-rigid attitude to the supply of arms to the Egyptian Armed

/Forces

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Forces, an attitude which caused them to turn to the Eastern Bloc and led directly to the Suez disaster. We similarly lost an opportunity in Syria in 1966/67, when the half-hearted attitude of both Whitehall and the firms concerned, resulted in a major project for the financing of a "national" oil pipeline falling from our grasp. This was a project which the Syrian Prime Minister of the day said would have led to greater things and a new page in Anglo-Syrian relations, if, as he had hoped, it had been executed with the cooperation of the United Kingdom. A better start was made in the newly independent Algeria, and its first major project, also an oil pipeline, was financed and constructed by British initiative. The good effects to some extent survived the Middle East War of 1967 and the construction of the pipeline have since secured further valuable contracts in the same field.

91. It is significant that the Russians have missed few such opportunities. Their diplomatic representatives in Baghdad have in private been as critical of the Ba'ath régime as they have of that of the Arefs, and that for good reason. In spite of talk of a common front and in spite of Ba'athi efforts to secure the support of the Communists (on Ba'athi terms, of course), the Communist Party has been kept under the closest surveillance and, though the excesses of 1963 against the Communists have not been repeated, its members have little reason to love the Ba'athis. Moscow's dislike of the régime's Kurdish policy, of its hostility to the pro-Russian left wing Ba'ath régime in Syria and its intransigence over Palestine /are well known.

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are well known. The Russians must know that many of the Ba'ath Party leaders are anti-Communist for religious, if not for any other reason, and that even among the rank and file, the younger and more starry-eyed excepted, there are some reservations about both Communism and the U.S.S.R. The Russians must know too that those of them who come into contact with the Iraqis, in general fail to inspire affection and that the Iraqis who for some reason or another spend time in the U.S.S.R., return home with little respect for the Russian way of life. Nevertheless, the Governments in Moscow and in the Eastern European capitals have not allowed these considerations to stand in their way and have lost no opportunity of extending their influence in this country with a view no doubt to extending it in due course even farther in the Persian Gulf. In this respect, the fisheries agreement is surely significant.

12. No such tolerance has been in evidence in Whitehall. The tendency seems to have been to assume that the régimes would be short-lived (although it was usually admitted that it was unlikely that they would be replaced by anything better) and to adopt a policy of wait and see. This looks uncommonly like complacency and/or wishful thinking and has proved highly damaging to our interests, as the latest Iraqi/Soviet Agreement for the development of Iraq's oil and irrigation potential shows. In Westminster, too, there has been a
/similar lack

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similar lack of enthusiasm and it is disappointing that the Labour Party should have shown little interest in the progressive Arab movements - in sharp contrast to the fraternal relations that have developed between the Labour Party and the labour movement in Israel. More generally, neither the Government nor the oil companies, whose stake in this country is our major preoccupation, have shown much understanding for or sympathy with the developing peoples' aspirations, e.g. their desire to exploit their own oil resources themselves. It has become fashionable to dismiss these régimes as of no account and this has been accompanied latterly by a tendency to permit tendentious press comment to influence policy, to the detriment of our export drive. All this has not escaped the notice of the Arab leaders concerned, who feel that they are being cold-shouldered and driven into the arms of the Communists.

13. I realise that, as I have served so long in "progressive" Arab countries, this is also a measure of my own failure. It is, however, a matter of personal satisfaction that, having experienced the break in diplomatic relations between neighbouring Syria and the United Kingdom, it should have fallen to me to re-open Her Majesty's Embassy here in Baghdad. Her Majesty's Embassy has, I venture to say, been restored to its rightful place in the eyes of both the Iraqi authorities and of foreign Missions. That this has been possible is due to the excellence, loyalty and devotion to duty of my

/staff

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staff at all levels. It is indeed encouraging that such qualities should be so abundantly in evidence when the Service itself has failed so many of its able and experienced members. It is a privilege to have served at all, but it is sad to leave at such a juncture.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Jedda and Tripoli.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant

A handwritten signature in dark ink, consisting of several fluid, connected strokes, positioned above a horizontal line.

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Mr. AclandMr. Evans Valedictory Despatch


Mr. Evans is generally critical of our (Whitehall and Westminster) attitude to "progressive" regimes in the Arab world with particular reference to our apparent reluctance to deal with the Ba'athists in Iraq. He feels that we have missed opportunities in Iraq and have (this is by inference) thus allowed the Russians and East Europeans greater scope for increasing their influence in the area. The specific opportunities that we have missed in Iraq are not spelled out nor are there recommendations on how we ought to have proceeded to improve Anglo/Iraqi relations.

2. I recommend

(a) that the despatch be printed for Foreign and Commonwealth Office distribution only;

(b) that priority printing is not necessary in this instance.

3. I have prepared a copy for the printers. There is a spare copy which Mr. Hayman and Mr. Arthur (on return) may wish to see. Mr. Balfour Paul should also see the despatch when he visits the department. Our departmental paper on Iraq should be attached to Mr. Evans' despatch if this is to be submitted upwards so as to present a balanced picture of Anglo-Iraqi relations.



(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)
28 July, 1969

I agree.

2. I have sent a copy to Print.

3. Mr. Tupp is making another copy to Mr. Hayman, P.V.S. & Mr. Allen o.r.

4. Most of the points raised are answered in the Departmental paper on Iraq which we have recently submitted after consultation with other Departments.

5. Oil Dept may care to see it is copy before the print is distributed.

Mr. Bryant C.J. 4/8
Oil Dept.

AA Acland
21/7

/I fear

I fear that the misunderstanding which has persisted between Mr. Evans and the Department over the oil situation in Iraq emerges very clearly from this despatch. With respect to him, the answer to the question at the end of para. 4 (Why has so little progress been made over a settlement of the IPC's dispute with Iraq?) is that it has not been in the interests of the IPC to accept the terms offered them by the Iraqis. Whether or not the IPC are right in their judgement is hardly for H.M.G. to say. On balance, I should have thought that the Groups of the IPC were doing very well from their Iraqi operation as matters stood, and that given the potential glut of oil in the world market, they might well find themselves in difficulties - not least over production - if they were to reach an agreement on the terms which the Iraqis are offering.

2. I fear that Mr. Evans has confused the advantage and benefit of concluding an agreement for agreements sake, substantial though these may be, with the advantage and benefit which the IPC would look to obtain from a settlement. In any case we are now fully engaged in the task of assessing what agreement would be beneficial to British interests on the Iraq oil front, and perspectives are changing rapidly.

3. Again with respect to Mr. Evans, however, I suggest that his recollection of the affair of the oil pipeline in Syria in 1965/66 has become slightly unbalanced with the passage of time. In fact, Whitehall - and this Department in particular - exerted itself to the utmost to assist Costains to obtain the oil pipeline contract. (I remember in particular a clutch of flash telegrams being despatched just before Christmas in 1965). What in fact happened was that SNAM Progetti, a subsidiary of the Italian para-statal company ENI, filched the contract from under Costains noses by devious methods. What Costain would not do was to cut their prices and/or specifications for the pipeline in order to undercut the Italians to such an extent that the company made no profit on the deal. It might have been different had Costains been seeking to break into a market which held substantial possibilities for them. But this was not the case in Syria, and the project had to stand or fall on its own merits.

4. In the same way, the IPC must judge whether they would gain or lose from a substantive agreement with the Iraqis. Not even the port dues agreement is a happy precedent, since in the negotiation of this agreement it was the IPC which made all the concessions. Mr. Evans therefore seems to want us to conclude a settlement with the Iraqis solely on their terms. It should, however, be recalled that H.M.G., and the British oil companies, also have their own interests to look to.

5. One final point of detail is that Mr. Evans seems to assume that it is on Soviet initiative that the recent oil agreements have been concluded with Iraq. In fact, according to Gen. Ammash's revelations to Mr. Hahn, it was Ammash who approached the Russians, for his own political purposes. But the agreements with the Russians offer nothing like the advantages which the Iraqis could conceivably obtain from the IPC i.e. a cash down payment, plus a fairly swift share of the profits from the exploitation of North Rumaila and other fields. The Russian agreements, by contrast, offer only limited profits during the next 7 years while the Russians loan would be repaid. It would not be until 1980 that Iraq would feel the real

benefit of the Soviet deal. And I strongly doubt whether any Iraqi leader can afford to look as far ahead as that.

6. Incidentally, Mr. Evans initiated a protracted correspondence about the possibility of our coming to terms with the Arab "progressives", during his tour of duty as H.M. Ambassador at Damascus in 1966. His views then received little support, either from the Department or posts.

C.T. Brant

(C.T. Brant)
Oil Department
1 August 1969

Mr. Adams.

I agree with all of the foregoing,
AMM 5/8

Mr. Hinchcliffe: Soda I. *PLM/Hull*

Mr. Topp: may care to see also.

Mr. Brant's recollections and judgements are useful reminders of the need to assess interests when advocating courses of action or policies.

J.P.?
7.8.

AMM pa.

7/8

CONFIDENTIAL

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Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Whitehall Distribution

IRAQ

24 July, 1969

Section 1

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IRAQ: VALEDICTORY DESPATCH

Mr. Evans to Mr. Stewart. (Received 24 July)

SUMMARY

Our failure to do business with the "progressive" régimes in the Arab world is in marked contrast with our continuing success with traditional régimes. This is surprising, as at least the Ba'ath Arab Socialist régime established in Iraq in July 1968 contains elements who are well-disposed to the United Kingdom. (Paragraphs 1-5.)

2. Why have the Russians and the East Europeans been more successful? They have not allowed the régime's drastic treatment of the Opposition and even of the Communists to deter them and they have moved in quickly on all fronts. (Paragraphs 6-9.)

3. Could we have done better? Probably, yes. In Egypt in 1955 and in Syria in 1967 our rigidity and lack of imagination had unfortunate results. In Algeria in 1963-64 we were more far-sighted and some of the advantages gained have survived the Middle East war of 1967. Moscow had no inhibitions. (Paragraphs 10-11.)

4. No such tolerance has been in evidence in Whitehall, where the tendency has been to assume that with the exception of Nasser's Egypt progressive régimes would be short-lived. In Westminster, too, the Labour Party has shown little interest in Arab progressive movements—in marked contrast to the fraternal relations that have developed between the British Labour Party and the labour movement in Israel. (Paragraph 12.)

5. Satisfaction of Her Majesty's Ambassador at his being called to reopen Her Majesty's Embassy in Baghdad. It has been restored to its rightful place, thanks to the loyal co-operation of the staff. This is encouraging at a time when the Service has failed so many of its most experienced members. (Paragraph 13.)

(Confidential)

Sir,

Baghdad,

15 July, 1969.

I shall shortly be leaving Baghdad on the termination of my mission. I shall at the same time be resigning from Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service after 32 years to take up my appointment to the Woodrow Wilson Chair of International Politics at the University of Wales.

2. The entire period of 32 years has been spent in the Arab world or in dealing with Arab affairs, the last 15 in the so-called "progressive" countries, Egypt, Algeria, Syria and Iraq. It might therefore be useful if I do not confine my valedictory observations to Anglo-Iraqi relations but extend them to the wider field of Anglo-Arab relations, and in particular of relations with the "progressive" countries.

CONFIDENTIAL

3. One thing stands out. It is that our efforts to do business with the new régimes have only been very partially successful. This is in marked contrast with what has happened in countries where traditional régimes have persisted. In Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the Persian Gulf States, Libya and Jordan British influence has been maintained and British interests safeguarded in a highly satisfactory manner.

4. Eleven years have passed since in this country the revolution of 1958 swept away the king, Nuri Pasha and all they stood for. It is not surprising that we found it difficult to come to terms with the *régicide* Qassem, whose reforming zeal quickly gave way to eccentricity and violence, often turned against the very elements he sought to protect. The nine months' period of the Ba'athist/Military rule in 1963 was hardly long enough to allow a meaningful relationship to be established. Under the two Arefs the régime was marked by undisguised military dictatorship, unalleviated by any pretence at ideology or even a serious attempt at honest or efficient government. The exception, the Bazzaz Administration, was short-lived. Though there was some half-baked progressive legislation, land reform under Qassem and the establishment of a Public Sector under the first Aref, it is doubtful whether any of the Governments of this period, certainly not those of the Arefs, really qualify for the label "progressive" even of the Middle East variety. The resurgence of the Ba'ath after the *coup d'état* of July 1968 seemed to herald at least an approximation of progressive government and there were at the time signs that at least some lessons had been learned from the excesses of the 1963 experiment. It was clear that the régime could not have come to power and that it could not maintain itself without the support of the military wing of the party and its control of the armed forces. Nevertheless observers were hopeful that some progress towards good government would be made, although the fundamental ruthlessness of the régime soon came to the

surface. It was also known that there were among the leaders of the movement some that were well-disposed towards the United Kingdom, particularly General Hardan Takriti, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. Within a very short time of their coming to power these elements made it clear to us that they were anxious to establish friendly relations with the United Kingdom in the economic, cultural and political fields. In particular they indicated that they very much wanted to come to some agreement with the Iraq Petroleum Company, whose dispute with the Government had persisted since the nationalisation without compensation in 1961 of over 99 per cent of the company's concessionary territory. Nearly a year has passed and little progress has been made. It is pertinent to ask why, particularly as the Russians and the East Europeans have made marked headway in developing their relations with Iraq.

5. We should perhaps first consider whether those Ba'athis who profess to seek friendly relations with the United Kingdom are genuine and mean what they say. We should also consider what influence they have in the Councils of the Party and whether they are weaker or stronger than those who would prefer to develop co-operation with the USSR and her allies. Fortunately the record of 1963 is clear. General Takriti, who was then the Commander of the Iraqi Air Force, succeeded in partially re-equipping the Iraqi Air Force with British Hunter fighters and other British equipment, and there is no reason to doubt his word when he says that he would "like to do better" this time, now he is Minister of Defence and also Deputy Prime Minister. Unfortunately, although he is beyond question a powerful figure (possibly, as enjoying the loyalty of the air force, the key figure in any power struggle), he is certainly not all-powerful and his influence among the civilians in the party is limited as compared with that of General Ammash, Minister of the Interior, and of a number of other figures. But other influential persons, for example, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and possibly

President Bakr himself, appear to support General Takriti in his moderate courses. In general even protagonists of a pro-Soviet policy are probably not unconscious of the need to balance Russian influence. Few, Communists apart, want Iraq to become a Russian satellite.

6. Why then are the Russians succeeding and we have so far failed to do so? There has been no lack of trying on our part. General Takriti was invited to be the guest of Her Majesty's Government at the Farnborough Air Show last autumn. There is no doubt that he would have liked nothing better than to have accepted, but it is equally clear that he did not feel strong enough at the time to do so. Hence, in part, his insistent desire to play a role in the settlement of the dispute between the IPC and the Government, which would not only enable him to buy military equipment, particularly aircraft, in the United Kingdom, but would strengthen his position in the party and in the Government. The Minister of Foreign Affairs responded early in the year with an invitation to the Minister of State, Mr. Goronwy Roberts, to visit Baghdad. Unfortunately, although he accepted the invitation, Mr. Roberts was unable owing to other commitments to fix a date for the visit.

7. As regards the IPC, cautious probings were undertaken over the months but it was only in these last days that even modest progress was made. The recently concluded Cargo Dues Agreement, the first for 16 years, although covering only a limited field at least proved that agreement between the company and the Government was possible and opened the way to the consideration of more far-reaching problems.

8. Unfortunately extraneous factors contributed to the difficulties of the situation. The régime's preoccupation with the activities of the Opposition and with foreign espionage, which culminated in the public hangings last spring and in the detention of well-known political figures, particularly the former Prime Minister, Bazzaz, who was well known and much respected in the United Kingdom, brought

down on the heads of the partly unsuspecting Iraqi leaders much merited and some unmerited criticism. In informing public opinion in the United Kingdom, liberals joined forces with both Arabophiles of the traditional variety, to whom kings and sheikhs represent Arabism and the so-called progressives are anathema, and with the pro-Israelis, who were delighted with the opportunity to denigrate Iraq. Iraq's image suffered not only with the general public but also in commercial, financial and industrial circles. The Iraqi leaders reacted with charges of interference in the internal affairs of Iraq and withdrew an invitation to a British trade mission to visit Baghdad. British commercial interest and participation in various development projects in Iraq quickly evaporated and Iraqi interest in alternative sources of technical and other assistance intensified. Very soon, mutual confidence was at a low ebb.

9. Not surprisingly, while this sad story was unfolding, the Russians and the East Europeans, who by virtue of economic and arms supply agreements dating back to the time of Qassem were well placed to move forward, lost no time in taking advantage of the situation. In quick succession the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defence and Minister of the Interior visited Moscow and various lesser Ministers visited the lesser capitals in the Communist camp. Numerous Communist delegations visited Iraq and it was clear that the Russians and their allies were making every effort in the economic, political, military and cultural fields. All this culminated in the recognition of the GDR, in an agreement with Poland for Polish participation in the exploitation of Iraq's sulphur deposits and in agreements with the USSR for the development of fisheries, the construction of dams on the Euphrates and, more important, for co-operation in the direct exploitation of the country's petroleum resources, including those in North Rumaila. This should not surprise us. Many elements in the party, particularly its younger members, are naturally receptive to the blandishments of the Left. Unlike

their elders, even of the same class (school teachers, minor officials, etc.) they have had little contact with the British and the West and the diet of propaganda and lies on which they have been brought up hardly predisposes them to a favourable view of Western policy. They were thus not protected even by the principle, well respected in the Arab world, of "the devil you know is better than the devil you don't know" and were thus ready to fall into the embrace of the Russian bear. The Czech lesson had no meaning for them. Even the more experienced leaders, for example General Ammash, who is anti-Communist and, in spite of his rivalry with General Takriti, not anti-British, has to take them into account, particularly as his influence in the armed forces is not so great as that of General Takriti. General Ammash probably does not like it and it may be that pressure from below is to some extent serving to bring the two rival generals together. Finally, and perhaps the most telling argument of all, shortage of cash. Anyone who is prepared to offer credit on favourable terms, and the Russians and the East Germans are, is well placed to do business with the Iraqis.

10. In these circumstances was there anything we could have done that would have avoided these, from our point of view, unsatisfactory results? My feeling is that there was, and this is reinforced by my experience in other progressive Arab countries. Most of the advantages of the 1954 Anglo-Egyptian settlement were, in my opinion, largely lost by our over-rigid attitude to the supply of arms to the Egyptian Armed Forces, an attitude which caused them to turn to the Eastern bloc and led directly to the Suez disaster. We similarly lost an opportunity in Syria in 1966-67, when the half-hearted attitude of both Whitehall and the firms concerned resulted in a major project for the financing of a "national" oil pipeline falling from our grasp. This was a project which the Syrian Prime Minister of the day said would have led to greater things and a new page in Anglo-Syrian relations if, as he had hoped, it had been executed with the

co-operation of the United Kingdom. A better start was made in the newly independent Algeria, and its first major project, also an oil pipeline, was financed and constructed by British initiative. The good effects to some extent survived the Middle East war of 1967 and the constructors of the pipeline have since secured further valuable contracts in the same field.

11. It is significant that the Russians have missed few such opportunities. Their diplomatic representatives in Baghdad have in private been as critical of the Ba'ath régime as they have of that of the Arefs, and that for good reason. In spite of talk of a common front and in spite of Ba'athi efforts to secure the support of the Communists (on Ba'athi terms, of course), the Communist Party has been kept under the closest surveillance and, though the excesses of 1963 against the Communists have not been repeated, its members have little reason to love the Ba'athis. Moscow's dislike of the régime's Kurdish policy, of its hostility to the pro-Russian Left-wing Ba'ath régime in Syria and its intransigence over Palestine are well known. The Russians must know that many of the Ba'ath Party leaders are anti-Communist for religious if not for any other reason, and that even among the rank and file, the younger and more starry-eyed excepted, there are some reservations about both Communism and the USSR. The Russians must know too that those of them who come into contact with the Iraqis in general fail to inspire affection and that the Iraqis who for some reason or another spend time in the USSR return home with little respect for the Russian way of life. Nevertheless the Governments in Moscow and in the Eastern European capitals have not allowed these considerations to stand in their way and have lost no opportunity of extending their influence in this country with a view no doubt to extending it in due course even farther in the Persian Gulf. In this respect the fisheries agreement is surely significant.

12. No such tolerance has been in evidence in Whitehall. The tendency seems

to have been to assume that the régimes would be short-lived (although it was usually admitted that it was unlikely that they would be replaced by anything better) and to adopt a policy of wait and see. This looks uncommonly like complacency and/or wishful thinking and has proved highly damaging to our interests, as the latest Iraqi/Soviet Agreement for the development of Iraq's oil and irrigation potential shows. In Westminster, too, there has been a similar lack of enthusiasm and it is disappointing that the Labour Party should have shown little interest in the progressive Arab movements—in sharp contrast to the fraternal relations that have developed between the Labour Party and the Labour movement in Israel. More generally neither the Government nor the oil companies, whose stake in this country is our major preoccupation, have shown much understanding for or sympathy with the developing peoples' aspirations, *e.g.*, their desire to exploit their own oil resources themselves. It has become fashionable to dismiss these régimes as of no account and this has been accompanied latterly by a tendency to permit tendentious Press comment to influence policy, to the detriment of our export drive. All this has not escaped the notice of the Arab leaders concerned, who feel that they are being

cold-shouldered and driven into the arms of the Communists.

13. I realise that, as I have served so long in "progressive" Arab countries, this is also a measure of my own failure. It is, however, a matter of personal satisfaction that, having experienced the break in diplomatic relations between neighbouring Syria and the United Kingdom, it should have fallen to me to reopen Her Majesty's Embassy here in Baghdad. Her Majesty's Embassy has, I venture to say, been restored to its rightful place in the eyes of both the Iraqi authorities and of foreign Missions. That this has been possible is due to the excellence, loyalty and devotion to duty of my staff at all levels. It is indeed encouraging that such qualities should be so abundantly in evidence when the Service itself has failed so many of its able and experienced members. It is a privilege to have served at all, but it is sad to leave at such a juncture.

I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Algiers, Amman, Bahrain, Beirut, Jedda and Tripoli.

I have, &c.

T. E. EVANS.



Mr. Makinson,
N.E.D.

14

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When Iraqi Ministers called on Mr. Roberts last November they mentioned in passing the inaccurate entry on Iraq in the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Mr. Roberts subsequently wrote to the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and received a reply from one of them suggesting that they might meet in May of this year; in the end this did not take place.

7

2. Some notice must have been taken of Mr. Roberts' remarks, because the attached ^{att'd.} extract on Iraq has recently arrived at this office. Mr. Roberts would be grateful for your comments on this revised article, which he would like to send in a letter to the editors of the Encyclopaedia.

K. I. Ferguson

(K. I. Ferguson)
31 July. 1969

Mr Ferguson

We spoke on Friday. I agreed to draft a letter, incorporating our comments on the article, which Mr Roberts may wish to send to Mr Kent, the Deputy Editor for London, to whom Mr Roberts' letter of 14 January was to Sir

William Haley was cited. I think that
it was on Mr Kents' instruction that the
article on Iraq for the 1969 edition was,
somewhat belatedly, sent to Mr Roberts

FLAG-M


I attach a draft letter.

PRM Hinchcliffe

(P.R.M. HINCHCLIFFE)

N.E.D.

4/8/1969.

Mr Roberts agrees the draft.  Def to type pr.

IRAQ.

1969 PRINTING

age of being written in an easily readable Aramaic alphabet, whereas the Zoroastrian books (largely commentaries on the Avesta and treatises on religious subjects, composed down to the 9th century) are written in the highly ambiguous Pahlavi script and abound in Semitic ideograms. The extant Pahlavi literature has been computed to amount to 628,000 words (E. W. West). The Manichaean texts, discovered in central Asia at the beginning of the 20th century, are much less numerous but have shed much light on the reading of Pahlavi books.

The first specimen of the Bactrian language, recorded in Greek letters, comes from an inscription of the 2nd century A.D., which was discovered in northern Afghanistan in 1957.

Khwarazmian is found only in glosses and sentences imbedded in medieval Islamic law books.

Sogdian, the native language of the province centred on Samarkand, is available in three distinct Semitic alphabets, one being employed for lay documents and for Buddhist texts, one for Christian and the third for Manichaean literature. Each group, moreover, is characterized by dialectal variations. Sogdian traders and missionaries, traveling and settling in colonies along the route connecting Sogdiana with China, raised their language to the status of a lingua franca of central Asia between the 4th and the 10th centuries. A great deal of Sogdian literature was still awaiting publication at mid-20th century.

Saka is known in two varieties. One, richly attested, was once the language of the kingdom of Khotan in Chinese Turkistan and hence is known as Khotanese. The other (of which only one Buddhist fragment survives) was connected with Tumshuq, also in Chinese Turkistan. (See SAKA.) Phonologically, the Iranian language which is closest to Khotanese is the present-day Wakhi in the Pamirs. The amount of Khotanese literature that has been recovered (largely Buddhist, but including some documents of lay content) is hardly less than what has survived in Pahlavi. The language is permeated with Indian elements. The study of Khotanese, still in its initial stage in the 1960s, seemed bound to have a profound effect on philologists' understanding of Iranian in all its branches.

Modern Languages.—All Iranian languages now used display some tendency toward an analytic stage (simplification of the sounds and, in morphology, the use of new auxiliary tenses, etc.). Of these languages by far the most important is literary Persian, as found in the extensive Persian literature and among educated speakers.

Modern Persian is a direct descendant of Middle Persian, but has borrowed many words from a source akin to Parthian, and contains numerous Arabic and Turkish elements. It is written in Arabic characters. Though Modern Persian is a single language, local variations spoken in Iran, Afghanistan, India and Russian Turkistan (Tadzhik S.S.R.) are considerable.

Dialects, parallel to literary Persian, are used in most Iranian towns and villages. The dialects of Fars, Luristan, Khurasan and Kerman belong to the same southern group as the literary language. On the other hand, numerous other vernaculars represent the remains of former northwestern idioms.

Such are the local dialects of the Caspian provinces, the language of the Kurds (spread over a vast area and sporadically found in northern Syria and even close to Ankara in Asia Minor), the language of the Balochis (*q.v.*) and the tongues of isolated groups (such as those of Kashan, Simnan, etc.).

Among Modern Iranian languages of the eastern group are the Afghan language, Pashto (*q.v.*) or Pushto, the various dialects of the Pamir group (Shughni, Wakhji, Munjani, etc.), Yaghnobi (a modern descendant of Sogdian) and Ossetic (see OSSETIC LANGUAGE), spoken in the heart of the Caucasian mountains south of Ordzhonikidze (Vladikavkaz), a survivor of the once powerful Sarmatian group of Saka spoken in south Russia.

See also references under "Iranian Languages" in the Index.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.—Detailed monographs on most Iranian languages, with a bibliography complete to the end of the 19th century, will be found in vol. I of *Grundriss der iranischen Philologie*, ed. by W. Geiger and E. Kuhn (part I, 1895-1901; part II, 1898-1901; supplement on Ossetic, 1903). Its modern, more succinct counterpart is *Handbuch der Orientalistik*, vol. IV (*Iranistik*), part 1 (*Linguistik*), ed. by B.

Spuler (1958). For the Old Iranian languages see: C. Bartholomae, *Altiranisches Wörterbuch* (1904), *Zum altiranischen Wörterbuch* (1906); R. G. Kent, *Old Persian* (1950). Middle Persian and Parthian texts have been edited by W. B. H. Henning from 1932 onward; see also A. Ghilain, *Essai sur la langue parthe* (1939); and Mary Boyce, *The Manichaean Hymn-Cycles in Parthian* (1954). For a selection of Parthian ostraca see I. M. Diakonov and V. A. Livshits, *Dokumenty iz Nizy* (25th International Congress of Orientalists, Moscow [1960]). For Shapur's inscription see M. Sprengling, *Third Century Iran, Sapor and Kartir* (1953). For Bactrian inscriptions see W. B. H. Henning, *Bull. Sch. Orient. (and Afr.) Stud. Lond. Univ.*, xxiii (1960). Other inscriptions: *Corpus Inscriptionum Iranicarum* (London, 1955-). For Khwarazmian see A. A. Freiman, *The Khorezmian Language* (in Russian, 1951). Sogdian texts have been published by F. W. K. Müller, W. Lentz, R. Gauthiot, E. Benveniste, W. B. H. Henning and O. Hansen; see Ilya Gershevitch, *A Grammar of Manichaean Sogdian* (1954). V. A. Livshits has been publishing Sogdian documents from the Samarkand region since 1959. Khotanese texts have been edited chiefly by E. and M. Leumann, S. Konow and Sir Harold Bailey; see for instance H. W. Bailey, *Khotanese Texts*, vol. iv (1961). For the languages spoken in Afghanistan and the Pamirs see G. A. Grierson, *Linguistic Survey of India*, vol. x (1921); G. Morgenstierne, *An Etymological Vocabulary of Pashto* (1927), *Indo-Iranian Frontier Languages*, 2 vol. (1929, 1938); on Ossetic see V. I. Abayev, *Ossetic Language and Folklore* (1949), *Ossetic Etymological Dictionary* (1958-), both in Russian. For Modern Persian and Kurdish dialects see O. Mann and K. Hadank, *Kurdisch-persische Forschungen*, 7 vol. (1906-30); D. N. MacKenzie, *Kurdish Dialect Studies*, 2 vol. (1961-62); A. Christensen, *Contributions à la dialectologie iranienne*, 2 vol. (1930-35); B. V. Miller, *The Talyshi Language* (in Russian, 1953).

The best theoretical grammar of Modern Persian is C. Salemann and V. A. Zhukovsky, *Persische Grammatik* (1889). More practical are D. C. Phillott, *Higher Persian Grammar* (1919), and Ann K. S. Lambton, *Persian Grammar* (1952). Dictionaries include: J. A. Vullers, *Lexicon persico-latinum*, 2 vol. and an annex (1855), complete and important for research work; Baron J. J. P. Desmaisons, *Dictionnaire persan-français*, 4 vol. (1908-14); S. Halm, *New Persian-English Dictionary*, 2 vol. (1934-36), *New English-Persian Dictionary*, 2 vol. (1929-31). (V. F. M.; I. A. G.)

IRANIAN LITERATURE: see PERSIAN LITERATURE.

IRAQ (AL JUMHURIYAH AL 'IRAQIYAH or AL 'IRAQ), an independent country of southwest Asia and a republic since 1958, is bounded north by Turkey, east by Iran, southeast by the Persian gulf, south by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and west by Jordan and Syria. Its area is 167,568 sq.mi. and population (1965) 8,261,527 (including 40,818 Iraqis living abroad). It comprises the three former Turkish provinces (*vilayetler*) of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul (*qq.v.*). The frontiers were agreed and delimited between 1922-37; until 1926 it was uncertain whether the Mosul region would form part of Turkey. In the north and much of the east, the frontiers follow natural features in difficult hill country with few routes. There is one comparatively easy route via Kermanshah to central Iran. Toward the head of the Persian gulf the Iraq-Iran frontier is arbitrary, and the entire Shatt al Arab is in Iraq. The western and southern frontiers are again arbitrary—straight lines drawn between a few outstanding natural features.

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2. Relief and Drainage
3. Geographical Subregions
4. Climate
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I. PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

1. Geology and Structure.—Iraq consists of a lowland trough lying between asymmetrical and very different upland massifs to the east, north and west, and continuing southeastward as the Persian gulf. The region is one of crustal weakness and subsidence, with relatively young and plastic sedimentary rocks engulfed and downwarped between (on the west) the ancient, rigid and highly resistant block of Syria-Arabia and (east and north) the highly folded and topographically imposing younger Zagros and Anatolian mountain chains. The Zagros folds are mainly immense anticlines or hogbacks running from northwest to southeast with great regularity, and rising abruptly from the flat low-lying riverine plain. The Iraq-Iran political frontier follows this well-defined physical boundary for only about 250 mi.; farther south, Iranian territory extends westward to include a stretch of lowland at the head of the Persian gulf, while toward the northeast the frontier swings east into the Zagros formation, thus including an extensive hill territory within Iraq. On the northwest and west, the land rises more gradually and regularly into the plateau of Syria-Arabia, which consists of a mass of Archean granites overlain by sedimentary layers, chiefly of the Mesozoic (Jurassic and Cretaceous) and Cenozoic (Eocene and Miocene) periods. Slight tilting or differential erosion have produced minor topographical features and the western edge of the Euphrates valley is in some places marked by a discernible cliff (*irag*) from which the name of the country is said to originate. In the extreme northwest there are several small and gentle but clearly defined folds, which appear as ridges aligned more or less in an east-west direction, the chief of which is the Jabal Sinjar near Mosul.

2. Relief and Drainage.—The fundamental elements in the physiography are the twin valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates (*qq.v.*) rivers, joined in the south, but diverging in the north, separated by a tongue of higher land stretching southward from the Anatolian foothills to just north of Baghdad, and known as Al Jazirah ("the island"). Like Egypt, Iraq is very largely the gift of its rivers; and a consideration of both rivers is an essential basis to understanding the geography of the country.

Both rivers rise in the eastern highlands of Asia Minor, and pursue an intricate course southward around the numerous east-west aligned mountain ridges. In places, earth movements and the emission of lava have greatly affected their course; e.g., the lava flow from Karacali Dag near Malatya has diverted the Euphrates to the southwest. Both rivers also flow at times in enormous gorges cut directly across the fold ridges, and it is inferred that the folds may have developed subsequent to the drainage pattern. Emerging from the Anatolian mountains into the upland country of Syria and Kurdistan, they have cut normal narrow valleys into the plateau surface and dropped considerably in level. Between the Turkish frontier and the Baghdad region, the Euphrates falls by about 800 ft. (1:3,000) and the Tigris by 1,000 ft. (1:1,750), hence both streams are swift and heavily charged with sediment at all seasons. In the region of Baghdad there is a sharp change: from there the valleys are extremely flat—Baghdad itself is only 110 ft. above sea level. Northward from the head of the Shatt al Arab, where the two rivers may be said to merge, there is a fall of only 8 ft. in 100 mi. To explain this somewhat unusual pattern two theories have been evolved. The earlier, postulated by J. de Morgan, is that at one time the Persian gulf extended as far as the Baghdad area. Two smaller rivers, the Karun and the Kharkeh, both of which are relatively large in volume and swift (owing to rapid descent from the Zagros mountains) then emptied directly into the Persian gulf, and in so doing rapidly built out deltas toward the south. Ultimately these deltas extended entirely across the gulf to its southern shore, thereby cutting off the Tigris-Euphrates system from the open sea and the scouring effects of

currents. In consequence, the Tigris and Euphrates deposited huge quantities of silt and mud which gradually filled in the head of the gulf, and dried out to form a low, irregular land surface, with the head of the gulf rapidly receding toward the southeast; a rate of two miles per century has been suggested. As substantiating evidence, De Morgan invoked (1) the presence of a low but prominent ridge 250 ft. high running across the river valleys from Ramadi to a point a few miles southeast of Baghdad; this, he suggested, was the old coastline of the gulf; (2) the remarkable flatness of the lower valleys of both rivers, with a succession of river channel, marsh flats and sandy ridges; and (3) the undoubted changes of coastline within historic time in the configuration of the gulf coastline around Basra.

In 1952 the validity of this view was challenged by G. M. Lees and N. L. Falcon (*Geogr. J.*, vol. cxviii, March 1952), who demonstrated that in the past 100 years in some areas there had been no significant advance of the coastline toward the southeast; that at Basra the alluvial deposits lie directly upon land-formed rock series and not, as would be expected, upon strata showing a former marine incursion; and lastly, that the historic changes in land and coastal forms may have been less than at first supposed. They therefore postulate a more stable coastline, roughly at its present day position, with the accumulation of silt from the rivers producing a downwarping of the land surface in order to accommodate increasing weight. As the land surface sank there would at first be temporary hollows which gradually filled up through the deposition of alluvium and also by the "trapping" and "fixing" of wind-borne dust by water surfaces. Discussion still continues, with inconclusive results in favour of either theory.

Regime of the Euphrates and Tigris.—Both rivers are at their lowest in September and October, and as temperatures fall, evaporation is markedly reduced, leading to an increased flow from November in the Euphrates, though not in the Tigris, which being narrower and deeper is less affected. In spring the melting of snows in the Anatolian and Zagros mountains produces flooding, with a maximum level in April (Tigris) and May (Euphrates). This difference is due to earlier melt in the more southerly Zagros, and also to the character of underlying rock strata: the western Zagros include many impermeable layers from which runoff is rapid, while in the Euphrates basin there is much porous limestone through which meltwater percolates relatively slowly. The Euphrates rises by 11 ft. at Hit, and its flow increases from 8,800 to 64,300 cu.ft. per second; and the Tigris by 18 ft. with, at Baghdad, a normal increase in volume from 11,900 to 106,650 cu.ft. per second. There are important differences in the two rivers. After leaving its mountain area, the Euphrates receives only two left-bank tributaries, the Belikh and Khabur; there are no right-bank tributaries. Consequently, there is much loss by evaporation during passage through the Syrian steppe and lowlands of Iraq. The Tigris, on the contrary, though devoid of right-bank tributaries, flows parallel to the Zagros ranges, from which it receives many affluents, including the Great and Little Zab, Diyala and Karun. The Tigris therefore not only carries far more water but is also subject to much more sudden flooding, since its catchment area is wider, and local rainfall can have a greater effect—it may rise by 10–20 ft. in one day. Another feature common to both rivers but more developed on the Tigris is the formation of natural embankments, or levees, in the lower valley. This phenomenon, characteristic of many silt-charged rivers flowing over flat plains, e.g., the Mississippi in the U.S. and the Yellow river in China, gradually raises the river bed above the level of the surrounding plain, and tributaries thus enter with difficulty, often forming a marshy or flooded area near the confluence. Another feature is that if flooding destroys the bank of a natural levee, the river may develop an entirely new course. This has happened on many occasions in the past on both rivers; e.g., the mainstream of the Euphrates flowed past Hillah in the early 19th century, but 100 years later had shifted to a new channel just east of Najaf. In the lower valley therefore there are many old channels, some dry, some occupied by tributary streams which lead off water from the main course, and others now used for irrigation. Because of the extreme flatness many thousands of square miles in lower Iraq are regularly

flooded from 10 to 20 ft. deep. Settlements, roads and railways are therefore sited on natural or artificial mounds. Baghdad in particular has been subjected to devastating floods, especially in 1954; but with the completion of river control projects, including that of the Wadi ath Tharthar, flooding has been greatly reduced in the north.

3. Geographical Subregions.—It is possible to distinguish on a physiographic basis four major subregions: lower Iraq, made up of the twin lowland of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers; upper Iraq, the now separated river valleys with an intervening plateau zone; Assyria and Iraqi Kurdistan; and the western desert region.

Lower Iraq or the Lower Valley (sometimes referred to as the delta lowlands) begins at the ridge between Ramadi and Baghdad and extends about 350 mi. southward to the Persian gulf. The Tigris and Euphrates diverge respectively east and west below Baghdad, which is therefore in a narrower waist of lowland. The Tigris has a particularly tortuous course; between Baghdad and Kut the distance by river (213 mi.) is about twice that by road. This stretch of the river is marked by large numbers of old meander channels, some cut off to form oxbow lakes. Because of the natural levees and the difficult entry for tributary streams there is much marsh. Many subsidiary rivers empty into the Suwayqiyah depression, and navigation of the mainstream is difficult because of the sharp bends and strong current. Below Kut the course of the Tigris is much straighter, with a flatter slope (1:29,000 as compared with 1:15,000) and this allows free-flow irrigation on a large scale—a more difficult matter above Kut. The Tigris has shifted its course several times in the last 1,500 years: between the 8th and 16th centuries it flowed in what is now the Shatt al Gharraf. In its lowest section, especially from 'Amarah southward, the waters are dispersed into distributary channels and marshes, both east and west: only 19% of the flow at Baghdad passes down the main (navigable) channel from 'Amarah to Al Qurnah.

From Ramadi southward the Euphrates flows at first in a well-defined channel, about 150–300 yd. wide and of low season depth, 3–7 ft. Natural levees occur, as on the Tigris. Between Al Musayyib and As Samawah the river discharges into various distributaries, and in early Arab times formed one enormous swamp, with many present-day remnant features: old channels, levees, cutoffs and lakes. From As Samawah there is a well-defined channel as far as Nasiriyah, or even Suq ash Shuyukh, lying within an open plain which is now largely arid and almost featureless. Below Nasiriyah distributary channels (natural and also man-made) take off the whole of the Euphrates water, which ultimately drains into Lake Hammar, a vast expanse of reedy swamp, only 2–3 ft. deep in places. From Al Qurnah, the point of junction between the waters of Lake Hammar and the Tigris, the river is known as the Shatt al Arab.

Away from the rivers patches of swamp and marsh occur with irregular ridges between. Parts are still largely uninhabited and unsurveyed; in other areas are communities of Marsh Arabs, who live in reed and brushwood huts set often on brushwood foundations, and who subsist on rice, fish and *ageyl* (an edible species of rush). Along the river there is much variation in the quality of the land; some parts have infertile sands and gravels while others have alluvium and clay which when watered can be highly productive.

Upper Iraq.—This comprises the valleys of the two main rivers, together with the tongue of irregular and somewhat higher ground which stretches southeastward between them as a prolongation of the Syrian steppe. At its entry into Iraq the Euphrates has cut a broad flat valley about 10–12 mi. wide, and because of the absence of tributaries the sides are generally steep. Rejuvenation of the Euphrates led to many meanders being incised into the flat floor, giving a second set of terraces, with the river about 150–500 yd. wide. Irregularities in rock strata have produced rapids and shoals, and the river tends to hug the western bank, producing a marked escarpment on the west, and more open country to the east. The Tigris on leaving Turkey has cut an irregular winding passage among low foothills and ridges: in places it runs parallel to the strike of these folds (mainly northwest-southeast) but elsewhere it cuts directly southward by narrow gorges through the

hills themselves. Hence the upper Tigris has something of an alternation in topography; where the river flows southeastward it tends to have a wide, shallow bed, with steep-sided hills on the western (right) bank, and open rolling country to the east. Separating these reaches are north-south running defiles, the narrowest of which is at Baghloja, about 18 mi. below the confluence with the Iraqi Khabur, where the Tigris is only 40 yd. wide, with a series of rapids which are almost cascades. Such conditions continue as far as Mosul, after which relief becomes much less accentuated, ultimately falling away to open steppe through which the Tigris flows in a broader channel marked by shingle deposits. There the Tigris is joined by the Great and Little Zab rivers; the latter, though small in volume, being liable to rapid flooding. One last, isolated, defile occurs where the river breaks through the Jabal Hamrin above Ba'iji at a gorge which is now used to carry the oil pipelines from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. From Tikrit southward the Tigris wanders on a flat plain, breaking up into several arms, with the beginning of some of the features developed to a greater degree below Baghdad; at least two major changes of course have occurred.

Between the Euphrates and Tigris, and bounded on the north by the Jabal Sinjar lies Al Jazirah, a region of undulating steppe, small-scale fold ranges and closed drainage basins. The steppe continues into Syria and Jordan with the fold structures arranged in an arc running from west to southeast. The warping of the whole area has produced closed drainage basins, the largest of which is the Wadi ath Tharthar (a long defile running more or less parallel to the Tigris about 30 mi. farther west) which was important as a grazing area and is now part of the Tigris flood control project.

Assyria and Iraqi Kurdistan.—Fronting the Tigris on the east between the Turkish frontier and the broad Diyala valley is an upland area roughly rectangular in shape which rises in steps eastward from river level. The first step is the Jabal Hamrin (1,600 ft.), and behind it lies an undulating territory of river basins, rolling plateaus and irregular hills which ultimately pass into the main Zagros range. The lower (western) part, broken by the valleys of the Great and Little Zab, is the ancient region of Assyria (*q.v.*); farther east, as the mountain zone begins, there is an alternation of high ridges aligned northwest-southeast, with river basins between.

The plain of Mosul is drained mainly by the Great Zab and consists of irregular steppe rising from about 700 to 2,000 ft. A rich heavy soil made this plain the granary and centre of ancient Assyria, with its capitals of Nineveh, Nimrud and Khorsabad. The zone between the two Zab rivers (central Assyria) is much less densely settled, partly because of the lack of good water; some springs are brackish and sulfurous. An exception occurs round Irbil, where the soil and water are better; this region still produces the best wheat in Iraq.

In Iraqi Kurdistan, mountain ridges trend generally northwest-southeast, attaining 10,000–11,000 ft. in a few places, with a summit average at about 8,000 ft. Between the ridges are trough valleys (often synclinal) usually occupied by rivers which have eroded out basins. All the streams weave a tortuous way south and southwest toward the lowlands, and are marked by gorge and defile sections (*darband*) where they skirt or cut through ridges. In a few places, e.g., Sulaymaniyah, Al 'Amadiyah, Rawanduz, patches of lowland allow cultivation, but much of Kurdistan is given over to pastoral nomadism. Remoteness and difficulty of access have hindered surveys and development. (See also KURDISTAN.)

Western Desert.—Lying to the south and west of the riverine lowlands, this region extends from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia on the south as far as Jordan and Syria. The desert area slopes gently upward from the Euphrates lowland, and is formed of Cretaceous and Tertiary rock series, which are often exposed as irregular pavement. Differential resistance to erosion produces minor relief features, and there has been some small scale tectonic disturbance, hence the surface is by no means uniform or featureless. In the extreme south, the actual frontier with Kuwait is formed by the Wadi al Batin, a rift structure three miles wide running

inland from Zubayr as far as central Arabia. To the north lies Sahra' al Hijarah, in the main a region of shallow mud-lined depressions, rocky outcrops and loose sand, passing, near the Euphrates, into an extensive swamp area.

Farther north lies the Wadian region with steeper slopes. Because of this steepness normal drainage developed again, and there is a network of dry valleys which are aligned northeastward to the Euphrates, and still carry flood water for an hour or two each year. The region takes its name from these valleys (wadies). There is no fringe of continuous sand or salt marsh, as farther south; the Wadian therefore offers more practicable routes westward and has been used from earliest days for transport, and now for oil pipelines.

4. Climate.—Because of the simplicity and regularity of relief, Iraq has a straightforward climatic regime. In the lowlands two contrasting seasons occur: a dry and intensely hot summer (May–October), and a relatively cool, humid winter (December–March) with short transitional periods. In the mountain zones relief exerts a considerable effect, and winters can be moderately severe. From May onward the predominating element is the existence of a semi-permanent zone of extremely low atmospheric pressure, situated at the seaward end of the Persian gulf, and over West Pakistan. This draws in air from the northwest, which produces a very persistent and regular northwesterly wind (*shamal*) over the whole of Iraq. Coming from land areas, these currents are dry, and hardly any cloud forms, so that for several weeks or even months the sun beats down uninterruptedly, producing extremely high temperatures—July and August means are about 35° C. (95° F.), with mean day maxima up to 43° or 49° C. (110° or 120° F.). Some drop is apparent close to water surfaces because of intense evaporation, but the physiological effect is hardly improved because of higher humidity. Strong winds produce blowing dust or sandstorms; July is the worst month, with an average of five storms at Baghdad and eight at Ash Shu'aybah. No rain falls between May and October, the first onset beginning at the end of October, with January–February the wettest period.

During the winter season conditions are more variable. Relatively shallow and transient depressions move eastward from the Mediterranean to the Persian gulf, and give rise to the *sharki*—a cool, damp southeasterly which brings rain and variable weather. At other times a cold air mass from the interior of Asia may extend westward, bringing fine but cold conditions. Hot air masses from the south may also affect Iraq; January temperatures of more than 27° C. (80° F.) are known but frost may occur anywhere, even at Basra, though this is unusual. The northeast has its own climatic conditions, as much as 30–40 in. of rain occur on the highest mountains, with 15–25 in. in Assyria. There are therefore two climatic provinces within Iraq; a hot arid lowland, and the damper northeast where rainfall is sufficient for crop growing, with slightly lower summer temperatures and a colder, continental winter, up to three months of snow lying in some places. Over-all, Assyria and Kurdistan apart, the main features of Iraqi climate are aridity and overwhelming summer heat, the difficulties of which are intensified by high atmospheric humidity locally near the rivers. Lacking in most cases the opportunity to move to higher altitudes, many better-off Iraqis have constructed underground rooms or cellars (*sirdab*) in which to pass the hottest part of the day.

5. Soil Character.—Reflecting the physiographic and climatic divisions of the country, the soils fall into two contrasted groups: heavy alluvial deposits associated with the main rivers, and very light soils in the rest of the country. The alluvial soils contain a significant proportion of humus and clay, and dry out to a hard tenacious mass which can be used for building. The light soils are deficient or entirely lacking in humus, with a low clay content; but they may have a proportion of wind-deposited minerals, some of which are valuable plant nutrients.

For both groups of soils there is an acute problem of salinity induced by watering under conditions of sharply seasonal rainfall followed by a hot arid season. This produces evaporation of soil moisture, and consequent accumulation of alkaline salts at or near the surface, in quantities sufficient to inhibit cultivation. On entering Iraq, the Tigris and Euphrates contain about 30 parts per

100,000 of salts; in their lower courses this proportion has trebled. In 1949 the Haigh commission estimated that 60% of all irrigated land in Iraq had become salinated, and an over-all assessment is that 1% of total cultivated area is abandoned each year because of salinity. Crop yields have fallen by 20%–30% since 1920 with a 50% decline in a few extreme cases. It is now recognized that irrigation itself is not sufficient; there must also be a system of rapid underground drainage to lead away irrigation water after use, before it is evaporated with consequent salination.

6. Vegetation.—Iraq is a meeting place of two major plant groupings, both of which show the predominating influence of drought. Toward the north and east (broadly from latitude 32°–33° N.) there is a steppe vegetation of perennial bushes and low shrubs, with mugwort (*Artemisia*), goosefoot (*Chenopodiaceae*) and grass species dominant, together with a "flush" of short-lived creepers and grasses, which amount to 60%–70% of the total vegetation. Toward the south and west, vegetation is often restricted to thorns (chiefly tamarisk and species of *Haloxylon*, of which *H. persicum* affords useful camel-fodder and fuel), a few shrubs, e.g., rhanterium and papposum, and other salt-resistant plants. Poplar, willow, licorice and tamarisk flourish (usually in small clumps) near the rivers, and below Al Qurnah the marshland is an area of reeds, tall grasses and sedge. Open oak forest occurs on the Zagros mountains between 2,000 and 6,000 ft., now mostly reduced to scrub by intensive cutting and unrestricted grazing; above this is an alpine zone of cushion plants and dwarf species broadly similar to those of alpine Europe. Millions of cultivated date palms produce one of Iraq's most important exports (see *Agriculture*, below).

7. Animal Life.—This has been much reduced: the oryx, ostrich and wild ass are now practically extinct, and the last lion appears to have been killed around 1910. Bats, rats of various species, jackals and wildcats are the most common mammals, with wild pig and gazelle in remoter parts. Reptiles are numerous: lizards (the largest, *Varanus griseus*, reaching four feet); snakes (mainly "racer" species and sand snakes), only three species of which (the horned and blunt-nosed vipers and a rare cobra) are poisonous; and two types of tortoise, of which *Trionyx euphraticus* is peculiar to Iraq. Many kinds of fish occur, including the "Tigris salmon," a barbel which can attain seven feet. Iraq is also visited by vast numbers of migrant birds.

II. THE PEOPLE

There are important racial and cultural distinctions among the population of Iraq, with the major, predominant difference lying between Arab and Kurd. The Arabs are a markedly homogenous group, and occupy most of the centre, west and south of Iraq, where they have probably lived since very early times. Both nomads and settled peoples in these areas are of this basic type; some authorities see a difference in the Marsh Arabs or Madan (see ARAB) who may be descended from the ancient Akkadians and Sumerians. The Kurds are racially akin to the Iranians, and form another, smaller homogenous group located mainly in the north and east; they are probably descendants of the Medes. Kurds with their racial associates, the Yezidis and the Assyrians, were estimated in 1964 to make up about 18% of the total Iraqi population. Smaller groups are (1) the Turkmen (*q.v.*; Turkoman) who live in communities in Irbil and Sulaymaniyah provinces; (2) the Shabaks of Mosul, who possibly originated in central Asia; and (3) the Mandaeans (*q.v.*), who though distinct as a religious group are less so as a racial element. Until 1948 Iraq had a significant Jewish community, living mainly in the towns; the majority have migrated to Israel. Arabic, the official language, is the most widely spoken. Kurdish and Turkish dialects are common in the north and variants of Iranian are found among the eastern tribes.

Religion divides the people of Iraq. The majority (about 75%) of the Arab population are Shi'ah Muslims, as are 50%–60% of the Kurds; but a minority of Sunni Muslims (about 25% of the Arabs and 40%–50% of the Kurds) have long held effective political dominance. Most tribal chieftains and politicians are Sunnis, a fact which partly explains the disturbed nature of Iraqi

politics. There are also a number of small Christian groups, who live mainly in the north, round Mosul, or in the larger towns: Nestorians (*q.v.*), Jacobites, Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics (*see* ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH) and Gregorian Armenians (*see* ARMENIAN CHURCH). They have generally been in political disfavour. Other religious groups are the Yezidis, who combine features of several religions; and the Mandaean, who revere John the Baptist.

Population.—The population of Iraq at the 1965 census was 8,261,527 (including 40,818 Iraqis living abroad). It is very unevenly distributed: for the most part the valleys of the two large rivers are relatively densely inhabited, while the deserts of the west and even some area of the riverine lowlands have a scanty population. On a basis of persons per square mile of cultivable land, population is concentrated in four main regions: the banks of the Shatt al Arab; along the middle and upper Tigris around Baghdad and across to the Euphrates at Hillah; the lowland basin round Sulaymaniyah; and the upper Euphrates. By no means all of the great river valleys (especially just north of the Shatt al Arab) are as densely peopled as would be imagined. With so much land sparsely populated, there is less incentive to farm it well, and some authorities have suggested that a denser population might result in improved methods of agriculture.

Towns play an important part in Iraq. Baghdad, the capital, is by far the largest; other large towns are Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk and Najaf (*qq.v.*). The rest are spread fairly evenly throughout the riverine areas. Special features of the settlement pattern are: (a) the number and even spread of towns of relatively small size (10,000–25,000 inhabitants); and (b) the extent to which the populations of even large towns are partly agricultural; *i.e.*, there is much less of the sharp distinction between town and country which is characteristic of western countries. Over most of Iraq the occurrence of towns and villages is closely related to water supply from rivers or irrigation canals, but in Assyria and Kurdistan rainfall is sufficient for nonirrigated cultivation, and there is a more uniform spread of settlement over the entire province—in sharp contrast to the rest of Iraq. Nomadism is important not only in the western deserts, but also between the two rivers, both in Al Jazirah and the drier and sandier parts as far south as the Shatt al Gharraf. Nomads are also an important element in the towns, which they frequent in large numbers at certain seasons. Religious pilgrimages to Karbala', Najaf and Samarra' swell the local population; and in Kurdistan seasonal migration (transhumance), mainly from winter (lowland) to summer (upland) pastures, is widely practised. Some Kurdish tribes even cross the frontiers into Iran and Turkey. (W. B. FR.)

III. HISTORY

For the pre-1914 history of Iraq, *see* MESOPOTAMIA; CALIPHATE; PERSIAN HISTORY; and articles on the former empires (BABYLONIA AND ASSYRIA; TURKEY) of which the territory had formed part.

1. World War I.—The entry of Turkey into World War I in Nov. 1914 led immediately to the dispatch of a small British expeditionary force from India to the head of the Persian gulf. It had three main objectives: to secure Great Britain's unique and valued position in the gulf and to safeguard its friends in that area; to prevent a hostile Turko-German penetration of southern and eastern Persia, such as to threaten India; and to safeguard the infant petroleum industry in southwestern Persia where oil was first produced by the Anglo-Persian Oil company in 1912. The force, collected at Bahrain, landed at and secured Abadan, and occupied Basra (Nov. 22). With increasing local contacts and commitments in the southern areas of the Basra *vilayet*, a rudimentary British civil administration came into existence under the chief political officer, Sir Percy Cox (*see* COX, SIR PERCY).

Turkish counterattacks having been repulsed, and country-wide river flooding survived, the expeditionary force, enlarged to army corps dimensions, reached upward into lower-Euphrates country as far as Nasiriyah, and up the Tigris to Qurnah and 'Amarah. In the autumn of 1915, however, a bold advance pressed upriver nearly to Baghdad could not be sustained, and resulted in with-

drawal to Kut, where the army of Gen. Sir Charles Townshend was surrounded, besieged and finally, after 140 days, in spite of strenuous efforts for its relief, forced to surrender on April 29, 1916. The summer was employed by the British in a thorough overhaul of establishments and communications, under a vigorous commander, Gen. Sir Frederick Stanley Maude. In the winter of 1916–17, after patient preparation, he ousted the Turks from their positions in the Kut area and advanced to the occupation of Baghdad (March 11, 1917) and beyond it, before settling down to a summer of consolidation. Maude died of cholera in Baghdad (Nov. 18, 1917).

Early in 1918, while the occupied territory was already under an improvised but comprehensive civil administration (conducted with admirable devotion, though not without its painful episodes), Maude's successor Gen. Sir W. R. Marshall was able to advance up the Euphrates and to plan a final blow on the Tigris. Late in October he advanced through the Jabal Hamrin, crossed the Tigris and administered a final defeat to the Turks at Kalat Sherghat (Sharqat) a few days before the armistice of Mudros (Oct. 30). Kirkuk was also occupied and then Mosul itself. (*See* also WORLD WAR I.)

2. The Iraqi State.—Two uneasy years followed. The British administration, hampered by the repatriation of key men, by war-weariness, and by uncertain policy, maintained itself in spite of lower-Euphrates Shi'ite intrigues, endemic tribal disorders, the reluctance of the Kurds of the Iraqi northeast to be controlled, and the entry of a stream of Arab-nationalist propaganda from Syria. The last-named element took its place in the Iraq of 1919–20 with echoes of the 19th century yearnings for Arab emancipation, awareness of the real or alleged promises of Arab independent statehood made by Sir Henry MacMahon as high commissioner in Egypt in 1916, the Wilsonian fourteen points (and notably the self-determination principle), and with the specific Anglo-French declaration (Nov. 1918) that Iraq and Syria were to become free, self-determined states. It resulted that, while tribesmen chafed at the exigencies of an efficient and honest regime, the Iraqi intelligentsia demanded, first privately and then openly, an "Arab government" of their own. Converting some leading sheikhs to their view, and noting the wholesale withdrawal of British forces, together with indications that concessions to their views either by Whitehall or the local civil commissioner (Sir Arnold Wilson) were slow and reluctant, they managed in the summer of 1920 to bring about disorders which, except in the principal towns and some quiet areas, upset administration, cost lives, and cut communications (including the new Basra-Baghdad railway) in much of the territory. A major military effort, with the re-entry of important British forces, was needed to restore order, collect arms and punish the recalcitrant. These tasks were accomplished by mid-autumn 1920, Sir Percy Cox returning to Iraq as high commissioner in October.

The general policy to be adopted had by now been settled in London—it was one of Iraqi self-government under British advice and (temporary) control—and a mandate for the territory, awarded to Britain by the Supreme Allied council at San Remo in April 1920, had been accepted. Cox inaugurated an all-Iraqi council of ministers, entrusted departmental and provincial administration to Iraqis under British advice or inspection, founded an Iraqi army—and looked for a king. He was found without difficulty in the person of Amir Faisal (*see* FAISAL I). Driven by the French from his Syrian throne (July 1920), he was encouraged to proceed to Iraq, was there widely acclaimed, and thanks to his personal gifts and wartime fame was elected to the throne by a rough-and-ready but decisive referendum. He was crowned in Baghdad on Aug. 23, 1921; an Iraqi state and monarchy had come into existence.

3. Monarchy Under Mandate.—The British mandate lasted until the autumn of 1932: the monarchy, from 1921 to 1958. The period during which the two institutions ran concurrently was a vitally formative period for the modern Iraqi state. Successive high commissioners—Sir Percy Cox, Sir Henry Dobbs, Sir Gilbert Clayton, Sir Francis Humphrys—were devotedly supported by the comparatively large but diminishing staff of British advisers and experts—ministerial, departmental, regional—engaged by the Iraqi

government, which included some outstanding personalities; and the Iraqi administration, from the council of ministers and head-quarter departments to remote outstations, developed and consolidated into a machine of considerable efficiency, with many officials of high merit. Relations between the British and Iraqi elements, too easily perverted to suspicion or worse, were normally preserved on a level of cordial co-operation. The mandate over Iraq, with its solid state-building achievement (and its early relinquishment) was beyond doubt the most successful of the mandatory experiments of the period.

The years 1921–32 showed many interesting features. The administration of the territory was established, and survived regrettable but inevitable incidents of tribal disorder, urban faction and political restlessness. Lawlessness in Kurdistan (which lacked Arab-inspired loyalty), mid-desert Bedouin anarchy and the theocratic recalcitrance of the Shi'ite (largely Persian) mujtahids (religious teachers) of the holy cities were gradually overcome. The Iraqi army and the police grew in efficiency. The monarchy appeared popular, with the king an indispensable element in unifying and inspiring public sentiment. The country in fact settled down to find its own orientation and level of security, and to be governed as a modern state. Its relations with neighbours were various: with Persia, never cordial but never violent; with Arabia, marked by serious frontier raids and bitterness (in which Hashemite-Saudi antipathy played a main part) until a measure of reconciliation was achieved in 1925. The Turks, neighbours and ex-suzerains, demanded at the 1923 Lausanne conference no less than the "return" of the Mosul *vilayet*, or most of it, to Turkey, as being predominantly Turkish in race. This led to the long-drawn "Mosul question" which, after many fruitless meetings at Geneva and Istanbul, and the mission to Iraq in 1925 of a fact-finding League of Nations commission, was decided by the League in favour of Iraq, with preservation of substantially the old *vilayet* boundary as the Iraq-Turkish frontier: a decision which, after initial protest, was loyally accepted by Ankara. The League decided, however, that British control in Iraq must be extended to 25 years.

The British decision to implement its mandate by a suitable Anglo-Iraqi treaty was a shrewd one, though it did not render the unpopular imposition of foreign tutelage either invisible or acceptable. A first treaty, with its attached agreements, was signed in June 1922, subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The latter was convened in March 1924 and succeeded, in face of much intimidation and reluctance, in ratifying the treaty and passing also an organic law, which endowed the country with the institutions of a limited monarchy and two-chamber parliament. Meanwhile, short-lived Iraqi cabinets came and went, the social services developed and British staffs continued to diminish.

A new Anglo-Iraqi treaty, in 1927, marked some advance, but the desired final step of terminating the mandate was delayed by divergent views on timing and by the interest of other League of Nations members. The years 1927–30 were marked by mutual misunderstanding and impatience, as well as by the normal effervescence of Iraqi domestic politics, by problems of security, the development of new (road, rail and transdesert) communications, and by the discovery in 1927 of an important oil field at Kirkuk. But the 20-year treaty signed in June 1930 laid down an acceptable relationship between the two nations, with minimal British privileges, and provided for Iraqi membership of the League in 1932. This was accepted by the League itself, under strong British sponsorship, and on Oct. 3, 1932, Iraq achieved its ambition of complete independence and League membership.

4. Independence.—The years 1932–39 were uneasy and disappointing. The sudden death of Faisal I in Sept. 1933, a grievous loss, made way for the short and inglorious reign of his pleasure-loving son Ghazi, and the road accident which killed Ghazi in April 1939—followed, in Mosul, by anti-British rioting—passed the throne to Faisal II, a child of three, under the regency of his cousin (and uncle) the young amir Abd-ul-Ilah (*q.v.*). The material development of the country continued; oil production, with its resulting revenues, began actively in 1934; and industry, irrigation, communications and the public services all made progress. British control ceased, and advice at all levels grew rarer. Though one

nationalist stalwart, Ja'far al-'Askari, was murdered, the state was served by many devoted ministers and officials, notably Nuri as-Said (*q.v.*), Yasin al-Hashimi, Hikmat Sulaiman and Jamil al-Midfai. New party groupings—although an authentic party system had little progressed—showed the advent of a new left-wing reforming nationalism among the middle-class intelligentsia. Cabinets continued to change rapidly, elections to be largely controlled, personal and class interests, mainly conservative, to be dominant.

A saddening, indeed shocking, episode of the time was the massacre of over 300 Assyrian villagers, at Simail (Sumayyil) in northern Iraq, by an army unit in Aug. 1933, an episode applauded by most Iraqi opinion, and never punished. It was followed by the departure of a large part of the hapless Assyrian community to Syria. A *coup d'état* by the ferocious Gen. Bakr Sidqi in Oct. 1936 was the first of a series of military interventions in the government; and though Bakr himself after some months of power was murdered in Aug. 1937, the evil precedent had been established. This was equally true of the politicians' practice of organizing tribal uprisings (never, in practice, controllable) against the government of their rivals in office.

Anti-British feeling gained ground during this period, largely by natural reaction against former control and through the Iraqi view of events in Palestine. Admiration of Hitler's Germany was shown in close contacts with that country and significant Nazi-type youth movements in Baghdad.

5. World War II.—The war period in Iraq falls into two unequal parts, separated by a single month of abnormal happenings. During the first 20 months from Sept. 1939 the normal restlessness of public life in Baghdad was aggravated not by mobilization or military disturbance but by increasing pressures, ambitions and controversies, and by the beginning of war shortages and economic dislocation. The murder of a minister of finance, Rustum Haidar, set off a long train of inquiries and vendettas; German victories and the fall of France seriously affected the attitude of the dominant army officers, and not least that of the "golden square" of four outstanding Anglophobe generals. In spite of a diplomatic breach with Germany (though not with Italy), a pro-German party, civil and military, formed and consolidated, while increased army pressure bore on successive civilian cabinets. Political strife grew ever bitterer and, after the finally enforced flight of the regent himself from the country, a revolutionary regime under a puppet amir was formed by Rashid Ali al-Gailani as prime minister supported by the "golden square."

In March 1941 the incoming British ambassador—Sir Kinahan Cornwallis, a veteran of the Iraqi administration of 1921–37—found himself at deadlock with the Gailani cabinet over British rights of military transit, for which the treaty of 1930 provided. Relations became critical, British women and children were evacuated, and on April 30, 1941, Anglo-Iraqi hostilities began in earnest at the British air base at Habbaniyah. This "war," highly embarrassing to Great Britain and its allies though waged with little conviction by the Iraqi forces, lasted some 30 days. The German aid expected by the Gailani government came too late and scantily; Iraqi opinion, and even its armed forces, were deeply divided. The attack on the scarcely defensible camp at Habbaniyah was never pressed, and, while all British and some U.S. subjects were confined uncomfortably in the British embassy in Baghdad and elsewhere in the country, light British forces reached the scene of action from Palestine, and others landed from India at Basra. These sufficed to bring about, in a few days, the disintegration and then the flight of the Gailani supporters, followed by the re-establishment of the legitimate regime, and constitutional government, under the returned amir Abd-ul-Ilah. The child-king returned from his Kurdish refuge to Baghdad.

During the remainder of the war period British troops stayed in Iraq, in a purely beneficent and defensive "second occupation" (as it was called by critical Iraqi politicians) until 1945. During this period political life was revived, within limits. Iraq adhered to (indeed, played a major part in) the inter-Arab negotiations at Cairo which produced the Arab league, as well as participating in all the end-of-war international congresses at Hot Springs, Bretton Woods, Chicago and San Francisco. Efforts, not wholly success-

ful, were made by responsible statesmen to restore national unity and self-respect. In spite of varied forms of control, retail prices rose, distress was widespread (though a few war millionaires flourished) and normal economic life was disturbed. The public services and officialdom deteriorated, and national development (including oil production) suffered; but security, except for a persistent nucleus of trouble in Kurdistan, was well maintained. The regent visited Great Britain and the United States, and Iraqi statesmen toured widely among Arab capitals.

6. Postwar Hopes and Distresses.—Once rid of British garrisons and wartime embarrassments, and with legitimacy and a degree of democracy restored, the state might well hope for rapid progress. Able men, though drawn still from a narrow circle, served the government—Hamdi al-Pachachi and his cousin Muza-him, Arshad al-'Umari, Fadhil al-Jamali, Salih Jabr, the Baban cousins Jalal and Jamal, and a dozen more, in addition to the veteran Nuri as-Said (Nuri Pasha), whose 10th premiership was announced in 1949 (and his 13th in 1958). The divorce between cabinet and parliament remained almost complete, still more the gap between parliament and nominal electorate. The regime was ill based and, increasingly year by year, failed to reflect much or most of the views, and the frustrated emotions, of the younger politicians and would-be reformers. The monarchy, with Abdul-Ilah still regent till 1953, was active and influential, with conservative leanings; the king went to complete his English education at Harrow. Reform or improvement in some public services was observable, especially after the shadow of acute financial shortage disappeared in the early 1950s as oil revenues increased. The oil development which produced these was extended, and material progress in many directions was notable. Almost the last of the veteran British advisory corps left between 1945 and 1947, only newly recruited technicians and specialists remaining. A permanent nonpolitical development board was set up in 1950, to spend 70% of oil revenues. Political parties, restarted in 1946, continued till 1954, and tended to coalesce into conservative progovernment and radical antigovernment groups, the latter of which seemed destined for permanent exclusion from power. Communism, ever present above or under ground, was habitually suppressed, especially by Nuri Pasha, but could still exercise attraction and had power to encourage disorder and fan anti-western feeling. The latter attitude, in spite of an explicit (but not uncritical) pro-westernism among the ruling clique, constantly gained ground and force among the opposition. British policy in Palestine was a major cause of this. The newspapers by their violence called for frequent measures of discipline or suppression. Political life, in fact, was full of tension and instability, even in periods of apparent tranquillity, and outbreaks of mob violence, often Communist-organized, were unpleasantly common, notably in the capital. Tribal disorder, except for a time in Kurdistan, seemed to be a rarer phenomenon than in earlier years.

Relations with Iran remained strained and suspicious, in spite of a state visit by the regent to Teheran in 1949. With Turkey a friendly treaty was made in 1947, against opposition protests. The Fertile Crescent conception (that is, Iraqi-Syrian-Jordanian union) had its supporters during the period, but came to nothing. Iraqi relations with Egypt were not cordial, those with Saudi Arabia improved. Outspoken support of all Arab objectives was incumbent on every politician, as was hatred of Zionism and the state of Israel. The U.S.S.R., feared as the worst of menaces by Nuri Pasha and his followers, was viewed not without sympathy, or at least with indifference, by the opposition, by whom western Europe and the United States were condemned as reactionary, self-interested, and inimical to Arab ambitions.

Episodes of these years, more important than state visits, official openings of new public works, or the installation and rapid fall of cabinets, included the participation of Iraqi forces in the unsuccessful Arab intervention against newborn Israel in 1948: forces which gave, indeed, a better account of themselves than most of the Arab armies. They were withdrawn in 1949. (The departure to Israel of some five-sixths of Iraq's 150,000 Jews dates from this period.) The Palestine expedition was, by some months, preceded by the signature at Portsmouth by Ernest Bevin, the secretary of

state for foreign affairs, and the Iraqi prime minister, Salih Jabr, of a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty (Jan. 1948) to replace that of 1930, which had long been unpopular; but massive and destructive riots in Baghdad, and a timely *volte-face* by the regent, led to the repudiation of the treaty by the Iraqi government and the hasty installation of a neutral caretaker government for some weeks, followed by general elections. Finally, the serious riots of Nov. 1952, starting with minor student grievances but soon transformed into a political demand for single-stage elections to the chamber (long an opposition desideratum), were a damaging blow to public order and confidence. With wholesale hooliganism and loss of police control, they led to the appointment of a leading general, Nureddin Mohammed, as temporary prime minister and, under martial law, to the temporary suppression of political parties. Normal forms of government were restored early in 1953; but it was to no peaceful heritage that the young King Faisal II, straight from Harrow, succeeded on his coronation on May 2. He was 18, small and unimpressive, a sufferer from asthma, but well meaning, dignified and popular. The regent, loyal and affectionate, remained as his chief personal adviser, and became crown prince.

7. Reign of Faisal II (1953-58).—The five-year reign of the young king covered a period of outward peace. There were fair hopes that the now great and increasing resources of the state treasury, derived from augmented oil revenues, would create a sounder and more broadly based national economy in agriculture, industry and commerce, and could thereby provide nonpolitical careers for the underemployed intelligentsia; and that the delights and distractions of an expanding and widely shared material prosperity would neutralize the fairly general "political" resentment known to be felt at the suppression of political parties and the sternly (but on the whole benevolently) authoritarian tone of political life under Nuri Pasha, who enjoyed the complete support of the throne. But this was not to be.

The reign opened with the inauguration of the great 30-in. trans-desert oil pipeline from Kirkuk to the Syrian coast, followed unhappily by devastating Tigris floods which inundated the outskirts of Baghdad itself. The king and Nuri visited Pakistan. After some rapid changes of cabinet (without relation to popular or parliamentary feeling) Nuri Pasha assumed office, for the 12th time, at midsummer 1954, this time for three full years. He abolished all political parties, including his own, and imposed his customary strict discipline on political life and the press, with particular severity against the Communists. The excluded politicians, nevertheless, with a fairly large urban following, coalesced increasingly into a dumb but potentially powerful opposition, and sentiment hostile to the regime gained ground, invisibly, even in the army. The monarchical regime, in fact, with its "strong" government, its scant respect for political exuberances, its openly pro-western leaning in international affairs, and its local support mainly from feudal, conservative, upper-class, and satisfied circles, became a minority faction less robust than it appeared.

Nuri Pasha's outspoken anti-Communism was, with his habitual sympathy for Turkey, mainly responsible for the conclusion of a defensive alliance with that country in Feb. 1955. This, joined by Pakistan and Iran, became the Baghdad pact (*q.v.*), and was, in effect, a (not exclusively) military organization designed to safeguard the exposed northern tier of middle eastern nations against the U.S.S.R. The accession to the pact of Great Britain made possible a specific reformulation of the latter's rights, as an ally, at the surviving air base of Habbaniyah. This in turn permitted the politically convenient demise of the existing (1930) Anglo-Iraqi treaty, long an object of opposition-nationalist attack. The pact, which the United States joined as a benevolent "observer," was, however, greeted with the strongest dislike, not only by most of Iraqi, anti-Nuri opinion, but by almost all other Arab countries, notably Egypt, as being an organization faithless to Arab loyalties and too friendly to "imperialism." Iraqi-Egyptian relations as a consequence further deteriorated.

During the crisis of outraged Arab feeling precipitated by the British-French and Israeli action at Suez in Oct.-Nov. 1956, Iraq broke off diplomatic relations with France, and it required all the resolution of Nuri and the palace to prevent a similar en-

forced break with Britain. Anti-western disorders in fact broke out at various centres, and martial law was proclaimed; but the government, which temporarily but pointedly absented itself from Baghdad Pact council meetings attended by Britain, was able to ride the storm. The cessation of oil exports, due to the destruction of the Iraq Petroleum company's pipeline pumping stations by Syrian troops, was a severe, if temporary, financial blow.

In 1956-57 an exchange of visits improved Iraqi-Saudi relations. Those with Syria deteriorated; those with Jordan grew closer. The king in 1957 announced his engagement to a young Turkish-Egyptian princess; he was assassinated before the marriage could take place.

The integration of the United Arab Republic (of Egypt and Syria) in Feb. 1958 led to a federation of Iraq and Jordan, the Arab Union, which as a Hashemite defensive move was created by a rapid series of Iraqi-Jordanian conferences. A federal constitution was drafted, with Nuri Pasha as prime minister, and general elections were held. But all this was brought to nothing by a sudden, unforeseen military revolution on July 14, 1958, led by Brig. Abdul Karim Kassem (Qasim). Long planned, it was accomplished in a single day of street violence and wholesale arrests and with the bloody "liquidation" of the young king, the crown prince, and almost the whole royal family—and Nuri Pasha—in circumstances never fully established. Order was quickly restored, a republic proclaimed, and a revolutionary cabinet of officers and civilians formed, with Kassem as prime minister. No counterblow, throughout Iraq, was struck. The revolution, received with horror in Jordan, was welcomed by the U.A.R.

8. Post-revolutionary Period.—Although the revolution was quickly accepted among the people and throughout the world, it nevertheless failed to gratify the high hopes it aroused. Iraqi relations with the U.A.R. soon deteriorated when Kassem's government refused the close adherence which had been expected and when Communist influence in Baghdad visibly increased. With Turkey relations remained correct, even after Iraq had renounced the Baghdad Pact; with Iran they deteriorated abruptly when Iraq claimed a long-disputed riverain strip on the Shatt al Arab. Relations were quickly established with the U.S.S.R., China, and other Communist countries.

The suppression of a military uprising in Mosul in March 1959, apparently in the Baathist or Nasserite interest, increased the Communist ascendancy; but demands for more Communist privileges and their direct representation in the cabinet were rejected by Kassem, and savage rioting in Kirkuk in July was attributed to them by "the sole leader" (Kassem)—who later reversed his judgment. Four old-regime officials and nine officers were put to death in September, and scores of further arrests followed an attempted assassination of Kassem in October. He retired to a hospital for two months and, amid the habitual Cairo-Baghdad radio and press polemics, "Nasserite agents" were generally blamed.

A serious revolt which broke out in Kurdistan in March 1961 was suppressed with great severity and incomplete success; it continued, with persistence and bitterness. On June 25, 1961, just after Britain had recognized the full independence of Kuwait, Kassem laid claim to the oil-rich emirate as being part of Iraq. British troops, sent at urgent request from Kuwait to strengthen its defenses, deterred the Iraqi army, but the claim persisted even after Kuwait's admission to the Arab League. Further protracted negotiations with the Iraq Petroleum company ended in failure. In October the company was deprived of some 99.5% of its entire concessionary areas (see *Oil*, below).

A termination of Kassem's dictatorship came with a coup by the "free officers," mainly of the Baath party, on Feb. 8, 1963, followed by the immediate execution of Kassem and later of dozens of known Communists. The authors of this revolution undertook to honour Iraq's foreign and industrial obligations and installed a capable team of ministers. Abdul Salam 'Arif became president. Plans for reform were published, and relations with the oil companies improved. Claims to Kuwait were dropped. Relations with the U.S.S.R. deteriorated, and Iraq's antimonarchism offended Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The Western Powers all recognized the new

regime. Early cordiality with Egypt led to Iraq's inclusion in a proposal for a wider U.A.R., to comprise Egypt, Syria and Iraq; but Nasser's objection to the strong Baathist influence in both Damascus and Baghdad killed the project. This was followed by agreement on an Iraq-Syrian supreme defense council. In Baghdad, disputes between extreme and moderate Baathist factions led in Nov. 1963 to an attempted coup by the former; but this, and the intervention of a delegation of Syrian Baathists, led only to a sharp fall in Baathist status in Baghdad and to a new, non-extremist cabinet.

Internally, an Iraqi Arab Socialist union was announced in July as the sole political party, and a massive wave of nationalization of local enterprises followed. The Kurdish war, bitter and prolonged, continued; the Baghdad government rejected the ever varying Kurdish demands. A new Unified Political command agreed upon with Egypt signified little. It first met, without appreciable result, in May 1965 and seemed inconsistent with the removal of six "Nasserite" ministers (those favouring unity with the United Arab Republic; July 1965) who had been critical of 'Arif's policies. These included an eventual return to parliamentary government and an actual transfer of powers from the National Council of the Revolution to a normal cabinet. In Sept. 1965 Gen. Taher Yahya resigned as prime minister, and was replaced by Brig. 'Arif Abdul Razzaq, an alleged pro-Egyptian; 12 days later, while the president was in Casablanca, the premier attempted a coup, failed, and fled to Cairo with a dozen supporters. An eminent lawyer, Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, became prime minister (the first civilian since 1958); the Baathists remained active, though mostly concealed, while Communists called for the deposition of the president. Political life was as ever uneasy, splintered, suspicious, and punctuated by Egyptian, Syrian and Communist pressures.

On April 13, 1966, President 'Arif was killed in a crashing helicopter, near Basra. He was succeeded by his elder brother, Gen. Abdul Rahman 'Arif, chief of staff of the army, momentarily absent in Moscow. The succession, entirely peaceful, indicated no change in policy or of prime minister.

In the summer of 1966 hopes rose of a cessation, by agreement, of the war against the Kurds, now themselves divided between moderate and extreme leadership. Al-Bazzaz successfully negotiated a ceasefire in June, but Iraqi army bitterness at their own failures, and al-Bazzaz's civilian and nonrevolutionary attitude, kept postponing the conclusion of peace. The premier himself was forced to resign in August. He was succeeded by a former brigadier, Naji Talib, believed to be pro-Egyptian.

The deep divisions of the Iraqi people on the Kurdish issue, on relations with Egypt, on socialism, on religion, on the world's East-West dilemma, persisted. Peace and unity were not in sight.

On May 10, 1967, President 'Arif formed a new cabinet which was to represent the various military, political and religious groupings. Three representatives of the Kurds were included and the extreme anti-Kurdish groups were not represented. President 'Arif said in a declaration that the government would "strive to implement national union, seek to end the transitional period, and re-establish parliamentary life." He also emphasized that the government was determined to fulfill promises made to the Kurds, by implementing decentralization measures and promised reconstruction of the north Kurdish areas destroyed by the fighting. Reconciliation with the Kurds had been negotiated during President 'Arif's visit to the northern provinces, where he received a warm reception and an assurance from the Kurdish leader, the Mullah Mustafa Barzani, that he was not seeking separation. President 'Arif announced his intention of entrusting ministerial posts to leading Kurdish personalities, and declared that the problem of the northern areas was a closed chapter.

In late 1966-67 an economic crisis which could easily become political arose through the refusal of the Syrian government to allow oil pumping through the Iraq Petroleum company's pipelines across Syrian territory, except on suddenly invented, exorbitant terms. Export from Iraq, of necessity, stopped, involving most serious losses to the country's revenues. The political necessity of supporting Arab brothers led President 'Arif to threaten dire consequences to the company.

When war between Egypt and Israel became imminent in May 1967 Iraq pledged support to the Arab cause and sent troops to the Sinai peninsula and Jordan. Iraqi armoured units took up front-line positions on the Israeli border. On June 4 Iraq joined the Egypt-Jordan defense pact at Amman. Iraq threatened to nationalize the western oil companies in its territory, and oil supplies to the west were cut off on June 6 after the outbreak of war. Diplomatic relations were broken off with the U.S., Great Britain and West Germany. In early July, Pres. Nikolai Podgorny of the U.S.S.R. visited Iraq to discuss the middle east situation and the means of "eliminating the consequences of Israel's aggression." Later in the month, President 'Arif and Pres. Houari Boumédiène of Algeria made a return visit to Moscow.

(S. H. Lo.; V. E. Hi.)

IV. ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS

1. Constitution and Government.—Iraq was for long a dependency of the Ottoman empire, though not fully brought into the central system of administration; thus while Turkish rule left a considerable imprint on some aspects of life, others were much less affected, and Iraq was far from being fully assimilated. After World War I and a period of British military government, a constitutional monarchy was set up in 1921, with the Hashemite Faisal I as king. The constitution was revised in 1924, and in 1932 the British mandate ended and Iraq became a fully sovereign state. Dynastic difficulties followed the death of Faisal I in 1933, his nephew Abd-ul-Ilah acting as regent for his young nephew (who became King Faisal II in 1953). This period was characterized by the growing influence of the army in political life, and by the development of a system of government under which, though democratic in theory, the real power lay in the hands of a few high officials, wealthy townsfolk, and tribal and religious leaders. The increasing unpopularity of the government led by the regent and his prime minister, Nuri as-Said, culminated in the military coup of 1958 which brought an end to the monarchy and gave power to the army group backed by Gen. Abdul Karim Kassem (who was in turn overthrown in 1963 by Colonel 'Arif [see *History*, above]). The 1924 constitution was annulled and a provisional constitution proclaimed on July 27, 1958, provided for the establishment of Iraq as an independent, sovereign and Islamic republic. Under the 1924 constitution, provision existed for popularly elected assemblies, with adult male suffrage; but this machinery was not always satisfactorily used under the monarchy or up to the mid-1960s by the "national revolutionary council."

By the 1924 constitution Iraq was divided into *liwa's* (provinces), each administered by a *mutasarrif* (governor). The settled and desert *liwa's* were subdivided into a varying number of *qadhas*

liwa's. (See Table I.) The administration of the country is exercised by the government through the *liwa's*. The *liwa* council has a right to a share of local taxes and may also receive government grants for particular projects.

One long-standing problem has been the position of minority groups. The chief of these, the Kurds, have shown nationalist feeling, aiming at uniting into one territory the peoples of Kurdish culture who are now scattered within Iran, Turkey, Syria and Iraq, and number probably 4,000,000–5,000,000. After the Kurdish revolt in the 1960s (see *History* above) attempts were made by the Iraqi government and Kurdish leaders to solve their dispute by acknowledging the special status of the Kurds.

2. Social Conditions.—A survey in Iraq during 1956 indicated that the average peasant annual income in cash and kind amounted to £14–20 per family. This is about the average within the middle east generally. A number of factors are responsible for this, some of which derive from the physiographical environment, others from purely social conditions. Of the former group, climate, irregular flooding and difficulties with soil fertility are the chief, and there is also a high incidence of disease, affecting humans, plants and animals. Three great afflictions in Iraq are malaria, parasitic infestation and dysentery. It is an unfortunate fact that often, with an increase in irrigation, malaria and parasitic infestation also spread; and there are a few parts of riverine Iraq where 50%–70% of the total population are affected, though the situation is better than in Egypt.

Until the revolution of 1958 oppressive social conditions lowered the living standards of many Iraqis. Heavy rents and taxes absorbed as much as 60–85% of the total produce of an agricultural holding. A survey in southern Iraq by D. Warriner in the late 1950s showed that in many instances a peasant had to pay taxes to the government, rents to the principal landowner, to minor subtenants and to local overseers and dues for irrigation water, leaving him with only 20% of all that he produced. Most land in Iraq was then owned by wealthy townspeople, whose social and economic position was greatly strengthened after World War I. It was often the practice to purchase land with a settled cultivating peasantry as an investment which produced a fixed return on capital without the need of further investment in long-term improvements. With the peasant often suffering from debilitating disease which left him with no energy to initiate improvements, even if he had been permitted to do so, low yields remained characteristic.

Conditions in Iraq, more than in some other middle eastern countries, favoured the wealthier classes who could afford to wait for a return on their money and were not totally dependent for existence upon the next harvest. As a result, Iraq has been characterized by a high degree of social imbalance: great disparity of wealth and poverty; much land held by absentee landlords; and tribal authority transforming itself into economic dominance, while at the same time divesting itself of social responsibility to those from whom its wealth was derived. The 1958 revolution is thus not hard to explain; and one of its principal results was an important program of land reform and redistribution. All land not redistributed in the late 1960s was leased by the peasant from the state for a low rent. Taxation which comprised about 15% of the crop left the peasant in a much stronger financial position. Land was redistributed to the extent of 2,767,000 *mesharas* (1,709,414 ac.) between Sept. 1958 and Sept. 1963.

The growing contrast between an archaic countryside and developing towns has produced in the mid-20th century a second social phenomenon in Iraq: a considerable migration into, and expansion of, the towns. Most of the increased wealth is spent or displayed in the towns, which thus offer a strong attraction to many peasants; the city of Baghdad grew by 50,000 annually during the 1950s and doubled in size, with a population (1967) of more than 1,500,000. The *Iraq Times* stated in 1956 that in some areas more than 80% of the total rural population had migrated to the towns; and many of these live as squatters, in huts made of reeds, mud or flattened gasoline cans, with few or no amenities. This explosive development of town life brings political as well as social problems. The growth of a rootless, under-

TABLE I.—Administrative Divisions and Desert Territories

<i>Liwa's</i>	Area (sq.mi.)	Pop. (1965 census)
Amarah	6,929	346,663
Baghdad	7,692	2,124,323
Basra	6,958	673,623
Diwanayah	32,179	548,830
Diyala	6,078	400,049
Hillah	2,660	448,023
Irbil	5,913	360,285
Karbala	2,768	339,692
Kirkuk	7,545	462,027
Kut	5,720	335,495
Mosul	19,645	954,157
Nasiriyah (formerly Muntafiq)	5,580	500,033
Ramadi (formerly Dulaym)	53,270	319,289
Sulaymaniyah	4,630	408,220
Desert Territories*		
Northern Desert	39,127	...
Southern Desert	29,399	...
Al Jazirah	9,670	...

*The areas of these territories are also included in the areas of the *liwa's* above.

and *nahyals* under *qaimmaquams* and *mudirs* respectively. By 1960 the three desert *liwa's* (then designated as territories) had been distributed administratively among certain of the 14 settled

privileged town proletariat, by no means always employed, adds yet another volatile element to the already perilous social mixture in Iraq.

On the other hand, the growth of an educated middle class may prove a stabilizing factor. In 1947 only 8.5% of the Iraqi population was regarded as literate; but since then education has considerably expanded. The emergence of technically trained persons is not only essential if the wealth of Iraq is to increase, but highly desirable on political grounds. A high birth rate (30–33 per 1,000), and a low death rate (8–12 per 1,000) strikingly reduced during the mid-20th century, means that population is increasing by about 2.5% annually, and thus could double in less than 50 years. With only 20% of potentially cultivable land in use, and a relatively assured income from oil royalties for a number of years, this population surge can be accommodated (one of the few middle eastern territories where this is now the case), but development depends on a favourable political situation.

Of a total working population of approximately 2,000,000, it was estimated that 1,560,000 were farmers or herders (160,000 nomadic); 105,000 in industry (14,000 in the oil fields and refining); 200,000 in commerce; 55,000 in transport; 20,000 in catering trades; and the remainder in professional or government service. Women would seem to provide 25%–30% of the labour force in agriculture, and 15% in industry. Under the monarchy organized labour was virtually nonexistent. The announced policy of the republican government was the encouragement of trade unions, and by the early 1960s the General Federation of Labour Unions claimed 50 affiliated unions and a membership of 250,000. The General Federation of Peasant Societies, founded 1959, claimed more than 730 affiliated societies.

3. Welfare.—Iraqi life has a certain dualism; in some respects ways have changed little since Ottoman days when sharp class distinction, with extreme poverty the lot of the majority, and inefficient, bureaucratic and unsympathetic methods of rule tended to prevail. Since World War II, however, major changes have occurred; 1954 saw the enactment of a comprehensive labour law which sanctioned and encouraged co-operation movements, extended provision for educational and cultural improvements, and laid down minimum wage rates for workers. Trades unions came into existence unofficially about 1924 and became legal in 1944; some have since been dissolved by governmental action and others infiltrated by Communist sympathizers. The law of social security (1956) formulated a plan of national insurance, covering old age, illness, death and unemployment; but its provisions need time to become fully operative.

4. Justice.—At the start of mandatory rule, the existing Ottoman civil and commercial law codes were retained, and the penal code replaced; after 1945 both the civil and commercial laws were in turn altered. There are now three types of court: civil, religious and special; and in addition tribesmen are permitted to accept tribal justice. Trial by jury does not operate in Iraq. The civil courts are organized by *liwa'* into courts of first instance and appeal courts; personal status (marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc.) is dealt with by religious community courts; and the special courts deal with tribal land cases, political offenses, malpractices by officials, and the interpretation of the constitution and its legal implications.

5. Education.—Education developed considerably after 1920. Primary schools, then less than 100, now number about 2,000; and elementary education is in theory free and compulsory, though in fact only a minority of Iraqi children attend school regularly. Female education has progressed with the opening of mixed primary schools, but the over-all proportion of pupils is 4:1 in favour of boys. Most colleges of higher education are now co-educational, and technical institutes have been started since 1947. To co-ordinate the working of the various existing colleges of higher education the University of Baghdad was inaugurated in 1956. There has been much enthusiasm for development, leading to marked advance; but the abstract, didactic and theoretical nature of Iraqi teaching tends on occasion to obscure logical and critical thinking. Preoccupation with politics and a fear of overproduction of graduates have also been adverse factors. Many Iraqi

students are sent abroad to study, mainly in the U.S., U.K. and Lebanon.

6. Defense.—At its creation, the Iraqi state was faced with both internal turbulence and the hostility of its neighbours; hence the creation of a strong Iraqi army (and also later an air force) was one of the earliest developments, and the army has remained a pillar of the state—the symbol of independence and power, closely influencing events, and in turn having the personal interest and support of the ruler. Training and equipment for defense were first provided by Britain, with some U.S. participation from 1954; and later Soviet assistance was obtained. The strength of the Iraqi army in the late 1960s was about 70,000 men comprised mainly in two infantry divisions, two mountain divisions and one armoured division. The air force consisted of 11 squadrons. The navy's ships included 12 torpedo boats, 3 submarine chasers and 4 river gunboats.

V. THE ECONOMY

Iraq is still overwhelmingly an agricultural country. Despite the richness and wide extent of petroleum deposits, the number of Iraqis actually employed by the oil companies is relatively small; and although oil revenues play a highly important part in development, they provide a much smaller percentage of the gross national product than agriculture and stock rearing. Manufacturing, very restricted before 1950, has increased significantly but is still on a small scale. More than 75% of Iraqis still live by agriculture or stock rearing, either directly or by handling the products.

1. Agriculture.—The 15-in. isohyet dividing Iraq into two climatic provinces (rain-watered agriculture and irrigated cultivation) also coincides approximately with the northern limit of the date palm, hence the country really comprises two agricultural regions. In one, the smaller, which takes in Assyria and Kurdistan, barley, wheat and Mediterranean crops (fruit, tobacco, nuts) are staples; in the other, where irrigation is essential, barley, dates and rice are the chief crops. Barley is the main cereal of Iraq, because of its tolerance of aridity and a saline soil, and also because, having a relatively short growing season, it is less likely to be affected by pests, the most widespread of which are the sunn pest, a small insect which appears in late summer and bores into the ear, and the locust, which arrives in swarms usually from Arabia. Yields of barley can be double those of wheat; native strains are not especially productive, but improvements have followed the introduction of foreign varieties. The principal areas of barley growing are the lower Tigris valley round Kut and the Shatt al Gharraf, the middle Euphrates zone from Nasiriyah to Samawah, and the Assyrian plains, especially round Mosul, Irbil and Kirkuk. Rice is grown extensively only in low-lying areas where irrigation is easily available. Under good conditions it produces over four times as much as barley or wheat per unit area planted, and it is thus the main cereal crop of lower Iraq. Specially good areas are the marshes round 'Amarah (Tigris) and two zones on the Euphrates, the Shamiyah area between Najaf and Diwaniyah, and from Nasiriyah as far as the head of Lake Hammar. Rice is also grown in small plots in the mountain valleys of Kurdistan, where it is much more a delicacy. Because of heavy demands on irrigation water the total area devoted annually to rice growing is restricted by law, but since World War II marked expansion has occurred, parallel with the enlargement of irrigation works. Wheat, like barley, is grown as a winter crop and more than 70% of Iraqi production is still from Assyria, where it is grown with or as an alternative to barley. Some production also occurs on the upper Tigris and Euphrates valleys. Two cereals of recent introduction are millet and maize (corn), both of which are summer crops and therefore useful as an element in rotation.

Iraq produces most of the world's export supply of dates. The palms can tolerate extremely dry and sandy conditions, but bear best with a copious supply of water. A hot, long and bright summer is also essential; hence conditions along the lower valley of Iraq are ideal, and the southern Tigris and Euphrates, especially the Shatt al Arab round Basra, are the most productive areas. The ground is dug over annually, and the female palms artificially pollinated in April. Harvesting begins in August, and many

nomads arrive in the region as temporary labour. The finest quality fruit is produced only in moderate quantities; but more prolific palms carry up to 120 lb. of dates annually, of lower quality. Dates form an important, sometimes principal, article of diet (they keep well, provide sugar and do not easily carry human disease), and the stones of the date are used as animal fodder. *Arak* (a spirit) is distilled.

Cotton is grown in increasing quantities, though soil salinity is one distinct handicap, another being liability to attack by weevils and locusts. Quality is not outstandingly high, and levels of production have oscillated, reflecting world conditions, because until the 1950s there was little or no home demand. Now east Asia (Japan and Hong Kong) and Europe provide markets, with exports exceeding £500,000 annually, while a newly established home industry has further stabilized the position. Other crops are tobacco and vines, both for internal use only and largely within the hill country of the northeast. Nut trees are important in a few localities; and market gardening around the larger cities is increasingly important, reflecting rising standards of living and the new demand from such groups as oil-field workers. Experiments have been made with flax, jute, alfalfa, sesame, peanuts, potatoes, yams and clover. There is much individual variety in fruit and vegetable growing, especially in the rain-watered zone, though yields are sometimes less than in irrigated areas.

A number of wild crops are also important. Licorice grows along the banks of the principal rivers as far south as the Shatt al Arab, and the root is dried for export for tobacco curing and as a sweetmeat. Gum tragacanth is an exudation from a bush which occurs in drier steppe regions, and about one-half of world production, used in sauces and pharmaceuticals, comes from Iraq. The valonia oak, native to the higher, damper mountains of the north and east, produces an extract used in tanning.

2. Irrigation.—The problems involved are somewhat complex because of the time of flooding, at the season when many crops are partially grown. Excess water must be retained within the river between high banks. Variation in the level of the river beds means that in some parts free-flow irrigation is possible, while in others pumping is necessary. Stagnant water must be led back to the rivers as rapidly as possible, again by pumping if necessary, in order to avoid salination.

The largest river control project is that of the Wadi ath Tharthar, completed in 1956. A canal 40 mi. long leads from the Tigris at Samarra to the basin of the wadi, which thus accumulates floodwater. The basin holds 63,000,000 cu.m. and the project is also being used for the generation of electricity. A smaller project on the Euphrates employs similar methods; water is led off from the mainstream at Ramadi into two basins, at Habbaniyah and Hawr Abu Dibs. The Habbaniyah basin is definitely saline, so only flood control can be achieved. Other regulator dams are complete or under construction: on the Little Zab at Dokan—a high dam of 380 ft., with extensions at Batma, 'Udhaim and Kirkuk; on the Great Zab at Bekhme; and on the Tigris above Mosul. These and the schemes at Mandali and Jassimiyah are primarily for irrigation, with flood control and electricity generation as subsidiary features.

The earliest modern irrigation work was at Hindiyah (1913, enlarged 1922) which directs the Euphrates water into an older channel running through Hillah; and also on the Euphrates are the Musayyib project (1956) and smaller works at the head of Lake Hammar. At Kut on the Tigris a barrage completed in 1943 and three times the size of the Hindiyah dam will ultimately improve irrigation south and southeast of Kut; but a limiting factor there is the restricted volume of water available in summer. The entire low-season flow of the Diyala river below the Jabal Hamrin is now diverted for irrigation. Other irrigation works on a smaller scale are planned or in construction around Lake Hammar, the Shatt al Arab, Sulaymaniyah, Irbil and Mosul. Between £30,000,000 and £40,000,000 has also been spent on land drainage projects (to counter salination) and on windbreaks to prevent the silting up of irrigation and drainage channels. In all, more than £140,000,000 had been devoted to irrigation and flood control by the mid-1960s, and it was planned to spend as much again.

3. Livestock.—This is proportionately much more significant than in many other countries of the middle east. Because of the extent of mountain, desert and even unirrigable stretches within the riverine lowlands, the boundary between cultivated and grazing land is far less sharp than, say, in Egypt; and alternation of the two kinds of terrain encourages herding in close proximity to cultivation. Within the steppe and mountain zones (Al Jazirah and much of Kurdistan) stock rearing is by far the most important activity: in occasional years exports of animal products can be as valuable as those from agriculture.


Sheep numbered more than 11,000,000 in the late 1960s and were chiefly found in Al Jazirah, and the arid zones south and west of the Euphrates; but south Assyria and the Gharraf areas were also important. There are four breeds: the Arabi, chiefly found in the lowlands; the Karadi (Kurdish), larger and fatter but with coarser wool; the Tartar (fat tailed), the best meat producer; and the Awassi, a cross between the first two. There is usually a well-developed seasonal migration of sheep. During winter and spring they move into the arid areas, where a flush of grass occurs until about May–June; in summer they are brought back into the riverine lands where they are kept either near marshy tracts or on fallow cultivated ground where their manure is valuable. In Kurdistan transhumance is practised.

Goats (1,800,000) occur mainly in the hillier parts of the north and east, and in the drier areas. They furnish milk, meat and hair valuable for tent cloth and for Arab clothes which, when well made, are waterproof. Cattle are kept, mainly in riverine areas, for milk (meat is rarely eaten) and as draft animals for plowing and the operation of irrigation wheels. Camels are still bred in considerable numbers in the deserts; formerly their main use was for transport, but increasingly they are slaughtered for their meat and hides. Camels do not thrive in the swampy lowlands; there water buffalo are numerous, and about 80% of the total in Iraq are found in the four southern *liwa's*. Donkeys are the principal beasts of burden, and mule breeding is important in Kurdistan. As elsewhere in the middle east a few horses are kept, but definitely as an exotic luxury.

There has long been a trade in animals with neighbouring countries. Formerly they were driven westward to market in the Levant using a circuitous route along or close to the Euphrates. But with the advent of through railway connection, and above all, the motor truck, live animals are increasingly transported for sale in Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Wool is exported to Europe mainly for use in carpets; it is of lower quality than Australian wool.

4. Forestry.—In 1955 a forest law was passed. Forest land had been greatly reduced by cutting for fuel and the grazing of animals, and only 2,800 sq.mi. of woodland, much of marginal quality, could be said to exist in Iraq. There had hitherto been little concern for woodland, but various 20- and 50-year plans were then drawn up, with the aims of doubling present forest areas, and of creating tree avenues on certain main roads. The poplar is well established in parts of the northeast, and in drier sandier areas eucalyptus was introduced with some success. A forest police was started, and extension of woodland was given importance as a protection against soil erosion and the silting of irrigation canals, and for the provision of building timber, practically all of which must now be imported.

5. Oil.—Overwhelmingly the most important mineral resource in Iraq is petroleum, which is now exploited in the northeast, north and south of the country. The first field to be developed was at Kirkuk (1927), which lies on a lowland embayment between the Zagros and the Mesopotamian plain. In this area there is a fold structure, the Pusht-i-Kuh, running parallel to the main Zagros, which dies out to northwest and southeast, where two enclaves of lower ground occur, one in Iran which forms the Masjed Soleyman oil field, and the other in Iraq, at Kirkuk. The geological structure is interesting. At Kirkuk the petroleum is held in Eocene-Miocene limestone about 1,000–2,000 ft. thick, termed Main limestone. Above lies an impermeable complex of Miocene shales, salt and anhydrite which acts as a seal, and the whole series is folded into long anticlines and synclines striking northwest-southeast. A spe-



W. B. FISHER AND E. W. PULLIN

PRINCIPAL TOWNS, OIL FIELDS, PIPELINES AND RAILROADS OF IRAQ

cial feature is the continuity of porous rock series into the main Zagros farther east; hence considerable hydrostatic pressure within the rock is induced from rainfall at higher levels, producing in the oil region itself pressures of 2,000–3,000 lb. per square inch—a fortunate circumstance in that there is no need to pump the oil, which rises of itself in immense gushes. At Kirkuk there is an oil-bearing anticline 50–60 mi. long (a huge size for such structures, which are normally measured in yards) and only 38 wells are needed to tap the entire structure (*cf.* 25,000–30,000 wells in Texas). A much smaller field in the southern embayment (at Naft Khaneh, just inside Iraq) produces oil which is refined at Alwand near Khanaqin, and serves only the internal needs of Iraq, with no export. Deposits of petroleum also occur within the riverine lowlands (the bitumen at Hit has been exploited for 2,000–3,000 yr.), and oil fields have been developed at 'Ayn Zalah and Butmah (north of Mosul), and at Zubayr-Rumaylah near Basra. First discovered in 1939 but not productive until 1952, the Mosul field has a relatively small reserve of lower grade oil, held in Cretaceous limestone. The Zubayr field has been developed since 1949 and now ranks second to Kirkuk. Its reservoir rock is of Cretaceous sandstone, like that of adjacent Kuwait, at greater depth and only slightly folded into a very shallow anticline. Other petroleum deposits are known to exist in central Iraq, but these are "heavy" and sulfurous, and under present conditions are uneconomic to exploit.

Because of distance involved (about 4,000 mi. by sea from the mouth of the Shatt al Arab to the eastern Mediterranean) and Suez canal dues (when the canal is open), it is normally cheaper to move oil from Kirkuk by pipeline, whereas oil from the Basra area is shipped by tanker. Two 12-in. pipelines were constructed from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean, running together as far as the cross-

ing of the Euphrates at Al Hadi-thah. The lines then divided, one continuing via Palmyra, Syria, to Tripoli, Lebanon, the other via Ar Rutbah to Haifa, Israel. This latter has been closed by the Iraqi government since the Israel-Arab war of 1947–48. It had been planned to construct a 16-in. pipeline to Tripoli and Haifa, and the Tripoli branch came into operation in 1949; the other remained unfinished. A 30–32-in. pipe was completed to Baniyas, Syria, in 1952, giving a transportation capacity of 14,000,000 tons annually. Because of the vulnerability of pipelines to political and other pressures, it is policy to diversify routes—hence the alternative terminal in Syria; and the possibility of a new pipeline via Turkey has been considered.

The entire oil production of Iraq (with the exception of the Khanaqin field formerly owned by the British Petroleum Oil company but after 1958 operated by the Iraqi government) is controlled by the Iraq Petroleum company (I.P.C.) and its two subsidiaries, the Basrah Petroleum and Mosul Petroleum companies. This group began before World War I as an Anglo-German group, known as the Turkish Petroleum company, but was reconstituted after 1918 and renamed, the shareholders being: B.P.O.C. 23½%, Royal Dutch Shell 23½%, Near East Development com-

pany (Standard Oil of New Jersey and Standard Vacuum of New York) 23½%, Compagnie Française des Petroles 23½% and the foundation of Calouste Sarkis Gulbenkian, the original negotiator of the concession, 5%. Under an oil agreement of 1952, Iraq received 50% of the profits before deduction of foreign taxes and, as from Jan. 1956 the companies guaranteed a minimum annual output of 30,000,000 tons. In 1961 the Iraqi government announced that the concession area of I.P.C. and its associates would be restricted to an area of less than 750 sq.mi., and in 1967 it passed legislation terminating the concessions of the oil companies and allocating them to the Iraq National Oil company (I.N.O.C.). The I.N.O.C. became responsible for developing all the area not actually worked by the I.P.C. and its associates.

Other Mineral Resources.—These comprise (1) a deposit of brown coal at Kifri between Baghdad and Kirkuk, a few thousand tons of which are produced annually; (2) small-scale local deposits of potassium nitrate, gypsum and quartz; (3) rock salt which is exploited in a number of localities under government supervision as subject to taxation. Small deposits of copper, iron, chromium

TABLE II.—Oil Fields of Iraq

Field	Date of development	No. of wells (1967)	Annual production (1962; bbl.)	Cumulative production to 1965 (bbl.)
Naft Khaneh	1923	2*	1,434,820*	—
Kirkuk	1927	56	299,222,992	3,337,000,000
'Ayn Zalah	1939	9	7,429,520	95,000,000
Zubayr	1949	26	25,909,846	387,000,000
Butmah	1952	3	2,033,288	23,000,000
Bai Hassan	1953	13	16,981,954	88,000,000
Rumaylah	1953	28	107,468,920	607,000,000
Jambur	1954	3	4,262,623	34,000,000

*Complete figures for this government-controlled field are not available in detail. The figure for wells is for 1961 and that for annual production is for 1963.

and manganese are known to exist, but there is no large-scale exploitation.

6. Industries.—These are on a small scale. Prior to 1940, there were little more than craft industries producing textiles, building materials (chiefly cement), food products and leather goods, together with a restricted amount of modern machinery. Since about 1940 attention has been given to industrial development, with some state participation in oil refining, asphalt, cement, and tobacco and food processing. Textile production (mainly cotton and rayon with some jute) is the most important activity, with a number of modern factories in Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. By the late 1960s new industries had been developed, including fertilizer plants, a sugar beet factory in the Mosul region and a sugar-cane factory in Amara.

Development.—Much economic improvement has been financed by the state, through a development board established in 1950. Some 75% of oil revenues received by the Iraqi state (these were £100,000,000 to £140,000,000 in the mid- and late 1960s) are allocated to the board, together with further sums from taxation. Economic development plans (5-, 6- or 7-year) have been initiated, some for the improvement of communications (e.g., better road surfacing and the conversion of metre-gauge railways to standard), some to education and some to flood control and irrigation.

7. Trade and Finance.—Domestic trading is of two kinds. Westernized department stores serve an exclusive small group of well-to-do people. However, most Iraqis use the traditional bazaars, retail trade being especially brisk in the holy cities. Peddlers and traveling merchants visit villages and tribal camps.

Foreign trade is dominated by petroleum, which by value accounts for about 85%–90% of all exports, and was at an annual level of about £300,000,000 in the late 1960s. Most oil moves untreated to Europe, with small but increasing amounts to eastern Asia and Africa. Other exports are mainly of agricultural and pastoral products, especially grain and flour (barley and wheat) to neighbouring areas (particularly Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon), with some export to the U.K. for malting purposes. Iraq is the largest world exporter of dates (about 80% of world sales); and there is a significant export of raw cotton, chiefly to Japan, Hong Kong, India and eastern Europe. Wool and hides are sold to Europe, and there is some trade in live animals with Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. Production of oil continues to grow fairly steadily; but in contrast, exports of other products (dates excepted) tend to experience sharp annual fluctuations, reflecting the vagaries of climate within Iraq and changing world prices.

Capital goods (steelwork, machinery and vehicles) are the principal imports, followed by foodstuffs (sugar, tea, etc.) and textiles. By the mid-1960s annual exports (excluding oil) averaged about £16,000,000. Transit traffic (to Turkey, Iran and Arabia) amounted to £1,666,443, and imports to nearly £150,000,000, the balance being covered by petroleum exports and by subventions or loans from abroad chiefly for the armed forces. Main trade links have been with the U.K. (which takes about half of total oil exports and supplies 30% of imports), the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan. Some increase in trade with the U.S.S.R. was suggested after the fall of the monarchy, but, at least at first, was more putative than actual.

The unit of currency is the Iraqi dinar. I.D. 0.86 = £1 sterling; I.D. 1 = U.S. \$2.80. The greatest single item in the revenue of the state is the oil royalties, about 40%–45% of the total. The remainder of the revenue is raised by taxes both direct and indirect. There are several foreign banks operating in Iraq and four government banks.

8. Communications.—Originally the rivers provided most of Iraq's means of communication, but they are greatly declining in importance. The railway system (now operated by the Iraqi State Railways administration) gradually developed: of standard gauge from Baghdad to Mosul and (in 1940) connecting Syria and Turkey; and of metre gauge from Basra to Baghdad, and on to Kirkuk. This was an inconvenient system, and plans were made to extend the standard-gauge line to Basra and the metre-gauge line from Kirkuk via Irbil to Mosul, and to change over to diesel haulage.

Flooding restricted road development for a long time. In 1950

there were only 1,500 mi. of surfaced roads, the rest being of earth and impassable in winter. By the late 1960s about 4,500 mi. of roads and tracks had been developed for motor traffic, which increased greatly. Air-conditioned buses operate to Damascus and most of the pilgrim traffic from Iran is handled by motor coach. There are international airports at Baghdad and Basra, and a state-owned airline operates within Iraq and abroad, with pilgrim flights to Jidda. Air, rail and to some extent road services are integrated by a state board. Radio and television stations in Baghdad are a government monopoly administered by the ministry of guidance.

See also references under "Iraq" in the Index. (W. B. Fr.)

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
IRBID, a town and district of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. The town lies on the northwest corner of a rich corn-growing plain, 40 mi. N. of Amman. The district (formerly 'Ajlun) has an area of 1,500 sq.mi. and includes the subdistricts of 'Ajlun, Irbid, Jarash, Kura, Mafraq and Ramtha. Pop. (1961) town 44,685; (1965) district 311,309. Part of the town covers a mound which represents the Early Bronze Age town of about 2500 B.C. A section of the ancient basalt town wall can be seen. Irbid is an administrative and commercial centre linked by main road with Amman, Syria, and the desert road to Iraq. (G. W. L. H.)

IRBIL, also known as ARBIL, ERBIL or ARBELA, an important foothill town in northeast Iraq, about 48 mi. E.S.E. of Mosul in 36° 15' N. and 44° E.; pop. (1957) 34,751, largely Kurds. The long unbroken history of Irbil, attested by the accumulation of building debris which forms the high citadel mound, is explained by its position as a centre of communications and by the fertility of the countryside, which is for the most part adequately watered and produces good cereal crops. It is the commercial and administrative centre for the *liwa'* (province) of the same name, bounded west by the Tigris, north and south by the Great and Little Zab rivers, and east by the Iranian frontier.


The city was known to the Sumerians in the 3rd millennium B.C. as Urbillum, and later, as Arba'ilu, ranked among the principal cities of Assyria; it housed a famous shrine of Ishtar (q.v.), and Sennacherib (q.v.) dug a canal, partly underground, to supply it with water from the Great Zab. In Achaemenid times it lay on the royal road through Nineveh from Sardis to Susa and Alexander the Great defeated the last Achaemenid, Darius III, on this road about 31 mi. W. of Irbil (see GAUGAMELA, BATTLE OF). Under the Parthians, Arbela became the capital of the petty kingdom of Adiabene, approximately the modern *liwa'* of Irbil; the city apparently retained its religious importance, since many Parthian kings were buried there. In the late Abbasid period it was a considerable town and a fine minaret of this era stands in the plain below the deserted citadel, whose western side is skirted by the older part of the town; more modern buildings extend across the plain. A tarmac road from Mosul to Kirkuk and Baghdad passes through Irbil, whence there is a branch through the Rawanduz gorge to the Iranian frontier. A metre-gauge railway runs from Irbil through Kirkuk to Baghdad. (E. E. D. M. O.)



Typical mountainous country in Kurdistan in northern Iraq



The leaning minaret of an ancient mosque at Mosul in northern Iraq



Part of the Citadel mound in Irbil, an important foothill town and religious centre in northeastern Iraq

VIEWS IN IRAQ




The Al Malwiyah tower (9th century) with a spiral ramp in the northeast corner of the Ziyadah (outer enclosure) of the Great Mosque at Samarra



A view of the Tigris as it flows through Baghdad, the capital of Iraq



Packing dates for export. Iraq supplies most of the world's demand for this fruit



A stabilization unit at Kirkuk oil field, in northeastern Iraq



Thoroughfare in one of the modernized sections in Baghdad which are gradually changing the face of the old city

SCENES IN IRAQ



The port of Fao (Al Faw) on the Persian gulf, terminal of the pipeline from the Zubayr oil fields



A market scene at Sulaymaniyah, a town in Kurdistan in northern Iraq



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

NE 83/548/1

From The Minister of State

4 August, 1969.

DESPATCHED BY
MINISTER OF STATE'S OFFICE

I am grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to have a look at the article on Iraq which is appearing in the 1969 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Like the article in your 1968 edition this is, I think, a fairly balanced description of Iraq. However, I have two comments on points of detail which may be of some interest to you.

The opening paragraph of the article refers to the entire Shatt-al-Arab as being within Iraq. I must point out that under the two most recent frontier treaties (the latest being 1937) Iran was granted anchorages (the frontier in these two instances being along the Thalweg) in front of the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr. Iran has recently restated a claim, which she has made on several previous occasions, that her frontier with Iraq in the Shatt-al-Arab should run along the border with Iraq, and this claim, as on all previous occasions, has been vigorously resisted by Iraq - standing firmly by the provisions of the 1937 Treaty which confirmed that the main line of the frontier, with the exceptions I have mentioned, runs along the Iranian bank of the Shatt.

/I think

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W.C.2.



2.

I think that there is a possibility that some Iraqis might well object to your paragraph (page 538) on development which seems to imply that the present Development Board is the self-same body as flourished in the days of the Monarchy. It is true to say that the present board (now under the guidance of the Ministry of Development) is the natural successor of the organisation set up in 1950 but the Iraqi (republican) view would probably be that the regimes since 1958 have pressed on more vigorously with development and industrialisation than did their predecessors under the monarchy. I do not necessarily share this view myself and am only pointing out a possible Iraqi reaction to this paragraph as it was a similar point which was raised by the Iraqi Minister of Industry and which prompted my letter of 14 January, 1969, to Sir William Haley, a copy of which I sent to you. (7)

Finally, I assume that it is for technical reasons only that there is no mention in the historical section of more recent developments in Iraq - for example there is no reference to the Revolution of July 1968 which brought to power the present Ba'athist Government under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

(G.O. Roberts)

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Draft letter

To: C.H.W. Kent, Esq.,
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From: Mr. Goronwy Roberts

I am grateful for the opportunity that you have given me to have a look at the article on Iraq which is appearing in the 1969 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.

Like the article in your 1968 edition this is, I think, a fairly balanced description of Iraq. However, I have two comments on points of detail which may be of some interest to you.

The opening paragraph of the article refers to the entire Shatt-al-Arab as being within Iraq. I must point out that under the two most recent frontier treaties (the latest being in 1937) Iran was granted anchorages (the frontier in these two instances being along the Thalweg) in front of the Iranian ports of Abadan and Khorramshahr. Iran has recently restated a claim, which she has made on ^{several} ~~many~~ previous occasions, that her frontier with Iraq in the Shatt-al-Arab should run along the Thalweg for as long as the Shatt forms her border with Iraq, and this claim, as on all previous occasions, has been vigorously resisted by Iraq - standing firmly by the provisions of the 1937 Treaty which confirmed that the main line of the frontier, with the exceptions I have mentioned, runs along the Iranian bank of the Shatt.

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I think that there is a possibility that some Iraqis might well object to your paragraph (page 538) on development which seems to imply that the present Development Board is the self-same body as flourished in the days of the Monarchy. It is true to say that the present board (now under the guidance of the Ministry of Development) is the natural successor of the organisation set up in 1950 but the Iraqi (republican) view would probably be that the regimes since 1958 have pressed on more vigorously with development and industrialisation than did their predecessors under the monarchy. I do not necessarily share this view myself and am only pointing out a possible Iraqi reaction to this paragraph as it was a similar point which was raised by the Iraqi Minister of Industry ^{and} which prompted my letter of 14 January 1969 ^{MINISTER'S OFFICE} to Sir William Haley, a copy of which ^{MINISTER} I sent to you.

Finally, I assume that it is for technical reasons only that there is no mention in the historical section of more recent developments in Iraq - for example there is no reference to the Revolution of July 1968 which brought to power the present Ba'athist Government under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAEL**Baghdad 'Al-Jumhuriyah' Attack on UK Gulf Policy****Baghdad home service in Arabic 05.45 GMT 16.12.69**

Text of press review of 'Al-Jumhuriyah' article entitled: "British plots should be countered with sincere efforts to achieve the Federation of Arabian Gulf Emirates":

Press reports indicate that the British Government intends to go back on its pledge to withdraw from its military positions and areas of economic exploitation in the Arabian Gulf in 1971 at the latest. Britain is adopting plans which will render the withdrawal useless.

The obstacles hindering the emergence of the Arabian Gulf Federation represent strong evidence of British activities to delay the establishment of the Federation and to exploit side issues by pitting one Arabian Gulf emirate against another. Their aim is to strengthen agent elements advocating division and to create crises which could be used as pretexts to procrastinate over the withdrawal of British military forces from the area. Such activities have been accompanied by statements by British officials and politicians sowing doubt on the possibility of the scheduled withdrawal.

By fanning disputes which hinder the creation of an Arabian Gulf Federation, the London Government is pursuing a traditional policy it has followed in many countries where popular revolutions and national movements have compelled it to withdraw.

Present conditions in the Arab homeland, however, cannot possibly allow Britain's imperialist policy to continue with such tricks. The Arabian Gulf Emirates' people do not stand alone in their struggle to liberate their territories, waters and skies from all forms of imperialist domination. Their struggle is shared by the masses throughout the Arab world. The Arabian Gulf people's struggle also enjoys the support of the progressive forces of the world, which are united against imperialism and reaction.

Britain's continued attempts to sabotage the Arabian Gulf Federation and to offer substitute plans call for the redoubling of sincere Arab efforts to overcome all obstacles and fabricated difficulties hindering the Federation. This Federation is the first step that should be taken towards true sovereignty, complete liberation and unfettered independence. It is also a defence needed to preserve Arab existence in the Gulf and to protect it from various foreign plots and ambitions.

Saudi Reports on Southern Yemen**Riyad home service in Arabic 18.00 GMT 16.12.69**

Text (except where stated) of reports:

(i) Arrivals from Aden say that dozens of wounded Hadramis who were removed by air to Aden during the recent aggression on Wadi'ah are now suffering from lack of medical treatment and malnutrition. They have asked to be returned to Hadramawt where they expect to receive better medical care. The communist authorities in Aden have packed these wounded into a military clinic at Nasr camp in Aden, while the wounded of the National Front and the sons of (?Jisnabah) are being treated at the Abbud Military Hospital and the Malikah hospital in Khormaksar. The wounded sent a letter of protest to the Army Command in Aden asking for better medical treatment and better food, but the Army Command ignored the letter. They then requested the authorities to return them to Hadramawt to be looked after by their relatives.

(ii) According to reports from South Arabia, a dispute has arisen between the agent Government in Aden and the Al Khalifah tribes in Ataq. The dispute began when the Government sent dozens of communist experts to supervise the building of an air base near the town of Ataq and the building of warehouses and camps for the resettlement of the Army in the town. The tribesmen told the Governor of the Fourth Province that the town would be exposed to danger if the Government insisted on turning Ataq into a military base. They also demanded that foreign elements should be banned from living in the town so as not to corrupt its genuine Arab traditions. The tribesmen threatened armed resistance if the Government did not respond and remove its base and experts to another place. It is reported that the Al Khalifah are holding out in the mountains awaiting the next step by the Aden Government. It is known that the communist experts had recommended that Ataq should be turned into a land and air base because of its position half-way between Hadramawt and Lahaj and since it was easy to move the Army from there to suppress any popular uprising in any part of the South against the communist agent Government in Aden.

(iii) (Excerpt) The National Front has begun to set up military courts in every province to try patriotic anti-communist elements in South Arabia. A known communist, Abdullah al-Khamiri, has been entrusted with the task of selecting members of these courts and defining their task of trying the officers and soldiers and patriotic elements the National Front wishes to liquidate....

Libyan Radio on the Wheelus Base

Bayda home service in Arabic 13.00 GMT 16.12.69

Excerpts from commentary by Abd al-Latif ash-Shuwayrib:

US-Libyan negotiations began yesterday. Thus, we have entered the second stage of liquidating foreign bases and liberating our country from intruders who infiltrated during its dark days. The first stage has been successfully carried out and implementation of the Anglo-Libyan evacuation agreement began on 14th December....

There are general differences between the Anglo-Libyan agreement and the US-Libyan agreement. The consequences of both, however, are the same:

(1) The Anglo-Libyan agreement was concluded when the British were in full control of Libya. The British authorities, who ruled Libya for about 10 years prior to its independence, worked to erect the pillars on which the British would depend in the future and worked to connect Libya to Britain in the post-independence era... But the same conditions were not available for the USA. Therefore, the USA had no justification for imposing its treaty on Libya and establishing a base because the USA did not enter Libya with the allied occupation troops, did not control Libya as the British did, and only took Mallahah airfield as its share of the spoils divided among the allies.

(2) The US base in Libya has become an element in the bitter struggle between the world's two power blocs because the USA is one side to that struggle and is the leader of the Western bloc and because the base is the largest training base outside the USA and a huge warehouse for above and below ground weapons of destruction. In view of all this, the Wheelus base has become one which the socialist bloc classifies as one of the main bases for heavy and guided missiles with all the consequences involved if a confrontation took place between the two power blocs. This means the involvement of Libya in problems it can do without and in a struggle in which Libya has no interest...

Anglo/Iraqi Political Relations; 'The Arab World And Israel'; Encyclopaedia Britannica Entry On Iraq; Death Of Iraqi Student In London. UK policy And Relations With Iraq. 4 Aug. 1969. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 17/883. Newspaper Cutting, Maps And Photo. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107475185/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=03800665&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.